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The unity of intuition: completing the B-Deduction
one must already have the disposition to represent objects as outside of
or inside of our point of view in terms of correlated sensations. The way
in which what is sensed is ordered is distinguishable from what is sensed.
It is not a property of what is sensed in isolation but depends on the
relations between what is sensed: ˜˜That in which sensations alone order
themselves and can be put in a certain form cannot itself be in turn a
sensation™™ ( °/ ).±± The way in which sensations array themselves
is a function in part of those sensations themselves. This suggests the
idea that sensations might have positions relative to each other that
would be su¬cient to induce an order in inner and outer sense. How-
ever, sensations taken on their own lack intentionality, that is, they lack
object-directedness. They are what Kant calls ˜˜subjective representa-
tions™™ that merely express the state of their bearer rather than represen-
ting an object. Since sensations do not represent objects, they do not
represent outer or inner objects. To represent outer or inner objects we
need a representation that does have intentionality, and this representa-
tion will have a content that is derived from sensation, but a form that is
independent of such sensation. Here Kant distinguishes a form accord-
ing to which we represent outer objects, and a form according to which
we represent inner objects. The former is the form of outer sense, the
latter is the form of inner sense.
The notion of outer sense is relatively straightforward, since we
have a good rough-and-ready understanding of what it is for an object
to be experienced as outside of our representations. It is somewhat
more di¬cult to understand just what it means for an object to be
internal to our representations and yet logically distinct from those
representations. Thus, Karl Ameriks distinguishes three di¬erent the-
ories of inner sense: (±) the re¬‚ection, () the independent stream, and
() the act theory.± According to the re¬‚ection theory, inner sense
consists only of re¬‚ection on past acts of consciousness. This theory
seems to draw its support from earlier texts in which Kant did not
distinguish between inner sense and self-conscious re¬‚ection. It has the
di¬culty that it fails to account for how representations are given to us
in the ¬rst place which is one of the avowed tasks of Kant™s conception
of inner sense. According to the independent stream theory, there are
two streams of consciousness, one representing spatial contents, and
the other representing contents that may have no direct reference to
spatial contents. This two-stream theory fails to do justice to the de-
pendence of both spatial items and mental events on the (single) tem-
poral stream of our successive representings. Finally, according to the
 Kant and the demands of self-consciousness
act theory, anything that is a representing, rather than a represented,
belongs to inner sense. The notion of an act suggests a process of
taking that is not wholly appropriate to the way representations are
immediately given to us in inner experience. I want to defend a modi-
¬ed version of the act theory according to which anything belongs to
the form of inner sense in virtue of being something represented by a
representing. Thus, on my interpretation, sensations belong to inner
sense, although they do not have an object that is logically distinct
from the sensing itself. But inner sense also includes the representa-
tions of all other objects insofar as they are potential objects of con-
sciousness.
The identi¬cation of the form of inner sense with time and the form of
outer sense with space raises obvious questions. For one thing, things
outside of us seem to be as much in time as our inner states. And other
creatures have distinctive experiences that are internal to their distinc-
tive points of view, but external to each of our own. It is not an analytic
truth about self-conscious beings in general that they must experience
things temporally or spatially. Di¬erent temporal series of representings
corresponding to di¬erent spatial standpoints do, however, distinguish
di¬erent self-conscious beings for us. These di¬erent series are orderable
in relation to each other in time and space, giving di¬erent empirical
meanings to the notion of the inner and the outer. Now, in order for one
to have a way of thinking of a certain set of representations as belonging
to a certain point of view, there must be some further way of character-
izing the relation of that point of view to another point of view. This
function is performed by linking time as the form of inner sense to space
as the form of outer sense.
Without an outer sense there would be no inner sense. Due to the
diaphanous character of consciousness and its self, the feature that Kant
refers to as the emptiness of consciousness, there would not be anything
to be represented by an experiencer. If the self as a determinate self is
essentially associated with a temporal point of view undergoing a suc-
cessive shift, then that which is outside of the self must be thought of as
not essentially temporal. We can make sense of the notion of a givenness
to us that is not essentially temporal through the notion of spatiality.
Space provides us with a way of organizing those items that we experi-
ence as outside of us in a system of di¬erences common to di¬erent
points of view. Time distinguishes di¬erent experiences that belong to
the same individual, and thus also provides a way of attributing di¬erent
mutually exclusive states to the same individual regardless of whether

The unity of intuition: completing the B-Deduction
those states are themselves experiences or not. We then bring space and
time together when we think of di¬erent individuals, each of which is
outside of the other, as being in a sequence of di¬erent states.
Kant takes the plausible position that the inner experience which is
essential to a distinctive notion of mineness does not have a content
which is uniquely inner (section ,  ±µ; section ,  ·). The content of
our representations of our inner states, inner experience, is derived from
outer experience. This thesis is intimately connected to his argument
against psychological idealism. In his Refutation of Idealism ( ·¬.),
he argues that I could not have determinate mental states if there were
no physical objects (no objects existing outside of my mind). The upshot
of this is that there is no self as a particular empirically knowable
individual that can exist independently of a certain body. The necessary
relationship between determinate mental states and embodiment avoids
the bare substratum view of the self that has sometimes been ascribed to
Kant. By committing Kant to a form of externalism concerning the
content of representations, the dependence of mental content on em-
bodied experience also provides the self with a determinate point of view
from within experience.± It is, however, true that the self is never itself
directly present as an object of empirical inquiry. This is because the self
is essentially the point of view from which any inquiry can take place.
The self can thus be characterized as an object of knowledge only by
objectifying the set of empirical representations that distinguish one
point of view in the totality of all experience from another point of view.
It is possible to derive a kind of no-ownership theory of the self from this
view, as Allison does. But such a view fails to do justice to the fact that we
are able to think of ourselves as a distinct individual, with a distinctive
point of view, by identifying the point of view of the self in general with
the history of a particular body. It is this body and its states that are then
the appropriate objects of self-knowledge. They have the kind of accessi-
bility to intersubjective scrutiny that Kant demands for bona ¬de
judgments and cognitions. Once we have such self-knowledge or knowl-
edge of others, then the spatio-temporal location and hence standpoint
dependence of my self-consciousness accounts for the discrepancy be-
tween the merely subjective validity of what is given to self-conscious-
ness empirically and the intersubjectivity possible on the basis of an
impersonal self-consciousness. We can thus allow a place for subjective
experience in our account of subjectivity without giving up on the claim
that objective experience is a condition for the very intelligibility of
subjective experience.
±°° Kant and the demands of self-consciousness
In section  Kant makes it clear that all non-empirical concepts have
content only in respect to appearances which are given to us through
our inner sense and outer sense, that is through our experience of
objects in time and space. He speci¬cally argues that self-knowledge
requires a ¬gural synthesis of transcendental imagination. The import-
ant thing about this synthesis of the sensible contents of experience is
that it is contrasted with the kind of ˜˜intellectual synthesis™™ involved in
applying categories to objects of an intuition in general. While it takes
places ˜˜in accordance with the categories,™™ and depends on the ˜˜orig-
inal synthetic unity of apperception,™™ it is independent of the actual
application of the categories in the forming of judgments ( ±µ±).
What Kant is concerned with here is a perceptual synthesis that is
independent of actual perceptual judgment, but guided through its cogni-
tive signi¬cance for us by the possibility of judgment. ˜˜Figural synthesis™™
or synthesis speciosa ( ±µ±) is the construction of shapes and sizes in
productive imagination. There is a double potential for paradox about
the idea of ¬gural synthesis. First, it is surprising to ¬nd our conscious-
ness of our inner states and even self-knowledge linked to the construc-
tion of shapes, and, second, it is odder still to connect self-knowledge
with a priori construction of shapes. Kant™s motivation for these two
claims has to do with his need to make a place for subjective experience
in the kind of objective experience that we can have with respect to
spatial objects.
The identi¬cation of the process through which we conceptualize
perceptual information with the tracing of a priori structures in space
points up the way empirical perceptions of particular shapes in space
depend on a priori constraints on how spaces may be connected. This is
relevant to self-knowledge because of the way in which our beliefs
depend for their content on what we perceive outside of ourselves.
Figural synthesis is involved even in our beliefs about our inner states,
since Kant wishes to argue that all our beliefs are ultimately about
external objects in space. Even the truths of logic and mathematics are
truths only because they tell us about possibilities that constrain the
existence of things in space. If, as Kant claims, the content of even our
beliefs about our own inner states is parasitic on objects outside of us in
space that are intersubjectively accessible, and if, as he also claims, our
very ability to order those inner states in a determinate way is parasitic
on the existence of a determinate order in objects that exist outside of us
in space, then even objects that we represent in a subjective fashion will
turn out to be available in objective terms. We will be able to have
±°±
The unity of intuition: completing the B-Deduction
knowledge of our own inner states, albeit not under the description
under which they immediately present themselves to our minds.
A subject of experience can only become a determinate object of
knowledge insofar as it is able to grasp itself as something that is
characterizable by more than the bare idea of having a temporal
perspective. In order to provide an adequate characterization of oneself
as an object of knowledge, one must also be able to characterize this
temporal perspective from outside of it. One must grasp it as a stand-
point within a certain system of standpoints. Thus, the only way we have
of locating ourselves in time is parasitic on our ability to locate ourselves
spatially. Space provides us with the only conception we have of the way
in which individuals exist outside of each other. Our knowledge of the
duration and temporal position of introspective objects depends on our
knowledge of the changes in external objects (section ,  ±µ). Indeed,
Kant wants to argue that the very successiveness of inner episodes is
based on our ability to connect di¬erent spaces together:
Motion, as an act of the subject (not as a determination of an object), hence the
synthesis of the manifold in time, when we abstract from it [space], and merely
pay attention to the act through which we determine inner sense according to
its form, actually generates the concept of succession. ( ±µµ)

Kant interprets the idea that self-knowledge is based on ¬gural
synthesis by means of the claim that self-a¬ection is parasitic on outer
a¬ection. Self-a¬ection is the way in which we a¬ect ourselves when we
have an experience of our inner states. Self-a¬ection may also be
described as the process of connecting the nows of consecutive aware-
ness in a second-order consciousness of one™s identity through those
successive states ( ±µµ). There is an obvious disanalogy between the
outer a¬ection that supplies us with information about external objects
and self-a¬ection.± Inner or self-a¬ection is the way in which we
connect bits of information that are already part of consciousness (inner
sense). Self-a¬ection allows us to interpret who we are as well as what
the objects are that exist outside of us. By contrast, outer a¬ection is
supposed to be the source of information about as yet uninterpreted
(undetermined) appearances ( ±“°/ “), and self-a¬ection is
about the interpreting (determining) of these appearances. The analogy
between inner and outer a¬ection seems to depend on an equivocation
in the notion of determination. Outer a¬ection determines the content
of our beliefs by providing us with speci¬c information, while inner
a¬ection determines the content of our beliefs by interpreting that
±° Kant and the demands of self-consciousness
information in a speci¬c way. The problem is less serious than it seems
to be. Kant does not claim that we are to understand self-a¬ection on
the model of outer a¬ection. These are, in fact, simply two di¬erent
ways in which we are determined. There is indeed a connection be-
tween self-a¬ection and outer a¬ection. But this connection is based on
the thesis that self-interpretation depends on the interpretation of what
is outside of us. The interpretation of objects outside of us does depend
on information about objects inside of us, as well, but the argument here
is based on the relation between self-interpretation and interpretation of
what is outside of us. Working from the assumption that outer a¬ection
is being a¬ected by external objects that are mere appearances, Kant
attempts to show that self-a¬ection must concern objects merely as they
appear to us to be. The content of what we experience when we have
determinate representations of our inner states is based on our represen-
tations of what exists outside of us, and what exists outside of us is itself
represented by us only as it must appear to us to be. From this he
concludes that we have self-knowledge only of the way in which we must
appear to ourselves. We do not have knowledge of how we really are.
To meet the worry about incoherence posed by his idealist interpreta-
tion of self-knowledge, in section µ Kant attempts to establish a sense in
which one can be conscious of oneself without knowing who one is. If I
am conscious of myself then it is pragmatically necessary that I exist,
whoever I might be. This existence is not restricted to how I appear to
myself or to anyone. In thinking about myself I am thinking about
someone and hence referring to a particular individual. However, I do
not know who that individual is unless I know some further self-locating
facts about myself. In self-consciousness I am conscious of someone who
is a basic rather than a dependent particular, since I am conscious of
whoever it is who is the bearer of that self-consciousness. Thus, in
self-consciousness I am conscious of myself as a thing in itself in the
transcendental sense, although any description I have of myself will
apply only to the way I must appear to myself spatially and temporally.

  °©  ©µ °  ¬ 
It is now time to see how one can meet the objection raised by Pistorius
by looking at a contemporary version of it articulated by Robert Howell.
Howell argues that Kant gets trapped between the necessity claims he
wants to make based on de dicto properties of self-consciousness and the
need for self-knowledge to anchor those claims. One must be in a
±°
The unity of intuition: completing the B-Deduction
position to be conscious that this representation is a representation of
(belonging to) the entity that one in fact is. According to Howell, Kant is
then seduced into making con¬‚icting demands on self-consciousness not
only by the deceptive surface grammar of his claims, but because he
runs together ˜˜the traditional theory of self-awareness™™ with a revision-
ary theory of knowledge.±µ Kant™s theory of knowledge commits him to
restricting knowledge in general, and self-knowledge in particular, to
appearances. A conception of knowledge which is restricted to ap-
pearances will not support the traditional conception of self-knowledge
and self-awareness. It will not support knowledge of the subject de re.±
On the other hand, such de re knowledge is needed, if self-ascriptions to
particular selves are to have any purchase a priori. We need to know
that we do in fact have knowledge, but ˜˜if we are to know ourselves
really to have knowledge, then that entity “ our self “ to which all
appearances appear must be known to be real.™™±· But, according to
Howell, we can only know this by violating the strictures on knowledge
associated with Kant™s claim that we can know only appearances.
Howell™s worry is not compelling. For the bearer of representations
that we know to have knowledge need not be known by us under the
description under which it is the ultimate bearer of thought. We may
know that the bearer of self-reference is real insofar as self-reference
could not take place without something which is real. This does not
imply that we have any knowledge of the speci¬c character of that
bearer. It does imply, according to Howell, that ˜˜one veridically grasps
the fact that the self in itself really exists.™™± This conclusion is, however,
premature. While it is true that there must be some bearer for one™s
representations, it simply does not follow that this bearer must be
characterized in itself as a self.

 ¬ ¦- « ®  ·¬ ¤ §   ® ¤    µ   “         
Kant treats self-knowledge on the model of a subject that represents
itself as an object: ˜˜I as intelligence and thinking subject know myself as
thought object™™ (section ,  ±µµ). This has suggested to many inter-
preters that empirical self-consciousness or even transcendental self-
consciousness is to be understood on the subject“object model, or the
re¬‚ection theory as it is generally called.± According to the re¬‚ection
theory, self-consciousness is capable of a reductive analysis into a two-
termed relation between the subject of consciousness and the object of
consciousness. It should be noted that Kant does not seem to use the
±° Kant and the demands of self-consciousness
term re¬‚ection to characterize the activity of self-consciousness in the
way described by the re¬‚ection theory.° According to the section on the
Amphiboly of Concepts of Re¬‚ection, re¬‚ection ˜˜is the consciousness of
the relationship of our di¬erent sources of cognition through which
alone their relationship to one another can be correctly determined™™ (
±/ ±). Re¬‚ection thus refers to the capacity to distinguish and
properly connect the contributions of the di¬erent faculties of represen-
tation. In order for one to be able to evaluate the contributions of the
various faculties of cognition, one must be able to see them as contribu-
tions to cognition that one makes as the subject of cognition. But there is
no obvious reason that re¬‚ection of this kind has to be construed as an
identi¬cation of a subject of consciousness with an object of conscious-
ness.
Those who have interpreted Kant as a defender of the subject“object
model and re¬‚ection theory of self-consciousness have come to the
conclusion that Kant™s conception of either empirical or transcendental
self-consciousness is incoherent. While I shall argue that Kant did not
hold a subject“object or re¬‚ection theory of self-consciousness, I do
think that he held a re¬‚ection theory of self-knowledge. The re¬‚ection
theory of self-knowledge is defensible so long as it is based on a non-
reductive theory of self-consciousness. The subject“object schema ap-
plies to self-knowledge because self-knowledge is constrained by criteria
governing the recognition of oneself as an individual person distinct
from other persons. The criteria for identifying and reidentifying per-
sons are parasitic on the criteria for identifying and reidentifying ma-
terial bodies, since the only way we have of identifying and reidentifying
di¬erent times is in relation to material objects that occupy spaces.
However, since self-knowledge requires self-identi¬cation, the object to
be identi¬ed under a certain description must not only be identi¬ed in
spatio-temporal terms but also be thought of as oneself. It is here that the
subject-model needs supplementation if it is to provide a coherent
account of self-knowledge.
If we try to extend the subject“object model to self-consciousness we
get the following paradox. The self must be able to identify itself (subject
= object) in order to be conscious of itself, but in order to identify itself it
must already have some form of knowledge of itself as a thinking subject
and object of that thinking subject™s thought. Self-knowledge involves
knowledge of the identity of the knower qua subject of self-consciousness
and the known qua object of self-consciousness (and subject of the
conscious state of which one is conscious in self-consciousness). But this
±°µ
The unity of intuition: completing the B-Deduction
knowledge of the identity of knower and the known actually presup-
poses an immediate re¬‚exive awareness of self. The subject“object
re¬‚ection theory already tacitly presupposes the self-conscious aware-
ness it attempts to explain. This is a fatal ¬‚aw if the subject“object theory
of self-knowledge is extended to include self-consciousness, or thought
to be a stand-alone theory.
The subject cannot be thought of as its own object without already
having some direct access to itself. Kant has two bases for such direct
access. As thinkers, we have an immediate representation of an imperso-
nal self, and, as sentient creatures, we have an immediate spatio-
temporal representation of ourselves. Kant sometimes seems to suggest
that there is no empirical subject or self at all. But he also carefully
distinguishes the I which thinks from the I or self-consciousness which
intuits itself (and therefore has data concerning) itself (section ,  ±µµ).
The empirical aspect of the self does not reduce the self to a mere object
of re¬‚ection. In fact, being an object of such re¬‚ection, the possibility of
self-knowledge depends on the ability to refer to oneself as having a
distinctive point of view. Empirical apperception must express a par-
ticular point of view with respect to experience from within experience
without necessarily involving re¬‚ection on oneself as an object of knowl-
edge. This is the force of the remark concerning self-intuition. Such
self-presentation from a particular point of view within experience is
what makes my representations mine, as opposed to yours. In this way,
Kant can explain how one can represent oneself as object. The directly
self-referential aspect of self-consciousness needs to be extended to
include a self-descriptive aspect. Self-description requires experience.
Although self-reference is possible without self-description, no self-
description is possible without self-reference. This descriptive aspect
distinguishing empirical self-consciousness is expressed in the Kantian
doctrine of self-intuition and self-a¬ection.
There are strong reasons to resist interpreting the direct access of the
self as representer to the self as represented on the subject“object model.
On the other hand, self-consciousness appears to presuppose a certain
amount of self-knowledge. The knowledge that I (who am the subject of
self-consciousness) am the subject of the consciousness I am ascribing to
myself is presupposed in self-consciousness. Such self-knowledge might
seem to preclude a sharp distinction between self-consciousness and
self-knowledge. A question arises as to how the self can know or be
conscious of itself, without already being conscious of the fact that it is of
itself that it is conscious. Indeed, we must already think of our experien-
±° Kant and the demands of self-consciousness
ces as re¬‚exively self-referential in order to make sense of the possibility
of self-consciousness with respect to them. Re¬‚exive self-referring to x
involves not only the use of a term that actually refers to x, but reference
to the referee doing the referring as internal to the act of referring.±
Ascription by me of representations to my own particular conscious-
ness must conform to the conditions under which access to any self-
consciousness is possible. But, in self-ascription to my consciousness,
reference to the fact that I am thinking the proposition in question is an
essential part of the statement. In such self-ascription of states, I claim
that this is the way representations are connected in my consciousness,
as opposed to someone else™s consciousness. As Kant sees it, intersubjec-
tivity and objectivity are attained when such self-reference is no longer
relevant to the empirical truth of a statement. Then we have what he
would call a judgment (or, more perspicuously, a judgment of experi-
ence). Looking at things in this way helps to resolve the paradoxical
status of self-knowledge in the B-Deduction. Statements expressing
one™s own propositional attitudes cannot be instances of self-knowledge
for Kant, because they involve an essential reference to the context in
which they are formulated. It is, however, possible to form judgments
concerning the having of such propositional attitudes. Such thoughts
are judgments because there is no essential reference to the point of view
of the empirical consciousness in which the thoughts in question occur.
We must therefore distinguish three di¬erent things: (±) consciousness
of myself as the potential subject of any of a potential in¬nity of di¬erent
representational contents, () empirical consciousness of inner states in
which I associate one representation of mine with another, and ()
knowledge of myself as a particular empirical individual (based on
evidence accessible to a third-person point of view). In pure appercep-
tion or consciousness of the self a priori, representations are ascribed to
the self as subject of thought. Here I represent myself as the formal
subject of thought. I can, however, enrich this formal notion of subject
through introspection and more indirect empirical evidence (included
in the general term ˜˜self-intuition™™). This empirical self-consciousness
di¬ers from self-knowledge. The self is something of which one can and
must have consciousness as a subject, i.e. from the ¬rst-person point of
view. However, the self can only be experienced as an object, something
which has been objecti¬ed, something which has become an object for
consciousness. As an object, the representations of the self are, in

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