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the Nondeterminate Character of Human Actions,™™ pp. ±µµ¬.
±° Kant™s appeal to the successiveness of representations has led Arthur Mel-
nick, Kant™s Analogies of Experience (University of Chicago Press, ±·), p. ,
and Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. µ, to argue that Kant takes
our (putative) lack of direct experience of temporal succession as a key
premise in his argument for the need for causal connection to determine the
temporal relations between representations. This is based on an interpreta-
tion of the synthesis of apprehension at   that I have already rejected in
my discussion of the A-Deduction. In the second edition of the Second
Analogy, Kant contrasts my consciousness that my imagination posits one
state before the other with knowledge of the objective relation between
states ( “). This strongly suggests that we are or can be directly
conscious of succession, while we do not have direct knowledge of the
objective relations between parts of an event, or between di¬erent events. It
does not mean, of course, that we therefore have knowledge of the order
even of subjective succession by introspection alone.
±± Van Cleve, ˜˜Four Recent Interpretations of Kant™s Second Analogy,™™ ·±¬.
± The idea that perceptions are bound down to the order of changes in the
object perceived may be a critical allusion to section µ of Hume™s Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding, E. Steinberg (ed.) (Indianapolis: Hackett,
±±): ˜˜All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows
another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem
conjoined, but never connected. And as we can have no idea of anything
which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the
necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connexion or
power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning,
when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life.™™
± Broad, ˜˜Kant™s First and Second Analogies of Experience,™™ ±µ. Wol¬,
Kant™s Theory of Mental Activity, p. , and Bennett, Kant™s Analytic, pp.
±“, among others, have understood Kant to be confusing subjective
sequence with objective sequence.
± Thus Harper and Van Cleve have argued that the reconstruction of the
argument in D. P. Dryer, Kant™s Solution for Veri¬cation in Metaphysics (London:
Allen and Unwin, ±), esp. pp. ±¬., fails to show that causal connections
Notes to pages ±“± µ·
are necessary to distinguish the occurrence of an event. The objection ¬rst
appears in the review article by Van Cleve, ˜˜Four Recent Interpretations of
Kant™s Second Analogy,™™ . He attributes it to William Harper. Harper
and Meerbote take up the objection in their very helpful introductory essay
to Kant on Causality, Freedom and Objectivity (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, ±), pp. ±“±.
±µ Harrison, ˜˜Transcendental Arguments and Idealism,™™ pp. ±µ“±, accuses
Kant of shifting in his defence of causation from a de dicto to a de re necessity.
Strawson famously diagnoses ˜˜a non-sequitur of numbing grossness™™ in
Kant™s analysis, in his The Bounds of Sense, p. ±. This point is related, but
somewhat di¬erent. As Strawson sees it, Kant shifts from a conceptual
necessity based on the fact of a change, to a causal necessity that a change
occur. Strawson™s justi¬cation of the non-sequitur is based in part on a modal
fallacy pointed out by Van Cleve in ˜˜Four Recent Interpretations,™™ .
Strawson treats the consequent of the conditional necessity involved in event
perception (whose antecedent is not itself necessary) as a conceptual necessity,
thus confusing it with the conceptual necessity of the conditional which must
be ful¬lled, if a perceptual sequence is to be a perception of a change.
± According to Arthur Lovejoy, ˜˜On Kant™s Reply to Hume,™™ Archiv fur ¨
Geschichte der Philosophie (±°), °“°·, Kant falsely infers a synthetic
necessity connecting states of objects from the analytic necessity of the
irreversibility of the sequence of perceptions in the perception of an event.
Lovejoy is correct that the perceptual isomorphism holding between the
sequence of perceptions of a ship going downstream and that objective
occurrence is based on analysis of what it means to be an event. But Kant™s
argument is not analytic as Lovejoy maintains. Causal connections are
conditions for the recognition of events, not part of the meaning of an event.
Without objective changes we could not have any knowledge of subjective
changes either. It is a substantive precondition of experience for Kant, and
not a matter of an analysis of the meaning of the concept of an event, as
Graham Bird, Kant™s Theory of Knowledge, pp. ±µ·¬., interprets the Second
Analogy. For Bird, the causal law is a ˜˜conceptual truth™™ that determines
the meaning of the terms ˜˜cause™™ and ˜˜event™™, see esp. pp. ±, ±µ“±.
±· Arthur Melnick seems to be the ¬rst commentator to emphasize the import-
ance of the idea that changes must be recognizable in the argument of the
Second Analogy, cf. Kant™s Analogies of Experience, pp. ¬.
± Allison, Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, p. .
± ¨
Arthur Schopenhauer, Uber die vierfache Wurzel vom zureichenden Grund. Kleinere
Schriften:Samtliche Werke III (Frankfurt: Cotta-Insel, ±), p. ±±µ.
¨

·   µ   ¬ ¬ · 
± A quite di¬erent reading of this passage may be found in Buchdahl, who
insists on the independence of the kind of necessity involved in speci¬c
causal laws from the necessity involved in the general causal principle; see
Gerd Buchdahl, ˜˜Causality, Causal Laws, and Scienti¬c Theory in the
µ Notes to pages ±“±
Philosophy of Kant,™™ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science ± (±µ),
±·“°.
 Melnick, Kant™s Analogies of Experience, pp. , °“±; Guyer, Kant and the
Claims of Knowledge, pp. µ“µµ, µ“µ.
 Henry Allison defends the view that Kant does not require the existence of
speci¬c causal covering laws in Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, pp. “,
and more recently in considerably modi¬ed form in ˜˜Causality and Causal
Law in Kant: A Critique of Michael Friedman,™™ in Idealism and Freedom, pp.
°“±. He appears to have been strongly in¬‚uenced by papers of Gerd
Buchdahl.
 The view that causal connections need not imply the existence of causal
laws for Kant is defended by Henry Allison, Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, p.
°.
µ Buchdahl, ˜˜Causality, Causal Laws, and Scienti¬c Theory in the Philos-
ophy of Kant,™™ ±·“°.
 Ibid., ±.
· Ibid., ±·“°.
 Allison, Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, p. °.
 Allison in ˜˜Causality and Causal Law in Kant,™™ p. .
±° Paton, Kant™s Metaphysic of Experience, vol. , pp. ·µ“·.
±± Ibid., p. ·.
± Michael Friedman, ˜˜Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural
Science,™™ in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, pp. ± and ±·°.
± Ibid., p. ±·°.
± Allison, ˜˜Causality and Causal Law in Kant,™™ p. ·.
±µ The view that the necessity of speci¬c causal laws is not due to the
understanding and the general causal principle is defended by Buchdahl in
Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, ±),
pp. µ±“µ, ˜˜Causality, Causal Laws, and Scienti¬c Theory in the Philos-
ophy of Kant,™™ °°“°±, and °, and ˜˜The Kantian ˜Dynamic of Reason™
with Special Reference to the Place of Causality in Kant™s System,™™ in L.
Beck (ed.), Kant-Studies Today (LaSalle Ill.: Open Court, ±), pp. °“.
Guyer also argues that necessity is derived from reason or re¬‚ective judg-
ment, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. ±, and also, Paul Guyer, ˜˜Kant™s
Conception of Empirical Law,™™ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society supp. vol.
 (±°), ±“. The e¬ort to prise apart the necessity of speci¬c causal
laws from the necessity of the general causal principle is criticized by
Friedman, ˜˜Causal Laws,™™ pp. ±·°“±·, ±°¬. Susan Neiman argues plaus-
ibly that the need for the existence of causal regularities in order to be able
to apply the concept of causation implies that the regulative principles of
reason are required in order for the understanding to function correctly, The
Unity of Reason, p. µ·. This is the conclusion that suggests itself from my
analysis of the connection between speci¬c forms of lawlikeness in nature
and the general lawlikeness of nature that Kant postulates in the A-
Deduction in terms of the transcendental a¬nity of nature.
Notes to pages ±“± µ
± Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. µ.
±· Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences, pp. ±·±¬.
± Melnick, Kant™s Analogies of Experience, p. ±µ; Guyer, Kant and the Claims of
Knowledge, p. °.
± Kant™s thesis that incompatibilism and compatibilism are compatible is
emphasized by Allen Wood, ˜˜Kant™s Compatibilism,™™ in A. Wood (ed.), Self
and Nature in Kant™s Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, ±), pp.
·“±°±.
° The most extensive account of the Davidsonian interpretation of Kant™s
account of agency is Hud Hudson, Kant™s Compatibilism (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, ±), esp. pp. ¬. But the view originates with Ralf
Meerbote, ˜˜Kant on the Nondeterminate Character of Human Actions,™™
pp. ±“±.
± The view that thought is only relatively spontaneous for Kant is defended by
Ingeborg Heidemann, ˜˜Der Begri¬ der Spontaneitat in der Kritik der reinen
¨
Vernunft,™™ esp. p. ; D. Henrich, ˜˜Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes,™™ in A.
Schwan (ed.), Denken im Schatten des Nihilismus (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, ±·µ), pp. µµ“±±; W. Sellars, ˜˜This I or he or it (the thing)
which thinks,™™ esp. p. °; Ameriks, Kant™s Theory of Mind, p. ±·; Kitcher,
Kant™s Transcendental Psychology, p. µ.
 Allison defends absolute spontaneity for thought in ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of
Materialism,™™ in Idealism and Freedom (New York: Cambridge University
Press, ±), pp. “±°, and in his Kant™s Theory of Freedom (New York:
Cambridge University Press, ±°), pp. °“±. It is also defended by Robert
Pippin, ˜˜Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind,™™ Canadian Journal of Philosophy ±·
(±·), esp. “·. The interpretation of Kant™s theory of spontaneity that
assimilates freedom in judgment to free will goes back to Fichte, but the
substantive view that judgment requires an incompatibilist interpretation of
freedom is already defended by Descartes in his Fourth Meditation.

  ¬ ¦ -  ® ©  µ  ®    ® ¤   °  µ ¤  - ¤ ©   ©° ¬ © ® 
¦    ®   ® ¤ ®  ¬ °     ¬  §
± Kant did not free himself from commitment to the project of rational
psychology until quite late in his career. Kant still thought of the subject of
thought as theoretically knowable in the substantial terms suggested by the
four basic paralogisms that he identi¬es in rational psychology into the
middle of the ±··°s. His discovery of the fallacies involved in inferences from
self-consciousness to substantive claims about the nature of the self or the soul
was the last important innovation in his thinking prior to publication of the
Critique in ±·±. The evidence for this claim is assembled in Wolfgang Carl, Der
Schweigende Kant (Gottingen: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, ±), pp. ±°±¬.
¨
 Karl Ameriks shows more interest in the metaphysical side of Kant than
most interpreters of the Paralogisms, emphasizing the extent of agreement
between the positive conception of mind that underlies Kant™s critique of
rationalism in the Paralogisms and traditional rationalists™ views. ˜˜The
° Notes to pages ±“±·
Critique of Metaphysics: Kant and Traditional Ontology,™™ in P. Guyer
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant (New York: Cambridge University
Press, ±), pp. “·, and especially Kant™s Theory of Mind: An Analysis of
the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. Ameriks links his approach to the metaphysical
approach to Kant that was in favor in the ±°s in Germany. ˜˜Understand-
ing Apperception Today,™™ in P. Perrini (ed.), Kant and Contemporary Epistemol-
ogy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, ±), pp. ±“·. At the same time, however, he
defends a metaphysical de¬‚ationary epistemological interpretation of the ˜˜I
think.™™ For instance, Ameriks rejects the thesis that Kant requires a notion
of absolute freedom or spontaneity to make sense of theoretical reasoning
and self-consciousness in favor of a relatively spontaneous conception of
self-consciousness. Ameriks criticizes Guyer™s interpretation of the ˜˜I think™™
as requiring a de re necessity, linking an analytic interpretation of the
principle that representations must be self-ascribable to the synthetic as-
sumption that we have empirical knowledge in his ˜˜Kant and Guyer on
Apperception,™™ Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie µ, ±°n. Ameriks then
¨
circumvents the problem of how knowledge is to be justi¬ed by dropping
any presumption that the possibility of knowledge is to be established in the
Deduction in ˜˜Kant™s Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argu-
ment,™™ Kant-Studien  (±·), ·“·. Kant is taken simply to assume the
existence of empirical knowledge.
 One may call the self that is the logical object of self-consciousness a
quasi-object to distinguish it from objects subject to third-person criteria of
identi¬cation, cf. Dieter Sturma, Kant uber Selbstbewußtsen (Hildesheim:
¨
Olms, ±µ), p. ±°.
 R. Descartes, La Recherche de la verite, in Oeuvres completes, Charles Adam and
´´ `
Adam Tannery (eds.) (Paris: Leopold Cerf, ±·“±±), vol. ±°, p. µ±.
µ Patricia Kitcher takes the First Paralogism as well as the Third to be about
the permanence of the ˜˜I,™™ Kant™s Transcendental Psychology, p. ±. But I have
tried to show that the First Paralogism is not about permanence or persist-
ence, but about being a basic particular. It is the task of the Third
Paralogism to deal with persistence and permanence. I discuss the Third
Paralogism in more detail in my paper, ˜˜Personal Identity and Kant™s
Third Person Perspective,™™ Idealistic Studies  (±), pp. ±“±.
 I owe the term ˜˜immunity to reference failure owing to misidenti¬cation™™
to Sydney Shoemaker, ˜˜Persons and their Pasts,™™ Identity, Cause, and Mind
(New York: Cambridge University Press, ±), pp. ±“, esp. pp. °¬.
Shoemaker restricts immunity to reference failure to non-deviant causal
and representational circumstances governing personal identity. The possi-
bility of branching and fusion of persons is thus excluded. This restriction
re¬‚ects his exclusive interest in the empirical notion of a person, that is, the
notion of a person linked to a particular representational history.
· Paul Guyer takes Kant to be committed in the Third Paralogism to the
actual existence of other minds that exist outside of me; Paul Guyer,
˜˜Placing Myself in Time: Kant™s Third Paralogism,™™ p. µ±. But there is no
Notes to pages ±·“±µ ±
compelling reason to interpret Kant this way. Kant talks of one taking the
standpoint of another, and of how, in order for one to take another™s
standpoint, one need not assume that the other person actually exists.
Indeed, Kant™s notion of a problematic use of the ˜˜I think™™ in the ascription
of thoughts would suggest that we cannot infer that another exists from the
fact that we can take the other™s perspective. There is thus also no reason to
see a con¬‚ict between Kant™s project in the Refutation of Idealism of
showing that inner experience presupposes outer experience and the argu-
ment in the ¬rst edition version of the Third Paralogism, as Guyer does.
Kant does not claim that one could not have the notion of a temporal order
for one™s experiences without the actual existence of another mind. Instead,
he argues that we could not have such a notion without the possibility of
taking the point of view of another possible mind. It seems plausible to
argue that the very notion of the kind of outer object presupposed in the
Refutation of Idealism as a condition under which inner experience is
possible is, in turn, only intelligible to us if we can abstract from our present
point of view and thus place ourselves in time and space relative to other
actual and possible objects.
 This possibility is discussed by Sydney Shoemaker, ˜˜Persons and their
Pasts,™™ °.
 Contemporary controversy over ˜˜repressed memories,™™ for instance in
cases of alleged child molestation, has become focused on the extent to
which putative memories of abuse might be the result of suggestion by the
therapists questioning the purported victims; see E. F. Loftus, ˜˜The Reality
of Repressed Memories,™™ American Psychologist  (±), µ±“µ·. The
important point is that the individuals in question believe themselves to
have a certain history, and this is as far as immunity to reference failure
extends.
±° A critical discussion of Leibniz™s views on immortality and continuity of
consciousness may be found in Margaret Wilson, ˜˜Leibniz, Self-Conscious-
ness and Immortality: In the Paris Notes and After,™™ Archiv fur Geschichte der
¨
Philosophie, Sonderheft µ (±·), µ“µ.

  · © ®¤ °  ®¤ ®  ©     ¬¦ ¦  ©   ¤ ?
± The importance of the simplicity of I thoughts for Kant™s argument in the
Deduction is emphasized by D. Henrich, ˜˜Identity and Objectivity,™™ pp.
±¬.
 Jonathan Bennett brings this ¬rst-personal perspective out in his essay ˜˜The
Simplicity of the Soul,™™ The Journal of Philosophy (±), µ. Unfortunately,
Bennett™s ascription of methodological solipsism to Kant leads him to argue
that ˜˜Kant is wholly inattentive . . . to all aspects of the notion of an
embodied mind,™™ p. µµ. But Kant™s view is that I have an empirical self only
as a human being, and hence an embodied mind. This mind is indirectly
accessible to the third-person point of view through its connection with the
human being™s body.
 Notes to pages ±“±
 Henry Allison takes the argument from simplicity to the self to go against
non-reductive as well as reductive materialism in ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of
Materialism,™™ in his Idealism and Freedom, p. ·.
 Rene, Descartes, Oeuvres completes, vol. ©©, p. ±. A helpful discussion of
´ `
embodiment in Descartes may be found in Paul Ho¬man, ˜˜The Unity of
Descartes™s Man,™™ The Philosophical Review µ (±), “·°.
µ Allison, ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of Materialism,™™ p. ·.
 Leibniz, On the Manner of Distinguishing Real Phenomena from Imaginary, in
Philosophische Schriften, C. J. Gerhard (ed.) (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, ±·),
©©, p. ±. See Nicholas Jolley, ˜˜Leibniz and Phenomenalism,™™ Studia
Leibniziana ± (±), .
· It has been suggested that the Fourth Paralogism™s critique of ˜˜dogmatic
idealism™™ ( ··) is directed at Leibniz rather than Berkeley; see George W.
Miller, ˜˜Kant™s First Edition Refutation of Dogmatic Idealism,™™ Kant-
Studien  (±·±), “±. But this is hardly plausible. Leibniz never main-
tains that matter is a self-contradictory notion, despite his interest in the
˜˜labyrinth of the continuum™™ and in a reduction of matter to force. The
dogmatic idealism of the ¬rst edition has also been identi¬ed with the
position of Bayle and Charles Collier, whose Clavis Universalis was bundled
with a German translation of Berkeley™s Three Dialogues in a collection by
Johann Christian Eschenbach, Samlung der vornehmsten Schriftsteller die die
Wirklichkeit ihres eignen Korpers und der ganzen Korperwelt leugnen (Rostock: Anton
¨ ¨
Ferdinand Rose, ±·µ). Lewis Robinson, ˜˜Contributions a l™histoire de
¨ `
l™evolution philosophique de Kant,™™ Revue de metaphysique et de morale ±
´
(±), ±“±, argues for regarding Bayle and Collier as the targets of the
criticism of dogmatic idealism. Heinz Heimsoeth, ˜˜Arthur Collier und der
Durchbruch des neuzeitlichen Bewußtseinsidealismus,™™ Studien zur Philos-
ophiegeschichte (Koln: Kolner Universitatsverlag, ±±), identi¬es Kant™s no-
¨ ¨ ¨
tion of skeptical idealism with Bayle™s skepticism. Heimsoeth maintains that
Kant has Descartes™s methodical doubt in mind when Kant refers to
problematic idealism, p. ·. But, as Wolfgang Muller-Lauter, ˜˜Kants
¨
Widerlegung des materialen Idealismus,™™ Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie
¨
 (±), points out on p. , Kant never explicitly distinguishes between
skeptical and problematic idealism, as he should have done. Skeptical
idealism would actually deny the existence of the external world, whereas
problematic idealism would merely entertain that denial as a hypothesis.
 However, Leibniz and Wol¬ provide obvious targets for the First and
Second Paralogisms; cf. Margaret Wilson, ˜˜Leibniz and Materialism,™™
Canadian Journal of Philosophy (±·), µ°¬.
 The controversy between Kant and Garve and Feder is discussed in helpful
detail by Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, ±·), pp. ±·¬.

± °     §µ  ®   § ©®   ©¤  ¬©  
± Martin Heidegger has suggested in Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh
(New York: State University of New York Press, ±), ˜˜that the ˜scandal of
Notes to pages ±“± 
philosophy™ is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are
expected and attempted again and again,™™ p. °µ (cited according to the
original pagination of the ± German edition reprinted in the translation).
On the other hand, Heidegger o¬ers what amounts to an argument for the
existence of objects outside of us. His argument for the assumption that
Being-in-the-World is a condition for the possibility of the temporal exist-
ence of the self, has at least some similarity with Kant™s argument in the
Refutation of Idealism. There are two key di¬erences. Heidegger attempts
to avoid the use of any assertions in his argument. This is only a super¬cial
advantage, since in order to have conviction his argument needs to be
reformulatable in terms of premises involving assertions. Heidegger also
rejects Kant™s assumption that there is a theoretical approach to the world
that is independent of our practical involvements. This raises too many
questions to answer here. It will have to su¬ce to say that it is not clear that
the problem of skepticism about the external world is substantially changed
by shifting to the perspective of an agent. For the agent must also have some
reason to believe that he or she is able to have a genuine e¬ect in the
external world.
 The allusion is to F. H. Jacobi, David Hume uber den Glauben, oder Idealismus
¨
und Realismus, ein Gesprach (Breslau: Lowe, ±·µ). Unlike Hume, Jacobi does
¨ ¨
not deny that our belief in the existence of the external world is true,
instead he argues only that it is indemonstrable. The problem is that we
cannot infer from what we perceive that objects exist even when they are
not perceived.
 Edwin McCann, ˜˜Skepticism and Kant™s B-Deduction,™™ ··¬. McCann
argues that the second step of the B-Deduction shows that one cannot even
think of oneself as an individual subject of conscious states without having
the determinate self-knowledge that is the basis for Kant™s argument in the
Refutation.
 H. J. Paton takes the empirical determination of consciousness to exclude
pure apperception in favor of objects of inner sense (Kant™s Metaphysic of
Experience, pp. ··“·).
µ Bennett identi¬es empirical consciousness with empirical knowledge of
one™s own history, Kant™s Analytic, p. °µ. Meerbote, identi¬es empirically
determined consciousness with the empirical cognition of our sensation-
states (and thought-states), ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of Problematic Material
Idealism,™™ pp. ±±“±±·. Similar views are expressed by Richard Aquila,
˜˜Personal Identity and Kant™s ˜Refutation of Idealism,™ ™™ Kant-Studien ·°
(±·), ±; McCann, ˜˜Skepticism and Kant™s B-Deduction,™™ ; and
Baum, ˜˜The B-Deduction and Kant™s Refutation of Idealism,™™ p. µ.
Allison™s interpretation of the Refutation seems also to favor an appeal to
self-knowledge as the lead-o¬ premise in the argument. He identi¬es the
consciousness presupposed in this premise as actual self-knowledge rather
than mere self-consciousness (Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, p. ·). He also
maintains that Kant identi¬es this consciousness of inner states with inner
experience ( ·µ). But, on the other hand, he claims that the argument is
 Notes to pages °°“°
committed to the real possibility of empirical self-knowledge. The notion of
real possibility in Kant is somewhat obscure, but Allison interprets real
possibility as being possible in or over a period of time in accordance with
the Analogies of Experience (Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, pp. ±“±°). It is
thus somewhat unclear what strength Allison gives to the ¬rst premise. The
¬rst premise might presuppose that one has actual self-knowledge or that
one is only in a position to acquire such self-knowledge.
 Bennett maintains Kant™s Analytic that the Refutation does not presuppose
the argument of the First Analogy, or at least that it ought not to. Part of his
argument for this claim is that the Refutation would have to be linked ˜˜to
the latter™s [the First Analogy™s] least comprehensible part “ not to the
analysis of existence-change but to the obscure doctrine that time is perma-
nent and unperceivable,™™ p. °. Bennett does not argue for this mistaken
claim, so I shall pass over it in favor of his major criticism. ˜˜Most important
of all: if the Refutation of Idealism presupposes the First Analogy, then the
˜proof™ of the latter must be taken as o¬ering, in support of the conclusion
that self-consciousness requires experience of something permanent, an
argument which is neutral as to whether the ˜something permanent™ is inner
or outer. This is an impossible reading of the First Analogy, which is clearly
stated in both editions as a thesis about the division of ˜appearances™, i.e. of
the objective realm, into substances and properties™™ (Kant™s Analytic, pp.
°“°). Bennett™s point is based on the dubious assumption that Kant
straightaway identi¬es the objective with the outer. But this identi¬cation is
precisely part of the task of the Refutation. Neither the Deduction nor the
Analogies require such an identi¬cation in any sense.
· Allison, Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, p. °µ.
 This also seems to be the way the argument is understood by Herbert Blunt,
˜˜La Refutation kantienne de l™idealisme,™™ Revue de metaphysique et de morale,
´ ´ ´
pp. “.
 The thing outside of me is to be taken here not only as a permanent
perceptible, but as something that belongs with me to a unitary experience.
And this experience is as much something external as it is something
internal to my consciousness.

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