<< . .

. 26
( : 30)



. . >>

conscious of already having had it. This is said to be memory. I owe the
references to Wol¬ to Wolfgang Carl, Die Transzendentale Deduktion, p. ±n.
The same point is made by Baumgarten in section µ· of the Metaphysics
(±·µ·) handbook that Kant used as the basis for his lectures (Ak. ).
 Kant connects the notion of a concept as a universal representation with its
function as a rule. Concepts are universal representations in two di¬erent
senses. They can be shared by di¬erent individuals with di¬erent intuitive
states, and they represent intuited particulars in repeatable terms. Kant
does not simply identify concepts with rules. In his discussion of the
 Notes to pages µ“·
subjective deduction, R. P. Wol¬ maintains that rules are concepts. This
leads him to detect ˜˜a con¬‚ict which runs through all the Critique and which
Kant never successfully resolves. On the one hand, his rationalist orienta-
tion and concern with the conditions of knowledge incline him toward an
emphasis on concepts, judgments, reasoning, and the other conscious
processes of cognition. On the other hand, his discovery of the problem of
consciousness, and his distinction between appearances and reality, force
him to assign the generative processes of the mind to a pre-conscious limbo.
Kant obscures this ambiguity to a certain extent by attributing the non-
conscious functions to faculties of the mind whose operations are customar-
ily considered conscious, by distinguishing synthesis itself from the bringing
of synthesis to concepts ( ·). This won™t do, however, for the concept is
simply the rule according to which the synthesis is performed, and hence
must precede, now follow it. ™™ Kant™s Theory of Mental Activity, p. ±±. Wol¬
confuses the concept with its schema. It is no surprise that Wol¬ cannot
make sense of Kant™s notion of a schema, since it is the schema rather than
the concept corresponding to it that precedes the synthesis to be performed.
 A helpful discussion of the di¬erent uses of the term ˜˜object™™ to be found in
Kant may be found in Charles Parsons, ˜˜Objects and Logic,™™ The Monist µ
(±), ±“µ±.
µ Henry Allison, ˜˜Transcendental A¬nity “ Kant™s Answer to Hume,™™ in L.
Beck (ed.), Kant™s Theory of Knowledge (Dordrecht: Reidel, ±·), esp. p. ±.
 Further remarks about the relation of Goodman™s problem to Kant™s
position may be found in Ralph Walker, Kant (Routledge and Kegan Paul,
±·), pp. ±·¬. as well as Gordon Brittan, Kant™s Theory of Science (Princeton
University Press, ±·), pp. ±¬. Neither author relates the Goodman
problem speci¬cally to Kant™s notion of the a¬nity of nature.
· Further discussion of the notion of a projected systematic unity of nature
may be found in Gerd Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science
(Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, ±), chapter , as well as in the papers
collected in his Kant and the Dynamics of Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, ±).
Philip Kitcher, ˜˜Projecting the Order of Nature,™™ in R. Butts (ed.), Kant™s
Philosophy of Physical Science (Dordrecht: Reidel, ±), pp. ±°“µ, and a
discussion by Paul Guyer and Ralph Walker of ˜˜Kant™s Conception of
Empirical Law,™™ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 
(±°), ±“, and “µ, are also extremely interesting. Systematic
unity has been discussed more recently by Susan Neiman, The Unity of
Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, ±), pp. ·°¬. and especially
Michael Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, ±), esp. pp. ¬.

  ¬¦ - ®   ©  µ ®    ® ¤   ¤   ® ¤  ¦  µ¤ §  ® 
© ®    - ¤  ¤ µ  ©  ®
± Robert Howell, Kant™s Transcendental Deduction (Dordrecht: Kluwer, ±),
pp. ±°¬.
Notes to pages “ 
 Allison, Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, p. ±·.
 D. Henrich, ˜˜The Proof Structure of Kant™s Transcendental Deduction,™™
in R. C. Walker (ed.), Kant on Pure Reason (Oxford University Press, ±), pp.
·“··.
 P. Guyer, ˜˜Kant on Apperception and A Priori Synthesis,™™ American Philo-
sophical Quarterly ±· (±°), ±°, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. ±±.
µ Hector-Neri Castaneda, ˜˜The Role of Apperception in Kant™s Transcen-
˜
dental Deduction of the Categories,™™ Nous  (±°), ±µ¬.
 Thomas Nagel, ˜˜Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness,™™ in
Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, ±·), pp. ±·“±.
· Terence Wilkerson, ˜˜Kant on Self-Consciousness,™™ Philosophical Quarterly °
(±°), µ¬.
 Manfred Baum, Deduktion und Beweis in Kants Transzendentalphilosophie
(Meisenheim: Konigstein, ±).
¨
 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. ±±·.
±° P. Guyer, ˜˜The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories,™™ The Cam-
bridge Companion to Kant (New York: Cambridge University Press, ±), p.
±µ±, sees Kant™s claim that the unity of consciousness is su¬cient for
cognition as a blatant error.
±± Allison, Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, p. ±µ.
± Ibid., p. ±.
± Ibid., p. ±µ.
± Ibid., p. ±µµ.
±µ Ibid., p. ±µµ.
± Ibid., p. °.
±· Ibid., p. ±.
± Ibid., p. .
± Ibid., p. .
° Ibid., p. ·.
± According to Allison, the only things of cognitive signi¬cance for Kant are
objective states of a¬airs. This is because objective states of a¬airs are the
only things of which we can be conscious in apperception. Allison™s restric-
tion of self-conscious experience to objective states of a¬airs also seems to
encourage him to give an absolute reading to the spontaneity or indepen-
dence from causal determination that Kant ascribes to self-consciousness in
epistemic contexts. For Allison, self-consciousness is more completely inde-
pendent of sensible information than it is for functionalists and other
philosophers who interpret the theoretical subject as only relatively sponta-
neous. See H. Allison, ˜˜Autonomy and Spontaneity in the Self,™™ in his
Idealism and Freedom, pp. ±“±.
 By treating objective validity as the target of judgment, I avoid the di¬cul-
ties that beset the interpretation that is defended by G. Prauss in his
Erscheinung bei Kant (Berlin: De Gruyter, ±·±), pp. ¬. and by H. Allison,
Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, pp. ·“·, according to which objective validity
consists only in the possibility of a judgment having a truth value. This
µ° Notes to pages “°
would hardly be enough to provide the truth with which Kant repeatedly
identi¬es objective validity.

µ   ¬¦ -  ®   ©  µ ®    ® ¤   µ ® ©    ¦ ©® µ © ©  ® :
  °¬  © ®§    -¤  ¤ µ   ©  ®
± The point that intuition involves unity or rather singularity of what is
represented by de¬nition is emphasized by Hoke Robinson, ˜˜Intuition and
the Manifold,™™ Southern Journal of Philosophy  (±), °µ.
 Henrich, ˜˜The Proof Structure of Kant™s Transcendental Deduction,™™ ·°“
·±. J. Claude Evans has recently defended Henrich in ˜˜Two-Steps-in-One-
Proof: The Structure of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories,™™
Journal of the History of Philosophy  (±°), µ¬.
 Friedrich Tenbruck seems to be the ¬rst interpreter to have emphasized the
two-step character of the proof in the B-Deduction in ˜˜Die transzendentale
Deduktion der Kategorien nach der zweiten Au¬‚age der ˜Kritik der reinen
Vernunft,™ ™™ Ph.D. Thesis, Marburg (±). Tenbruck sees the ¬rst step as
establishing that the categories apply to all representations of which we are
conscious, since all such representations must be unitary. He also thinks
that there is some question whether ˜˜all the manifold must be given in One
empirical intuition™™ (p. µ°). This is because he takes the ¬rst step in the
proof to be analytic, expressing a merely hypothetical necessity. The second
step must then provide a premise from which a categorical necessity may be
derived. Tenbruck traces this second premise back to the a priori unity of
intuition defended in the Aesthetic. According to Bernhard Thole, ˜˜Die¨
Beweisstruktur der transzendentalen Deduktion in der zweiten Au¬‚age der
˜Kritik der reinen Vernunft,™ ™™ in G. Funke (ed.), Akten des µten Internationalen
Kant-Kongresses (Bonn: Bouvier, ±±), pp. °“±, and Kant und die
Gesetzmaßigkeit der Natur (Berlin: De Gruyter, ±±), the ¬rst step (sections
¨
±µ“°) demonstrates only the possibility of thinking (not of knowing) objects
through the categories. A second step is required (sections “µ) in order to
show that there is a synthesis of empirical intuition corresponding to the
intellectual synthesis of thought. A third step then shows that the function of
synthesis in judgment is identical with that performed by the imagination in
the synthesis of perception and unity of time. Henry Allison divides the
argument into a proof of the objective validity of the categories in which
categories are only shown to apply to objects in a logical sense (step ±) and a
proof of the objective reality of categories in which they apply to real
empirical objects (step ), Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, p. ±µ; cf. also his
˜˜Apperception and Analyticity in the B-Deduction.™™
 Raymond Brouillet, ˜˜Dieter Henrich et ˜The Proof-Structure of Kant™s
Transcendental Deduction.™ Re¬‚exions critiques,™™ Dialogue ± (±·µ), ·“
´
; Hans Wagner, ˜˜Der Argumentationsgang in Kants Deduktion der
Kategorien,™™ Kant-Studien ·° (±°), µ“; and Robert Howell, Kant™s
Transcendental Deduction, pp. ±±¬., and ·n.
µ Manfred Baum, ˜˜The B-Deduction and the Refutation of Idealism,™™ ±°,
and especially Deduktion und Beweis, p. °±.
Notes to pages °“ µ±
 Edwin McCann, ˜˜Skepticism and Kant™s B-Deduction,™™ History of Philos-
ophy Quarterly  (±µ), esp. ·, ·, ·, ·.
· J. Claude Evans has recently defended Henrich in this way in ˜˜Two-Steps-
in-One-Proof,™™ esp. µ¬.
 The objection that an analytic ¬rst step would give the ¬rst step no
substantive role in the argument is forcefully made by Patricia Kitcher,
Kant™s Transcendental Psychology, p. ±·.
 McCann, ˜˜Skepticism and Kant™s B-Deduction,™™ ·.
±° A. Pistorius, ˜˜Review of Kant™s Prolegomena zu einer jeden kunftigen Metaphysik,™™
¨
Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek µ (±·), µ. It has seemed, even to some recent
commentators, that self-consciousness for Kant must be a form of self-
knowledge. Edwin McCann argues, for instance, that one cannot even
think of oneself as a self without having the determinate self-knowledge that
is the basis for the argument of the Refutation of Idealism; McCann,
˜˜Skepticism and Kant™s B-Deduction,™™ . But this reconstruction of the
argument of the Deduction would leave it wide open to the objection made
by Pistorius.
±± Kemp-Smith translates ˜˜das, worinnen sich die Emp¬ndungen allein ord-
nen, und in gewisse Form gestellt werden konnen™™ ( ±/ µ) as ˜˜that in
¨
which alone the sensations can be posited and ordered in a certain form,™™
Kant™s ˜˜Critique of Pure Reason™™ (New York: St Martin™s Press, ±), p. ,
treating ˜˜sich ordnen™™ as if it were not a re¬‚exive expression referring back
to ˜˜sensations.™™
± Karl Ameriks, Kant™s Theory of Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ±),
p. ±.
± Henry Allison appeals to Re¬‚ection µ, Ak. ©©©, p. ±, in support of the
ascription of Kant of the bar substratum view of the self when it comes to
judgments concerning inner sense: ˜˜All inner experience is a judgment in
which the predicate is empirical and the subject is I. Independently of
experience, therefore, there remains merely the I for rational psychology;
for the I is the substratum of all empirical judgments.™™ Allison is clearly right
when he says that Kant is referring here to the I qua subject of judgments as
something non-empirical. It is also true for Kant that the I as such cannot be
known empirically. Kant is left with the bare substratum view Allison
ascribes to him if one denies the empirical existence of the self as anything
but an object of re¬‚ection. Allison does claim that ˜˜a subjective unity of
consciousness is not a unity of self-consciousness, although it can (as objecti-
¬ed) become a unity for self-conscious thought,™™ Kant™s Transcendental Idealism,
p. ±µµ. On this view all (empirical) consciousness of oneself as a particular
individual is knowledge of oneself as an object. Put more bluntly all self-
consciousness that is not self-knowledge seems to be pure apperception for
Allison. This is di¬cult to reconcile with Kant™s references to empirical
apperception as self-consciousness. Kant™s reference to that object of re¬‚ec-
tion as self-intuiting indicates that the non-empirical or logical I of (pure)
apperception may refer to itself as the possessor of a certain individuating
spatio-temporal history.
µ Notes to pages ±°±“±°
± Paton, Kant™s Metaphysic of Experience, pp. “; cf. also Allison, Kant™s
Transcendental Idealism, p. .
±µ Robert Howell, ˜˜Apperception and the ±· Transcendental Deduction,™™
Synthese · (±±), µ, ¬., also Kant™s Transcendental Deduction, pp. ±¬.
± ˜˜Kant takes the I to be an a priori representation of thought, a representa-
tion that gives me no awareness of any particular object called the subject of
thought, but instead gives me only the awareness that there is an entity “
whose nature is not further revealed to me “ that we can call the subject of
thought. Hence by an appeal simply to his revisionary view of knowledge,
Kant takes the I to yield me no (empirical) intuition or intellectual represen-
tation of any particular entity at all, let alone any representation that
displays to me the nature of such an entity. And Kant takes the I to yield me
no such intuition or representation despite the fact that, as he sees it, the
relevant type of I think-related unity does obtain among my representa-
tions.™™ R. Howell, ˜˜Apperception and the ±· Transcendental Deduc-
tion,™™ .
±· Ibid., .
± Ibid.
± The attribution of the re¬‚ection theory of self-consciousness to Kant has
enjoyed a certain vogue in the German philosophical literature. Henrich
develops this view of Kant™s theory of self-consciousness at greatest length in
˜˜Fichtes ˜Ich™,™™ in his Selbstverhaltnisse (Stuttgart: Reclam, ±), pp. ±“µ.
¨
But he also makes some remarks about Kant™s purported re¬‚ection theory
in ˜˜Die Anfange des Subjekts (±·),™™ in A. Honneth et al. (eds.), Zwischen-
¨
betrachtungen im Prozeß der Aufklarung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, ±), pp. ±°“
¨
±·°. The re¬‚ection theory is developed and discussed in more detail in his
essay ˜˜Self-Consciousness: A Critical Introduction to a Theory,™™ Man and
World  (±·±), “. Henrich™s interpretation of Kant has been followed in
¨
this regard by Ulrich Pothast, Uber einige Probleme der Selbstbeziehung (Frank-
furt: Suhrkamp, ±·±), p. ±; Ernst Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-
Determination (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, ±), p. ±; and Manfred
Frank, ˜˜Intellektuelle Anschauung,™™ in E. Behler and J. Horisch (eds.), Die
¨
Aktualitat der Fruhromantik (Paderborn: Schoningh, ±·), pp. “±. Tugen-
¨ ¨ ¨
dhat devotes most of his attention, nota bene, to criticizing Henrich™s and
Pothast™s theory of self-consciousness (pp. “·). Charles Larmore notes in
his review of Tugendhat™s book, Philosophical Review  (±), ±°“±°, that
Tugendhat does not escape the circularity di¬culties in the analysis of
self-consciousness which he diagnoses in the re¬‚ection theory. Dieter Hen-
rich argues the same point in his response to Tugendhat, ˜˜Noch einmal in
Zirkeln,™™ in C. Bellut and U. Muller Scholl (eds.), Mensch und Moderne
¨ ¨
(Wurzburg: Konigshausen and Neumann, ±), pp. “±.
¨ ¨
° Henrich concedes that Kant™s use of the term ˜˜re¬‚ection™™ is quite di¬erent
from the use which became prevalent in post-Kantian philosophy in D.
Henrich, ˜˜Kant™s Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Back-
ground of the First Critique,™™ in E. Forster (ed.), Kant™s Transcendental Deduc-
¨
tions (Stanford University Press, ±), p. . It is unclear, however, whether
Notes to pages ±°“±° µ
he identi¬es the later usage with his talk of the re¬‚ection of self-conscious-
ness.
± I borrow the term ˜˜re¬‚exively self-referential™™ from Robert Nozick, Philo-
sophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, ±±), pp.
·±¬.
 Allison, ˜˜Re¬‚ections on the B-Deduction,™™ p. ·. Space and time are
uni¬able according to the Aesthetic, since they are all parts of one unitary
space and time. A categorially determined synthesis is, however, necessary
in order for the understanding to represent space and time as unitary. Kant
goes on to argue that space and time as intuited derive their unity from a
synthesis of the understanding that precedes all use of concepts. In conver-
sation, Allison has pointed out to me that he reads the claim that the
synthesis of space and time precedes all concepts as restricted to concepts of
space and time. For Allison, even the determination of sensibility by the
powers of what Kant calls the productive imagination involves the actual
application of categories. On my view, by contrast, this determination of
sensibility by spontaneity accords with the unity of self-consciousness and
thus makes categories applicable to experience, but it does not involve the
use of categories. There is a passage in section ± (not cited by Allison) that
seems to support this view. After insisting that the mineness of intuitions
means that those representations are self-ascribable in one consciousness,
Kant concludes that: ˜˜Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions as a
priori given is therefore the basis for the identity of apperception itself which
must precede all my determinate thought™™ (section ±,  ±). This suggests
that the identity of self-consciousness itself presupposes a unity of intuition
that is given a priori. But Kant goes on in the next sentence to trace the
synthesis upon which this synthetic unity is based to an activity of the
understanding.
 Allison, ˜˜Re¬‚ections on the B-Deduction,™™ in Idealism and Freedom, p. ·, and
also Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, p. ±.
 Allison, ˜˜Re¬‚ections on the B-Deduction,™™ p. .
µ Henrich, ˜˜The Proof Structure of Kant™s Transcendental Deduction,™™ p.
·°.
 The connection between the unity of space and time and the synthetic unity
of self-consciousness for Kant is undeniable. In a re¬‚ection dating from the
mid seventies, Kant even more directly expresses the thought that the unity
of time and space is based on their relation to self-consciousness: ˜˜Time is
unitary :einig9. (For there is one sub.) :(Denn es ist ein Sub.)9 Which
means as much as: I can know all objects (know them immediately accord-
ing to the form of inner intuition) only in myself and in representations to be
found in my unitary :einigen9 subject . . . Space is nothing but the
intuition of a mere form and without given matter, hence pure intuition. It
is a singular intuition due to the unity of the subject (and the capacity) in
virtue of which all representations of external objects can be placed (next to)
each other™™ (Re¬‚ection ·, Ak. ©©, p. ). A re¬‚ection dating from the
±·°s goes in the same direction: ˜˜The unity of intuition a priori is only
µ Notes to pages ±±°“±±
possible through the connection of the manifold in one apperception™™ (Ak.
©©©, p. ).
· Beatrice Longuenesse describes the dependence of inner sense on the
´
understanding as a dependence on the understanding™s capacity to judge,
Kant et le pouvoir de juger, pp. ·¬. This seems right to me, but what needs to
be pointed out is that this capacity for judgment itself depends for its
existence on our capacity for impersonal (transcendental) self-conscious-
ness. It is the unity that experiences have for such self-consciousness that is
responsible for the kind of implicit unity in what we experience that makes
our judgments applicable to what we experience.
 Robert Pippin has pointed out that  ±±n was a tremendous inspiration to
the development of German idealism, since it seems to break down the
distinction between the spontaneity through which we interpret experience
and the receptivity through which it is given to us in the ¬rst place, see R.
Pippin, Hegel™s Idealism (New York: Cambridge University Press, ±), pp.
“°. Talk of what is di¬erent from the self as a posit of the self was indeed
suggested to Fichte by Kant™s talk of time as nothing but the mode in which
the mind a¬ects itself ˜˜through this positing [setzen] of the representation of
its own activity™™ ( ). While it is true that Kant does make our reception of
space and time as intuitions in a certain sense dependent on the spontaneity
of the understanding, he does not intend to absorb receptivity completely
by spontaneity. For he explicitly distinguishes space and time which have
been constructed by our spontaneity from the forms and, a fortiori, the
content of our receptivity. In the passage in which Kant uses the language
of self-positing, he also distinguishes the form or, rather, the mode accord-
ing to which self-positing occurs from that activity itself. He is also careful to
assign the unity of space and time to space and time a priori and not to
concepts of the understanding. Since understanding is operating through
imagination, concepts are not being explicitly applied to objects. This is
why Kant then refers to section . If there were no forms of receptivity for
Kant that were independent of imagination, he would indeed have fallen
into the Fichtean idea of self-positing. Wayne Waxman actually argues, in
his Kant™s Model of the Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, ±±), that
transcendental idealism commits one to the denial ˜˜not merely of supersen-
sible reality to space and time, but superimaginational as well (here construing
˜sensible™ in a sense exclusive of imagination “ contrary to Kant™s regular
practice). All spatial and temporal relations must then be supposed to exist
only in and through imagination, and in no way to characterize sensations;
there can be no ˜¬‚ux™ of representations in inner sense, and not even color
˜patches™ can be regarded as genuine data,™™ p. ±.
 Anthony Quinton, ˜˜Spaces and Times,™™ Philosophy · (±), ±°“±·, is the
¬rst paper to defend the possibility of experiential spaces that might be
disconnected. M. Hollis, ˜˜Times and Spaces,™™ Mind · (±·), µ“µ,
extends the possibility of disconnected experiences to experiences of discon-
nected times. Richard Swinburne attacks the incoherence of such partially
Notes to pages ±±“±· µµ
connected times in his Space and Time (London: Macmillan, ±), pp. ±¬.
In ˜˜Time,™™ Analysis  (±µ), ±“±±, he maintains that the notion of
partially connected times is not coherent because it would not preserve
personal identity. But, of course, this assumes that personal identity is
something that we know must be preserved. I have already argued that
Kant rejects such an assumption.
° The theory upon which the existence of singularities is based is developed in
Stephen Hawking and Brian Ellis, The Large Scale Structure of Spacetime
(Cambridge University Press, ±·).
± ˜˜When we combine quantum mechanics with general relativity, there
seems to be a new possibility that did not arise before: that space and time
together might form a ¬nite, four-dimensional space without singularities or
boundaries, like the surface of the earth but with more dimensions.™™
Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time (New York: Doubleday, ±), p.
±·.

  ©  -  ®  ©  µ  ®    © ®   ®  ¬ § ©  
± There is a helpful discussion of the connection between the subject“predi-
cate structure in judgment and the Kantian notion of substance in Dieter
Sche¬el, ˜˜Der Anfang der transzendentalen Deduktion im Falle der
Kategorie der Substanz,™™ in G. Funke (ed.), Akten des µten Internationalen
Kant-Kongresses (Bonn: Bouvier, ±µ), pp. “°±.
 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, pp. ±“±.
 Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, pp. ±“±°.
 Kant™s reference to substances in appearance rules out Gordon Nagel™s
suggestion that the argument against multiple time-series is directed against
the possibility of di¬erent time-series implicit in Leibniz™s monadology and
in his notion of pre-established harmony, The Structure of Experience, (Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, ±), p. ±. The time-series of a monad are not
series that either Kant or Leibniz would ascribe to appearances, but rather
to things as they are in themselves. Leibniz anticipates Kant™s insistence
that phenomenal objects are subject to changes that must be empirically
determinable. So Leibniz™s views concerning phenomenal substance are
not a good target for Kant either.
µ Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, pp. ±“±. The argument is also criticized
by Broad, ˜˜Kant™s First and Second Analogies of Experience,™™ ±“±°;
Wol¬, Kant™s Theory of Mental Activity, p. µ±; and Bennett, Kant™s Analytic, p.
°°.
 Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker, ˜˜Kant™s ˜First Analogy of Experience™ and
¨
Conservation Principles of Physics,™™ Synthese  (±·±), ·µ“µ; Allison in
Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, pp. ±°¬; Guyer in Kant and the Claims of
Knowledge, pp. ±µ¬; and Van Cleve, ˜˜Substance, Matter and Kant™s First
Analogy,™™ Kant-Studien ·° (±·), ±µ“±±.
· Franz Brentano, Kategorienlehre (Hamburg: Meiner, ±), pp. °“·. A
helpful discussion of Brentano™s critique of Kant™s proof is to be found in
µ Notes to pages ±“±
Roderick Chisholm, ˜˜Beginnings and Endings,™™ in P. van Inwagen (ed.),
Time and Cause (Dordrecht: Reidel, ±°), esp. pp. ±¬.
 James van Cleve, ˜˜Substance, Matter and Kant™s First Analogy™ ™™ ±“±±.
 Unlike physical states, mental states are, for Kant, inherently anomalous.
This is a function of their inherently perspectival character. But, as long as
mental states have physical counterparts, an objective correlate may be
found for all statements ascribing inner states to oneself, even though there
is no way of reducing inner (mental) states to outer (physical) states. There
are two excellent discussions of Kant™s denial of lawlike properties to
psychological states: Theodore Mischel, ˜˜Kant and the Possibility of a
Science of Psychology,™™ Monist µ± (±·), µ“, and Meerbote, ˜˜Kant on

<< . .

. 26
( : 30)



. . >>