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principle, accessible to other points of view. Such experience of the self
as an object of knowledge is based on consciousness of the self as subject
±°·
The unity of intuition: completing the B-Deduction
of representation, since the self is only available through the possibility
of a point of view.


  ¬¦ - ®  ©µ ®   ®¤   µ ®© ¦ °    ®¤ ©  
After distinguishing self-knowledge from self-consciousness in section
µ, Kant attempts in section  to establish that even perception must be
subject to the a priori principles governing uni¬cation of representations
in one self-consciousness and hence to the objective standards set by
judgment. In this way, he bridges the gap between his thesis that
perceptual statements are not judgments if they involve an essential
reference to the person having them, and his thesis that self-knowledge
is only possible through non-perspectival statements about inner states.
The key to defending this position is the thesis that all mental states are
also temporal states of human beings and thus have a position in a
shared public time.
According to the received view, the conclusion of the B-Deduction
comes through an appeal to the unity of space and time as a priori facts
of which we have phenomenological evidence through our everyday
experience. The implication of this view is that Kant has no real defense
for the assumption that space and time must be unitary. According to
Allison, the ¬rst step shows ˜˜merely that insofar as unity is introduced
into the manifold of intuition by the understanding, that is, insofar as it
is represented as a manifold, it must conform to the conditions of the
unity of consciousness and, therefore, to the categories. This result
leaves completely unsettled the question of whether data given in
accordance with the forms of sensibility are capable of being uni¬ed in a
single consciousness according to the categories.™™ Thus, the very unity
of self-consciousness would be in jeopardy, if space and time were not
uni¬able in this way. On Allison™s interpretation, the unity of space and
time qua intuitions is somehow independent of the synthesis through
which space and time are said, in the footnote to section  to be given
in the ¬rst place. There is some question as to why the uni¬ability of
intuitions should be an issue at all. Allison does not deny that the
Aesthetic already treats space and time as uni¬able.

But as I argued in Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, we cannot infer the unity of time
(or space) from the unity of consciousness because there is no logical contradic-
tion in the thought of appearances being given in di¬erent times (or spaces).
Consequently, we cannot argue directly from the unity of apperception to the
±° Kant and the demands of self-consciousness
applicability to appearances of the relational (or, indeed, any) categories. We
can, however, reverse the process and argue from the unity of time to the
necessary conditions of the consciousness of this unity. I take this to be the
crucial move in the second part of the Deduction.


Allison™s point must be that objects can be given in the di¬erent
spaces and times of di¬erent experiences. This claim is still ambiguous.
Given the fact that the unity of spatial and temporal intuition, as Kant
understands it, covers the unity of space and time as privately experi-
enced, as publicly experienced, and as physically real, Allison might take
the unity of consciousness to allow for the possibility of di¬erent discon-
nected private, public, or even physical times or spaces. But, given
Allison™s thesis that the unity of consciousness as developed in the ¬rst
step of the B-Deduction is consistent with the existence of objects
existing in di¬erent spaces and times, he must be claiming that a
plurality of either public or private spaces and times is consistent with
the unity of consciousness in either its subjective or objective form.
Contra Allison, it seems to me to be crucial to distinguish the weak
unity of empirical and subjective consciousness from the strong unity of
the consciousness in general that makes such subjective consciousness
possible for Kant. Allison appears to be right that, taken in isolation, the
subjective unity of consciousness is consistent with the disunity of time
or space. However, against Allison, I have argued that the subjective
unity of consciousness is itself parasitic on what Kant calls the objective
unity of consciousness. Thus, if the objective unity of consciousness is
inconsistent with the existence of multiple disconnected phenomenal
times and spaces, then so is the subjective unity of consciousness. Of
course, Allison implies that even the objective unity of consciousness is
consistent with the existence of multiple disconnected times and spaces.
To be sure, Allison does not wish to claim that there are, in fact, multiple
disconnected times and spaces. Instead, he argues that such times and
spaces are ruled out by the unity of our intuition of space and time.
The implication of Allison™s interpretation is that the unity of space
and time a priori is a brute given, or fact about the phenomenology of
our experience that we discover through direct intuition. The unity of
space and time gives our experience and self-consciousness their unity,
and the task of the understanding is merely to represent to itself that
unity. Allison is clearly right that we do experience space and time at
least as if they were each of them necessarily connected in an experien-
tial whole. However, the unity of space and time is, at best, a phenom-
±°
The unity of intuition: completing the B-Deduction
enological fact that needs explanation and defense. The problem with
the Allisonian interpretation is that it o¬ers no prospects for providing
such a defense and thus makes Kant™s claims for the unity and objectiv-
ity of experience ultimately depend on a seemingly ad hoc assumption
that space and time are inherently unitary.
Henrich™s interpretation seems to me to be closer to the mark here.
He argues that Kant is able to include all representations within the
scope of the apperception principle by appeal to the Aesthetic, since
intuition contains all representations in it and now turns out to have
unity due to the synthesis of the understanding.µ Henrich seems to me
to be right to emphasize the manner in which even the unity of intuition
depends for its existence on a synthesis that Kant ascribes to the
spontaneous powers of the mind. Given his thesis that the self-ascriba-
bility thesis needs to be supported by an appeal to intuition, Henrich
needs to argue that this is a new premise. In fact, it is a mere application
of the argument in the ¬rst step of the proof.
By section ±·, Kant already takes himself to have established that
space and time are unitary because they consist for us of representations
that are cognitively signi¬cant for us. These representations are cogni-
tively signi¬cant because they are my representations that are thus
potential candidates for self-consciousness and objective judgment.The
footnote to section ±· tells the reader that the synthetic unity of con-
sciousness is contained in intuitions as singular representations. The
unity of consciousness is characterized as original, thus clearly linking it
with pure apperception. The claim that unity of our intuitions of space
and time is parasitic on the unity of self-consciousness is made explicit in
the summary of the argument in section ±· provided by section ° (
±):
The manifold given in a sensible intuition belongs necessarily under the
original synthetic unity of apperception because [Henrich reads ˜˜weil™™ here as
˜˜insofar as™™] through this unity the unity of intuition is alone possible (section
±·). ( ±)

Here, Kant claims that the unity of intuition is only possible through the
connectability of intuitions in one self-consciousness. This is a stronger
claim than that the unity of intuition (i.e. space and time) is represented
as such only through self-consciousness. It is the claim that unity of
space and time is constituted by self-consciousness. The reference to
section ±· takes up his claim, at section ±·,  ±n, that space and time as
individual representeds have a distinctive synthetic unity of conscious-
±±° Kant and the demands of self-consciousness
ness (where it must be insisted that all such connectedness derives from
an activity of the self ).
In section , Kant appeals to the assumption of the Aesthetic that we
have a priori knowledge of space and time as a whole in order to justify
the claim that all of our perceptions must be empirically connected in a
manner that is compatible with the a priori laws imposed on representa-
tional content by the self (section ,  ±°). These a priori laws are
themselves the laws that make it possible for us to make objective
judgments about spatio-temporal episodes. It is important to note that
Kant insists that the unity of connection involved in space and time ˜˜can
be no other than that of the connection of a manifold of intuition of a
given intuition in general in an original consciousness, according to the
categories, only applied to our sensible intuition™™ ( ±±). There can be little
doubt that this original consciousness is, in fact, the synthetic unity of
impersonal self-consciousness. Thus the unity of space and time is
supposed to be the mere speci¬cation of a relation which holds between
self-consciousness and any intuition to our (spatio-temporal) intuition.
Synthesis is always an activity of the self, and never simply received by
us from objects, as Kant emphasizes at the very beginning of the
Deduction in section ±µ ( ±°). In section ±µ, Kant also notes that the
unity of synthesis is something that precedes all concepts and judgments
( ±±). In section ± it then becomes apparent that the unity that is
higher than all concepts and judgments is the unity of self-consciousness.
But now, in section ,  ±°n, the unity of space and time is supposed to
be a result of synthesis by the understanding preceding all use of
concepts, but displaying itself in perception. How are we to understand
Kant™s claim in section  that the very givenness of space and time as
representeds depends on an activity of synthesis? How can space and
time, which are supposed to be in¬nite wholes existing prior to their
parts, be given through a process of synthesis? The notion of space and
time as in¬nite given wholes suggests a notion of totality that Kant
maintains must escape progressive synthesis by a ¬nite intellect.
Kant can only avoid contradiction by construing the synthesis of
space and time through which space and time are given as in¬nite
wholes as an ongoing process of uni¬cation that never actually comes to
an end. In e¬ect, we must construe the unity of space and time as ideas
of reason, rather than concepts of the understanding. The synthesis in
question must be the pre-conceptual and hence pre-categorial synthesis
of imagination and perception as opposed to the intellectual synthesis of
judgment.· In introducing the distinction between imaginative (percep-
±±±
The unity of intuition: completing the B-Deduction
tual) and intellectual synthesis in section , Kant links the perceptual
synthesis of imagination to the ˜˜original synthetic unity of appercep-
tion™™ (section ,  ±µ±). What this means is that imagination must be
guided in its synthesis of perceptual information by the possibility of
uni¬cation of those perceptions in an impersonal self-consciousness. In
this way, it becomes possible for us to conceptualize what we perceive.
At least part of the unity that Kant ascribes to space and time can be
derived from re¬‚ection on what it is to have any consciousness of space
and time as space and time and thus to be able to distinguish space and
time from what is in space and time. The capacity to distinguish the
structure of space and time from objects that occupy spatio-temporal
positions is lacking in subhuman animals. They lack such ability because
they lack the capacity for forming bona ¬de concepts. This capacity is
linked to the possession of dispositional self-consciousness. Self-con-
sciousness allows one to abstract from the current context so that one
can explore alternative possibilities. This ability to conceive of space and
time as abstract structures according to which data may be organized,
may be characteristic of all self-conscious beings. But, even if all ¬nite
self-conscious beings were to represent the world spatio-temporally,
further argument would still be required in order to justify the strong
notion of spatio-temporal unity that Kant assumes. The capacity to
order data spatio-temporally would seem to allow for a plurality of
spatio-temporal orders of things. It does not seem to give the uniqueness
of spatio-temporal order that Kant wants.
The apparent unity of space and time derives from the fact that we
think of di¬erent spaces and times as being connectible in a single
comprehensive point of view. This single comprehensive point of view is
just the impersonal unity of self-consciousness. We need to distinguish
two di¬erent aspects to the unity of space and time corresponding to the
unity of experiences in transcendental and empirical self-consciousness.
In empirical self-consciousness, experiences belong together in my or
your individual mind. Di¬erent individual minds assign di¬erent spatio-
temporal relations to di¬erent experiences. However, these di¬erent
spatio-temporal con¬gurations of experiences are themselves re¬‚ections
of the di¬erent standpoints that di¬erent individuals can assign to each
other within a shared space and time. This shared space and time is
intelligible to di¬erent individuals because they can represent them-
selves as experiencing things in di¬erent ways systematically corre-
sponding to these di¬erent alternative possible spatio-temporal posi-
tions. In doing so, they are forced to abstract from the particular context
±± Kant and the demands of self-consciousness
in which they actually ¬nd themselves and in which they happen to be
experiencing what they are experiencing.
Based on considerations such as these, Kant seems to assume that
there can be only one space and time. But it has been suggested that
experience might, in fact, lead one to believe in multiple space-, or
time-systems. Random occurrences which seemed to violate the unity
of space or time could always be explained away by auxiliary hypotheses
which would not require the extreme measure of giving up on the unity
of space or time. Kant would, in fact, argue that the occurrence of such
events could only be con¬rmed or discon¬rmed against the background
of objects characterized by spatio-temporal continuity. If there were
systematic appearances and disappearances of particulars at regular
intervals, one might, however, be tempted to defend multiple spaces or
times. Systematic appearances and disappearances of certain particulars
could be accounted for by a reformulation of natural laws. Could there,
then, ever be evidence which would lead us to opt for giving up the unity
of space and time instead of reformulating the laws in terms of which we
connect spatio-temporal particulars?
It seems that this is at least a real possibility. The thesis of spatio-
temporal unity seems to rule out singularities in space and time of the
kind postulated by contemporary theories of cosmology. Black hole
physics postulates the existence of quantum tunnelling e¬ects that
provide a form of indirect coupling between disconnected spaces which
gives empirical signi¬cance to disconnected spaces.° Such develop-
ments need not completely dismay the Kantian, since there may well be
a way of accommodating such singularities in a continuous space and
time.± But it is more plausible simply to concede that neither Kant™s
notion of a unity of intuition, nor his notion of the necessary unity of
self-consciousness require that space and time be unique (quasi) individ-
uals unless we accept his claim that space and time cannot be features or
relations of things as they exist in themselves. To concede that claim is,
however, to concede that we cannot legislate to nature except in a
limited sense. We can show that all objects in space and time of which
we can become conscious must belong to a unitary space and time, but
we cannot show that the notion of a non-unitary physical space or time
is inherently incoherent.
° 

Time-consciousness in the Analogies




So far, we have seen that an impersonal consciousness of self can be
regarded as a necessary condition for experience in as much as an
impersonal perspective is built into our ability to interpret the world in
terms of concepts. And, in a very general way, Kant has connected the
possibility of such impersonal self-consciousness with the existence of
categories. The task of this chapter is to explain how the categories can
serve as enabling conditions of experience. Carrying out this task in-
volves an explanation of the link between self-consciousness and the
kind of time-consciousness that is necessary to any experience that is
intelligible to us. For the sake of brevity, I shall restrict my discussion to
the arguments Kant develops in the Analogies of Experience for the
enabling role in experience of the most signi¬cant set of categories: the
relational categories of substance, causation, and interaction.
In contrast to the categories of quantity and quality, the so-called
mathematical categories, Kant does not regard the dynamic categories in
general, or the relational categories in particular, as constitutive of
intuition. Kant insists that there cannot be intuitions that do not have
some kind of extensive magnitude or metric, or some kind of intensive
magnitude, or magnitude corresponding to the intensity of sensation
involved in them. Nevertheless, he does regard the dynamic categories as
constitutive of any concept that we might have of an object in experience:

In the transcendental analytic, we have distinguished amongst the principles of
the understanding, between the dynamic, as merely regulative principles of
intuition, and the mathematical, that are constitutive of the latter. Nevertheless, the
dynamic laws in question are indeed constitutive of experience in that they make
concepts possible a priori, without which no experience would take place. (
/ )

We might be able to have an immediate awareness of the contents of our
perceptual ¬eld, even if the concepts of substance, cause, and interac-
±±
±± Kant and the demands of self-consciousness
tion had no purchase in experience. But, Kant wants to argue, we would
not have any concepts of objects. If it were not a necessary fact about
experience that we are able to apply the concepts of substance, cause,
and interaction to objects of experience, it might turn out that, in fact,
objects of experience could not be identi¬ed and reidenti¬ed across
di¬erent times and spaces. But, if we had no way of identifying and
reidentifying those times and spaces themselves, Kant wants to argue,
we would have no experience at all.
In this chapter, I want to argue that the so-called relational categories
are involved in justifying our judgments about the temporal and less
directly the spatial position of events and things because events present
themselves to us in such a way that we are able to apply the concepts of
substance, causation, and interaction to those events. Unlike commen-
tators such as Melnick and Guyer, I wish to deny that every judgment
concerning the occurrence of an event or a change in a thing involves
the application of these categories to a judgment. Instead, I wish to
argue that judgments concerning the occurrence or non-occurrence of
events or changes involve an implicit commitment to the truth of
principles (metaconceptual judgments), such as ˜˜every event is the
change in the state of a substance™™ or ˜˜every event has a cause™™ in which
such categories ¬gure as concepts. We can make judgments about the
temporal and spatial positions and relations of objects without applying
the concept of substance, cause, or interaction to those objects. But in
order to justify those judgments we need to appeal to the concepts of
substance, cause, and interaction, as well as to the more speci¬c laws
governing substances, causes, and interactions.
The categories in general, and the concepts of substance, cause, and
interaction, in particular, can play a role in justifying our judgments
concerning experiences because perceptions and other inner states are
already given to us in such a way that categories must be applicable to
them. But, in contrast to interpreters such as Allison, I wish to argue that
the categories apply to objective experience because they are indirect
enabling conditions of subjective experience. I wish to reject the idea
that any experience at all must present itself to us in a way that already
involves the actual application of the categories of substance, causation,
and interaction.
Inner states are given to us in time, and have content in virtue of
belonging to a possible self-consciousness. Outer states are given to us
not only temporally, but also spatially. The concepts of substance, cause,
and interaction are required if we are to connect di¬erent inner epi-
±±µ
Time-consciousness in the Analogies
sodes, especially perceptions, together in a global representation of time
that is capable of supporting an impersonal and standpoint-neutral
representation of self: ˜˜The general principle of the three Analogies rests
on the necessary unity of apperception, in respect of all possible empirical
consciousness, that is, of all perception, at all times™™ ( ±··/ °). In
linking the inner states of di¬erent individuals together in time, the
concepts of substance, cause, and interaction link those inner states to
outer states that are accessible to di¬erent observers. In the process, they
help to constitute a single uni¬ed time and space for all observers.
Now any representational content must be connectable to any other
representational content in one possible encompassing consciousness of
di¬erent representations belonging to di¬erent persons with di¬erent
spatio-temporal positions. For all representations that are intelligible to
us directly represent temporal objects, and at least indirectly, represent
spatial objects, and representations of spatial and temporal objects are
only distinguishable from one another in virtue of the di¬erent contribu-
tions that they make to experience. Thus, the di¬erential contributions
that di¬erent representations make to experience must be su¬cient to
yield a way of distinguishing one space and time from another. Absent
any empirical content to distinguish one space and time from another,
spaces and times may be distinct, in that they have di¬erent relations to
each other, but they are indistinguishable, since there is nothing that
allows one to pick out one term of a spatial or temporal relation from
another.
In the First Analogy, Kant argues that we must postulate substances
as substrates relative to which all change occurs. These permanent
objects with changing accidents make it possible to determine whether a
change has or has not occurred. Substances make it possible for us to
ascertain the truth value of judgments about change by making it
possible for us to set up a time-series in which changes are determinable.
But they make it possible for us to distinguish di¬erent clock-times in a
time-series by providing us with something at those di¬erent times that
allows us to distinguish one clock-time from another.
Even if substances are necessary for setting up a time-series, they are
not su¬cient for ordering times or events. Our knowledge of substances
does not tell us which times or events are earlier, later, and simultaneous
with which other times or events. In the Second Analogy, Kant argues
that causal connections are needed if we are to order episodes in
objectively valid temporal relations of earlier and later. The Third
Analogy then argues that interactions between substances are required
±± Kant and the demands of self-consciousness
in order to establish objectively valid relations of simultaneity. It thus
extends the general analysis of causal relations provided in the Second
Analogy from the temporal relations of earlier. and later to relations of
simultaneity.
In accordance with Kant™s claim that subjective experience is para-
sitic on objective experience, the objective relations of earlier, later, and
simultaneous underwrite our ability even to make judgments about a
subjective temporal order to events. It is not that we cannot directly
perceive changes in our mental states or their objects. But, in forming
judgments about even the subjective order of our inner states, we take
on a normative commitment to be able to justify claims about the order
of our inner episodes. Even claims about the subjective order of our
inner episodes can only be sustained by recourse to the way in which the
subjective temporal order of our inner episodes depends on the objec-
tive temporal order of outer episodes. For without a distinction between
my subjective take on what I am experiencing and what I am (subjec-
tively) experiencing, it does not even make sense to say that I am
formulating a judgment about my inner experience. I do not even have
a basis for thinking of myself as having inner experience.
Now, even the relational categories are not enough to elicit an
objective spatio-temporal order from experience; we must also rely on
higher-order principles of reason that guide inquiry in the search for
speci¬c empirical concepts of objects and laws. In the concluding
section of this chapter, I attempt to do this fact justice in a discussion of
the nature of the connection between the general principle that there
are identi¬able substances, causes, and interactions, and the existence
and recognition of speci¬c concepts of substance, causation, and inter-
action.

 µ   ® 
Given the fact that space and time are the forms according to which
anything real must be represented, regardless of whether it is represen-
ted as existing externally or internally to our points of view, any substan-
tive notion of a subject will have to be expressed in terms of the
numerical identity of a spatio-temporal point of view. For, taken in
abstraction from the experience of spatio-temporal particulars, the
concept of substance collapses into the purely logical relation of subject
to predicate.± It seems at ¬rst that the subject in question would also
have to be a spatio-temporal continuant in order to capture the distinc-

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