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something in common with other points of view, but also di¬ers in some
respect or other from those di¬erent points of view. The impersonal
consciousness of self to which I have been referring is an enabling
condition of personal identity, but it is not to be con¬‚ated with one™s
empirical personal identity. Acknowledgement of the possibility of being
conscious of oneself in such a way that one thinks of oneself as a
consciousness that is yet not identi¬ed with any spatio-temporal location
is an important dimension to our ability to understand and use concepts.
 Kant and the demands of self-consciousness
For the very impersonal way in which one represents the self allows the
impersonal representation of self to serve as a pre-condition of com-
municable experience and communicable representations. In particu-
lar, it underwrites our capacity for judgment and to come up with
concepts that articulate what we experience and otherwise grasp in ways
that we can communicate to others. Such a self-consciousness allows
one to conceive of space and time and the objects of experience in space
and time as a unitary system of permutations on potential standpoints
that I might assume with respect to spatio-temporal experience.
It might seem that only our capacity to form concepts and make
judgments with them that have objective import is based on our capac-
ity for abstractive self-consciousness. But, in fact, not only our grasp of
concepts, but our very grasp of the distinction between inner and outer
and the distinctive temporal and spatial form that it takes for us, is based
on the kind of capacity for abstraction that comes with the capacity for
self-consciousness. For this is a structure that is abstract in the sense that
each of us attributes it to him- or herself, and yet it is also a general
condition under which each of us individually is capable of experiencing
him- or herself, as well as the world. The self can represent itself spatially
and temporally in abstraction from the empirical objects that present
themselves to various particular spatial and temporal locations. This is
to represent oneself as having a point of view, but in abstraction from
the particular context in experience which makes one the distinctive
person one is. Any arbitrary self-conscious individual may think of him-
or herself as existing here and now, and in each case something di¬erent
will present itself to him or to her in accordance with the change in
context within spatial and temporal experience. Thus the abstract
representation of self as the possessor of a spatio-temporal experience
provides the most general notion of the self as an object of self-con-
sciousness which relates to itself as a distinctive object and to other
possible objects as distinguishable from it. The di¬erent objects that
present themselves to di¬erent spatio-temporal subjects, together with
those subjects, each of which may, in turn, be regarded as a spatio-
temporal object, may be ordered in a standpoint-independent way by
each self-conscious individual in a way that is consistent with each of
their di¬erent spatio-temporal perspectives. In order for them to order
episodes in this standpoint-independent way, subjects set up a common
Cartesian co-ordinate system with four di¬erent axes corresponding to
the three dimensions of space and a fourth dimension for time. They
can then assign tenseless relations of earlier, later, simultaneous, and

Conclusion
spatial co-ordinates to all objects. To do this, they, and indeed each one
of us, must be able to apply the concepts of causation, interaction, and
substance to experience, for only if we can legitimately apply these
concepts to all of our experiences will we be able to determine the
temporal relations and positions of all episodes within experience.
The unity of spatio-temporal experience manifests itself in the pos-
sibility of our having determinate beliefs and representations about
spatio-temporal objects. Beliefs about objects experienced in space and
time are determinate because there is a determinate procedure for
con¬rming and discon¬rming (verifying and falsifying) those beliefs. We
can make out something permanent in spatio-temporal experience that
provides the basis for a determinate procedure for con¬rming and
discon¬rming our beliefs. The very notion of an object as something
permanent in experience, or as something that is numerically identical
through space and time, turns out to be a function of our need to assume
a self-conscious standpoint that allows us to regard our experience as an
experience that can be captured and expressed in intersubjectively
communicable concepts.
The communicability of beliefs presupposes the possibility of a con-
sciousness from which we may distinguish ourselves. Our possession of
determinate beliefs also requires the existence of objects existing outside
of us. For only such objects can provide us with the permanence which
we need as a reference-point for determining the content of our beliefs
in some way which promises potential criteria for success and failure in
our self-ascriptions of beliefs and cognitions. Without permanent objects
whose existence is not at the mercy of our immediate representations,
we would fail to have any basis for believing that we had correctly or
incorrectly ascribed a belief or other representation to ourselves or to
someone else.
Kant™s transcendental idealism suggests that we can only give deter-
minate content to our beliefs at the cost of subjecting them to substan-
tive restrictive constraints, such as that every event must have a cause or
that every event must be the state of a permanent substance. These are
constraints on the self-ascription of spatio-temporal representations.
Thus Kant ¬nds himself defending the claim that all non-logical theor-
etical knowledge is restricted to spatio-temporal objects. These objects
might, however, in principle be subject to some other more fundamen-
tal mode of description that would not be spatio-temporal at all. But,
even where Kant seeks to ¬nd such a description in the dimension of
action motivated by impersonal reasons, he does not give up the basic-
° Kant and the demands of self-consciousness
ness of the idea of a numerical identity of the self that is a priori. For this
notion is the very basis for his defense of the impersonal point of view.
Nor does he give up the idea that the immediacy of experience is
something that we must conceptualize in a manner that sustains the
publicity of what we represent. The publicity of what we represent
continues to express the numerical identity of an impersonal point of
view. And this impersonal point of view, in principle, is available to us in
any arbitrary context of experience.
While the constraints that self-consciousness imposes on experience
may be necessary to any experience that we may conceive of as such, it is
not obvious that we can dictate that the world must be such as to
conform to conditions on the ascription of belief. This is the sense in
which Kant is entitled to defend his thesis that objects of experience are
transcendentally ideal, that is, inherently mind-dependent. We cannot
know what they would be like independently of the conditions under
which we must ascribe beliefs about them to us and to other thinkers.
The thesis that our only access to the world is constrained by pre-
conditions on experience governing that access, is a weaker construal
than Kant often gives to his transcendental idealism. For he often insists
that we can know that things as they exist are not spatial or temporal,
and sometimes even claims that we can be certain of the non-spatio-
temporality of things as they exist in themselves. The most that the
purely epistemic dimension of Kant™s transcendental idealism allows
him is that we can only make sense of the world in terms of the
spatio-temporal conditions governing our experience. It does not li-
cence the further claim that space and time could not exist independent-
ly of the role that they play in allowing us to identify and reidentify
objects of experience, and our cognitive states as well.
Kant is most successful in spelling out a framework in terms of which
we can think of how to make sense of our position in the world. It is this
framework that I have tried to develop. I have sought to restore the
standpoint of an impersonal self to the status it deserves as the crucial
starting-point for understanding our capacity to understand our individ-
ual identity and our place in the world relative to other selves and to
material things. In the process, I have argued that Kant™s transcendental
self-consciousness is not just a logical capacity that we associate with the
capacity for judgment, although it is crucial to our capacity for judg-
ment. Nor does transcendental self-consciousness simply collapse into
consciousness of personal identity. But transcendental self-conscious-
ness is the key to drawing the distinction between inner and outer
±
Conclusion
experiences and recognizing inner experiences as inner and outer ex-
periences as outer. It is on the basis of this capacity to distinguish
between inner and outer experiences that we are then able to apply
concepts to our experience in judgment.
Notes




± © ®    ¤ µ  © ®
± The objection that Kant must appeal to an unintelligible notion of subject in
his conception of transcendental self-consciousness is well articulated by
Rudiger Bittner, ˜˜Transzendental,™™ in H. Krings et al. (eds.), Handbuch
¨
philosophischen Grundbegri¬e (Munich: Kossel Verlag, ±·), vol. µ, pp. ±µ“
¨
±µ.
 Interpreters who have treated Kant™s theory of the identity of apperception
as a theory of personal identity include: Graham Bird, Robert Paul Wol¬,
Dieter Henrich, Paul Guyer, and Patricia Kitcher. I discuss their interpreta-
tion of the representation that we have of our numerical identity in chapter
two.
 I will argue in chapter four that the interpretation that Henry Allison
provides of transcendental apperception collapses all self-consciousness for
Kant into knowledge of objective states of a¬airs, or at least into judgments
that purport to be objective; see H. Allison, Kant™s Transcendental Idealism (New
Haven: Yale University Press, ±), see esp. p. ±µµ: ˜˜In other words, a
subjective unity of consciousness is not a unity of self-consciousness, although
it can (as objecti¬ed) become a unity for self-conscious thought.™™
 In his classic discussion of Kant, The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen, ±),
P. F. Strawson is careful not to run together the identity of the subject of
transcendental self-consciousness, which is concerned with the possibility of
experience, with empirical personal identity. A priori identity of self-con-
sciousness is supposed to be the basic condition for the possibility of empirical
self-ascription without being actually identical with that possibility (p. ±°).
Strawson rightly notes that, for Kant, objectivity has something to do with
transcendental self-consciousness and that personal self-consciousness has
something to do with how each of us experiences the world in our own
distinctive ways. Strawson is also clearer than many contemporary commen-
tators about the dependence of empirical self-consciousness on transcenden-
tal self-consciousness that Kant emphasizes in the same context. But Straw-
son does not spell out how transcendental self-consciousness is supposed to
help us to understand the connection and distinction between the subjective
and objective (Bounds of Sense, p. ±°·). While he notes that transcendental


Notes to pages “µ 
self-consciousness is supposed to be the core of empirical self-consciousness,
he has nothing to say about how it might serve as the core of empirical
self-consciousness. Indeed, he has almost nothing substantive to say about
what transcendental self-consciousness might be.
µ Kant™s general line of thought is articulated in an interesting way by Theodor
Lipps, Leitfaden der Psychologie (Leipzig: Engelmann, ±°), pp. ¬.: ˜˜I know . .
. immediately only of my own consciousness or of ˜me™. But this consciousness
is not in itself something individual, but rather simple consciousness; and this I
is not in itself ˜my™ I or ˜this™ I, but it is simply I . . . Not until I know of other I™s
does this I become ˜this™, ˜mine™, one among many, in short individual.™™ A
similar claim is developed in Theodor Lipps, Inhalt und Gegenstand: Psychologie
und Logik in Sitzungsberichte der philosophischen-philologischen und der historischen
Klasse der Koniglichen Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften  (±°µ), p. µ. Kant
¨
does not demand that I actually know that there are other egos in order to
ascribe beliefs or desires to myself. But he does think that one must have the
concept of other possible individuals endowed with self-consciousness in
order to have a grasp of the individuality of one™s own self-consciousness.

 © ®  ¤ µ  © ® § ° °    ° ©  ®
± J. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche uber die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung of
¨
±··± reprint: (Berlin: Reuther and Reichard, ±±), identi¬es inner sense with
apperception. In his Psychologia Empirica of ±· reprint (Hildesheim: Georg
Olms, ±), section µ, Christian Wol¬ argued that ˜˜apperception is at-
tributed to the mind insofar as it is conscious for itself of its perception.™™ Kant
criticizes the identi¬cation of inner sense with pure apperception in Anthro,
Ak. ©©, p. ±±, and with apperception in the B-Deduction at  ±µ.
 Andrew Brook, Kant and the Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press,
±), p. ±µ. Brook interprets Kant™s distinction between actual self-con-
sciousness and the possibility of self-consciousness and that between empiri-
cal and transcendental apperception as the di¬erence between optional and
non-optional acts of synthesis. The mind only sometimes engages in acts of
attentive awareness, however the mind is supposed to represent itself to the
self through the self™s activity of synthesis all the time. Now Kant does
distinguish between acts of attentive awareness and non-attentive awareness,
but he also distinguishes between self-consciousness and consciousness, and
there is little of no textual support for the claim that the distinction between
attentive and non-attentive awareness corresponds to that between self-
consciousness and consciousness. Con¬‚ating the two distinctions also seems
to be intrinsically implausible. The view that apperception is not about
self-awareness is also shared by Patricia Kitcher, Kant™s Transcendental Psychol-
ogy (New York: Oxford, ±°), esp. p. ±.
 Graham Bird, Kant™s Theory of Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
±), pp. ±¬., sees Kant as responding to Hume™s worries about personal
identity. R. P. Wol¬, Kant™s Theory of Mental Activity (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, ±), pp. ±¬. Wol¬ argues that Kant came to
 Notes to pages µ“°
know Hume™s critique of self-identity through Beattie™s Essay on the Nature
and Immutability of Truth in Beattie™s Works (Philadelphia: Hopkins and Earle,
±°), translated into German in ±··. The argument is presented in detail
in R. P. Wol¬, ˜˜Kant™s Debt to Hume via Beattie,™™ Journal of the History of
Ideas ± (±°), ±±·“±. More recently it has been articulated with vigor by
Patricia Kitcher, Kant™s Transcendental Psychology, pp. ·¬. Kant™s conception
of self-identity a priori is said by Patricia Kitcher to be a response to Hume™s
worries about self-identity. She argues for this in ˜˜Kant on Self-Identity,™™
The Philosophical Review ± (±). ±“·, and in Kant™s Transcendental Psychol-
ogy, p. ·. Paul Guyer also maintains that Kant™s conception of the numeri-
cal identity of the self a priori is intended as a reply to Hume in Kant and the
Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, ±·), pp. ·, ±·, ±·.
Other interpreters, such as Strawson, note similarities and di¬erences
between the two views of self-identity, but are more circumspect in their
claims of in¬‚uence, cf. Bounds of Sense, pp. ±“±·°. Wolfgang Carl, Die
Transzendentale Deduktion der Kategorien in der ersten Au¬‚age der ˜˜Kritik der reinen
Vernunft™™: Ein Kommentar (Frankfurt: Klostermann, ±), is an exception to
this approach to the identity of self-consciousness; Carl sees the German
philosopher and psychologist Tetens as the target of Kant™s critique, pp.
°¬.
 David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, L. E. Selby-Bigge (ed.) (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, ±), Book ©, Part ©, Section ©, pp. µ°“µ±.
µ Graham Bird, Kant™s Theory of Knowledge, pp. ±°¬., thinks that Kant runs
together apperception as involving personal identity and apperception as
providing a unity for objective judgment and conceptual rules.
 Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, pp. ±“±µ. Dieter Henrich, ˜˜Identity and
Objectivity,™™ in The Unity of Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, ±.
· The in¬‚ated view of a priori consciousness of self-identity is defended by
Dieter Henrich, ˜˜Identity and Objectivity,™™ in his The Unity of Reason, pp.
±·¬., and Peter Rohs, ˜˜Uber Sinn und Sinnlosigkeit von Kants Theorie
¨
der Subjektivitat,™™ Neue Hefte fur Philosophie ·/ (±), esp. ¬. Henrich
¨ ¨
argues that we have Cartesian certainty of our numerical identity over a
series of states. Rohs maintains that self-identi¬cation across time is criteria-
less and certain. He has nothing to say about the possibility of delusive
quasi-memories which threaten such a claim.
 Paul Guyer™s critique of Henrich is ¬rst presented in his review of Identitat ¨
und Objektivitat (the original German version of ˜˜Identity and Objectivity™™),
¨
The Journal of Philosophy · (±·), ±µ±“±·. Henrich™s response may be found
in ˜˜The Identity of the Subject in the Transcendental Deduction,™™ in E.
Schaper and W. Vosenkuhl (eds.), Reading Kant: New Perspectives on Transcen-
dental Arguments and Critical Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, ±), p. ·.
 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, pp. ±“±·.
±° Ibid., p. ±.
±± Ibid., p. °.
Notes to pages °“ µ
± A variant on Guyer™s interpretation is defended by Lorne Falkenstein, he
argues that, even though intuition is itself a manifold, when it is though it is
then collapsed into an absolute momentary spatial unity, i.e. that of a
particular shape. ˜˜The mind seems to distinguish automatically the mo-
ments of time over which the intuitions occur, and so, whereas it collapses
the manifold in space at any instant as an ˜absolute unity,™ it continues to
distinguish the di¬erent times over which the intuition occurs as so many
successive and distinct representations.™™ Kant™s Intuitionism (University of
Toronto Press, ±µ), pp. ·“··. Apart from the fact that Kant never claims
that thought transforms the manifold into an absolute unity, and that it is
hard to see how a particular shape could be an absolute unity, this view has
the di¬culty that it also requires powers of temporal discrimination of the
kind rightly criticized by Parsons. Falkenstein™s interpretation also seems to
be inconsistent with the position that Kant maps out in Re¬‚ection µ°:
˜˜All appearances stand as representations in time and are determined in
time. As a part of a whole appearance it [sic] cannot be determined
(genetically apprehended) in an instant, but only in a part of time.™™
± Ibid., pp. ±“±.
± P. Guyer, ˜˜Placing Myself in Time: Kant™s Third Paralogism,™™ in G. Funke
(ed.), Akten des µten Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (Bonn: Bouvier, ±µ), pp.
µ“µ.
±µ Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. ±°.
± Ibid.
±· Ibid., pp. ±µ“±.
± Jonathan Bennett, Kant™s Analytic (Cambridge University Press, ±), pp.
±°µ“±°.
± A certain capacity for recognitional awareness also characterizes the intelli-
gence of higher animals. Kant maintains that, while subhuman animals,
such as dogs and hares are not able to develop bona ¬de concepts, they do
learn from the animals which they are pursuing or who are pursuing them
(Metaphysics Lecture K (±·/µ), Ak. ©, p. ). This is a longstanding view
of Kant™s. In a ±· paper, Kant notes that animals can distinguish objects
based on their sensations and desires, ˜˜the dog distinguishes the roast from
the bread, because he is di¬erently a¬ected by the roast than by the bread™™
(Ak. ©©, p. °). The distinctive feature of (subhuman) animal awareness is, for
him, its lack of the capacity for universalization and full-blown concept use:
˜˜Animals are acquainted [kennen] with objects, but they do not know
[erkennen] them.™™ (Logic, ed. Jasche, Ak. ©, p. µ). Knowledge or cognition
¨
(˜˜erkennen,™™ ˜˜cognoscere™™) involves consciousness while the acquaintance
(˜˜kennen,™™ ˜˜gnoscere™™) requires only the associative capacity to represent
something in comparison with other things. Norman Kemp-Smith™s brief
discussion of Kant™s views on human and animal intelligence is quite
helpful, A Commentary on Kant™s ˜˜Critique of Pure Reason™™ (London: Macmillan,
±), pp. x±vii“±. There is also a useful discussion on the contrast between
animal and human intelligence in J. Michael Young, ˜˜Kant™s View of the
 Notes to pages µ“
Imagination,™™ Kant-Studien · (±), esp. ±µ°, and S. Naragon, ˜˜Kant on
Descartes and the Brutes,™™ Kant-Studien ± (±°), ±“.
° Thomas Nagel seems to me to be right when he argues in ˜˜What is it like to
be a bat?,™™ in Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, ±·), pp. ±¬.,
that it makes sense to talk of what it would be like to have the experience of
non-self-conscious being, such as a bat. However, I would argue that we can
make sense of this idea that there is something that it is like to be such a
creature and hence of its having a point of view only by thinking of such a
being as if it had self-consciousness. We understand representational con-
tent as such only from the vantage-point of the kind of creature that can
ascribe representational content to itself and to others.
± It is not entirely clear whether Kant thought he had a completeness proof
for the forms of judgment and the categories available or not. In a famous
Rostock dissertation, The Completeness of Kant™s Table of Judgments (Palo Alto:
Stanford University Press, ±), Klaus Reich argued that Kant had
thought through such an argument. Reich™s argument moves from consti-
tutive features of the unity of apperception (self-consciousness) to the indi-
vidual logical functions and from there to the categories. A more recent
book by R. Brandt, Die Urteilstafel (Hamburg: Meiner, ±), attempts a new
reconstruction based on the nature of judgment and the di¬erent manner in
which the nature of judgment manifests itself in the structure of concept,
judgment, and inference. The argument from the nature of judgment to a
completeness proof has been further developed by Beatrice Longuenesse,
´
Kant et le pouvoir de juger (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, ±) and
Michael Wol¬, Die Vollstandigkeit von Kants Urteilstafel (Frankfurt: Kloster-
¨
mann, ±µ).
 In the second edition of the Critique, Kant admits that we would not give a
reason why the understanding requires the kind and number of categories it
supposedly does, or even why we have these and no other functions of
judgment, or, for that matter, why space and time are the only forms
according to which we can perceive objects ( ±). Great weight is given to
the passage from section ± in the critical examination of Reich™s argument
for the completeness of the table of judgment forms and categories under-
taken by Lorenz Kruger, ˜˜Wollte Kant die Vollstandigkeit seiner Urteils-
¨ ¨
tafel beweisen?,™™ Kant-Studien µ (±), “µµ.
 Wilfried Sellars, ˜˜this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks,™™ Proceedings and
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association  (±·±), ±±.
 Ibid., ·“.
µ Sellars, ˜˜Metaphysics and the Concept of a Person,™™ in K. Lambert (ed.),
The Logical Way of Doing Things (New Haven: Yale University Press, ±),
pp. “.
 Sellars, ˜˜This I or he or it (the thing) which thinks,™™ ±n.
· Ibid., ±.
 Kitcher, Kant™s Transcendental Psychology, esp. pp. ±±±“±±. Ralf Meerbote
generally endorses Kitcher™s claim that Kant™s account of representations is
Notes to pages “µ± ·
functionalist because it makes representations depend on each other by
virtue of their content, although he insists that sensations cannot be under-
stood by Kant purely functionally, see R. Meerbote, ˜˜Kant™s Functional-
ism,™™ in J.-C. Smith (ed.), Historical Foundations of Cognitive Science (Dordrecht:
Kluwer, ±°), esp. pp. ±, ±·°.
 Ibid., pp. ±“±.
° Kitcher, Kant™s Transcendental Psychology, pp. ±±±¬.
± Ibid., p. ±.
 A somewhat di¬erent version of the functionalist interpretation is defended
by Andrew Brook, Kant and the Mind, esp. pp. ±¬. Like Kitcher, Brook
emphasizes the importance of synthesis, the process of connecting represen-
tations, in the constitution of representations for Kant. Brook meets the
problem posed for Kitcher by the unity of the mind by identifying the mind
with the unity of its representations (Ibid. p. °). Where Kitcher insists on
the synthetic character of the claim that we can become conscious of our
representations, Brook takes it to follow trivially from the self-intimating
character of representation.
 Sellars, ˜˜This I or he or it (the thing) which thinks,™™ ±.
 Sellars™s functionalist interpretation of the Kantian notion of the self has
been developed and defended by Jay Rosenberg, The Thinking Self (Philadel-
phia: Temple University Press, ±), and C. Thomas Powell, Kant™s Theory
of Self-Consciousness (New York: Oxford University Press, ±°). In particular,
Powell has noted the tendency to misinterpret Kant™s claims for conscious-
ness of self-identity as claims to knowledge that we are identical particulars.
But Powell pushes this insight too far. He interprets the self of which we are
conscious in self-consciousness as an illusion. We must represent di¬erent
states only as if they belonged to a single consciousness (Ibid., p. µ). This
prevents him from ascribing a constitutive role to self-consciousness which
merely becomes a stand-in for objective constraints on experience that are
themselves intelligible independently of self-consciousness.

   ®   °  , ¬ · ,  ® ¤      §® © ©  ®  ¦       
± Richard Aquila, Matter in Mind: A Study of Kant™s Transcendental Deduction
(Bloomington, Indiana: University of Indiana Press, ±), pp. ±¬.
 Christian Wol¬ also claims in his Psychologia Empirica of ±· (Hildesheim:
Olms, ±), section ±·, that a reproduced idea is recognized when we are

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