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±° Erling Skorpen, ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of Idealism,™™ Journal of the History of
Philosophy, maintains that ˜˜permanence cannot be a strict a priori concept if,
as Kant claims in the Refutation, permanent objects can be directly per-
ceived as such without the help of representations of permanence. If they
can, then the concept of permanence begins to look like an a posteriori
concept, and so too the concepts of time and substance which are analyti-
cally bound up with it,™™ p. . But permanent objects may be directly
perceived despite the fact that permanence itself is not directly perceptible
or even something of which one can have strictly empirical knowledge.
Skorpen goes on to suggest that Kant™s transcendental idealism is incompat-
ible with the thesis of direct perception that is crucial to the Refutation of
Idealism: ˜˜What would have to be modi¬ed in keeping with the Refutation
Notes to pages °“° µ
is the claim that the object of perception and knowledge is fashioned in its
essentials by the sensibility and understanding of man and is therefore
di¬erent from the thing-in-itself,™™ p. °. This also seems to me to be
mistaken for similar reasons.
±± Broad, Kant: An Introduction, p. ±.
± Douglas Langston has criticized the thesis that the arguments of the Fourth
Paralogism and the Refutation are incompatible in ˜˜The Supposed Incom-
patibility between Kant™s Refutations of Idealism,™™ Southern Journal of Philos-
ophy, µ“. Langston focuses on the issue of whether the claim in the
Fourth Paralogism that I am immediately conscious of my representations is
incompatible with the claim in the Refutation that external objects are
anything in me at all. The incompatibility is asserted both by Kemp-Smith, A
Commentary on Kant™s ˜˜Critique of Pure Reason™™ pp. ±“±, and A. C. Ewing, A
Short Commentary on Kant™s ˜˜Critique of Pure Reason™™ (Chicago University Press,
±), p. n. Surprisingly, Langston has nothing to say about the crucial fact
that the Fourth Paralogism argument asserts a symmetry of immediacy
between external and internal experience that is rejected in the Refutation.
± Moore rejects the need for an argument for things that no sane person
would doubt. But this is not even compelling on Moore™s own terms, since
he admits the possibility of having inferential or indirect knowledge of things
that can also be known directly or immediately. Moore agrees with Kant
that our knowledge of external objects is immediate. This is why he thinks
that raising his hands provides a proof of the existence of external objects.
One has direct perceptual knowledge of these objects. Barring some further
knowledge of unusual causal conditions such as hallucination, knowledge
that these hands are mine is as certain as anything is. We know that these
hands are here immediately, although we may con¬rm or discon¬rm our
judgment through appeal to much more indirect sources of evidence. ˜˜We
can now see that Kant insists on our possession of just the kind of knowledge
G. E. Moore thought he was exhibiting in his proof of an external world . . .
No theory that represents our knowledge of external things as indirect or
inferential could account for that knowledge; it could not show that we are
in the very position Moore unquestioningly took himself to be in,™™ Barry
Stroud, The Signi¬cance of Philosophical Skepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
±), p. ±.
± Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. .
±µ Erling Skorpen maintains in ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of Idealism,™™ pp. “,
that ˜˜Kant™s implication in the Refutation is not only that self-knowledge is
inseparable for world-knowledge, but that there is nothing we know about
ourselves which is not already reference to an external world. Any autobio-
graphical or biographical reference, including those growing out of
psychoanalysis, is con¬rmation for this. For even reports like ˜I was hostile,™
˜I am hallucinating,™ etc., are elliptical for longer reports starting where,
when, and under what circumstances,™™ p. . In ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of
Idealism,™™ Journal of the History of Philosophy ± (±·), ±µ“°, Myron
 Notes to pages °µ“°
Gochnauer criticizes Skorpen™s attempt to make all knowledge of inner
states not only dependent upon, but actually inclusive of, knowledge of
outer states (see p. °). Gochnauer maintains that it should be possible to
know that one is performing a logical inference or a mathematical calcula-
tion without also referring to the outside world. ˜˜I might feel sick and I
might solve equations even if there were no external world. But what I could
not do without an external world is to know the temporal ordering of these
two items of consciousness,™™ p. °. The dependence of Kant™s theory of
arithmetic (and of mathematics in general) on spatial sequence undercuts
this alleged independence from spatial models for arithmetic. Mathematics
is based on schemata “ generative rules “ for producing inherently spatial
objects of perception in imagination ( ±°/ ±·: ˜˜Bilder™™). The issue must
be pushed back to the general status of objects of imagination. Raw feelings
are di¬cult for another reason. It is not obvious that the connection
between raw feelings such as pains and the body is a contingent one. This is
at least a controversial issue and one that Kant does not express an explicit
opinion on. Even the independence of logic from spatial objects is less clear
cut than it might seem to be, since Kant thinks that without any implicit
reference to objects of experience, logic cannot make any bona ¬de commit-
ments to the existence of objects.
± An exhaustive survey of the relevant evidence is to be found in a chapter on
˜˜The Application of the Categories to the Self,™™ in A. C. Ewing, Kant™s
Treatment of Causality (London: Kegan Paul, ±), pp. ±“±.
±· This interpretation has been pursued recently by Ralf Meerbote in his
article ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of Problematic Material Idealism,™™ in B. den
Ouden and M. Moen (eds.), New Essays on Kant (New York: Peter Lang,
±), pp. ±±±“±µ. Meerbote derives inspiration for his view from Donald
Davidson™s anomalous monism. The ascription of lawlike relations to men-
tal events only under a physical description need not entail a commitment to
physicalism. The identity relation is, after all, a symmetrical one. Some
further premise is needed beyond the anomalous monist thesis to lead one to
physicalism. The physicalism that Davidson and Meerbote defend requires
not only that the physical states instantiating animal representations (and
indeed human representations) be subject to the causal principle, but also
the further premise that mental events are only subject to causal laws under
a physical description. It does not, to be sure, require that mental events are
only caused or causal under a physical description, since, for Davidson,
causation is an extensional notion. However, I cannot ¬nd a premise in
Kant that would justify the ascription to him of physicalism.
± Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. .
± Ibid., p. ±.
° Ibid., p. .
± Ibid., p. .
 Ibid., p. ±µ.
 Ibid., p. ·.
Notes to pages °·“±° ·
 P. Guyer, ˜˜Placing Myself in Time,™™ p. µ.
µ Eckart Forster, ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of Idealism,™™ p. µ. Forster™s objection
¨ ¨
of a contradiction between the theory of space in the Transcendental
Aesthetic and the externality claim of the Refutation goes back to Hans
Vaihinger™s article ˜˜Zu Kants Widerlegung des Idealismus,™™ Strassburger
Abhandlungen zur Philosophie (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, ±), pp. ±±“±. An
¨
extensive criticism of Vaihinger™s claim that the argument of the Refutation
is inconsistent with transcendental idealism is to be found in a postscript to
Anton Thomson, ˜˜Bemerkungen zur Kritik des Kantischen Begri¬s des
Dinges an sich,™™ Kant-Studien  (±°), “µ·.
 Eckart Forster seems to be attracted to the view that the refutation entails a
¨
form of extreme idealism, since he argues that the ˜˜full-¬‚edged idealism™™ he
¬nds in Kant™s incomplete work, the so-called Opus Postumum, is unavoid-
able, if the Refutation is to be integrated into Kant™s philosophy as a whole,
Forster, ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of Idealism,™™ esp. p. °.
¨
· H. A. Pritchard, Kant™s Theory of Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ±°±),
maintains that Kant means: ˜˜a thing external in the sense of independent of
mind, i.e. a thing in itself. For the nerve of the argument consists in the
contention that the permanent the perception of which is required for
consciousness of my successive states must be a thing external to me, and a
thing external to me in opposition to a representation of a thing external to
me can only be a thing in itself,™™ pp. “. Pritchard goes on to ¬nd a
contradiction between this notion of externality and that of the phenomenal
externality of things in space. Perhaps he does not give ˜˜dependence on my
mind™™ the normal connotation of privacy. But even then he has failed to
make out his claim of contradiction. Robert Dostal, ˜˜Kant™s Refutation of
Idealism: Transcendental Idealism and Phenomenalism,™™ in G. Funke (ed.),
Akten des µten Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (Bonn: Bouvier, ±±), discusses
and rejects the phenomenalism that Pritchard attributes to Kant, as well as
Pritchard™s view that the reference to things in themselves is unintentional in
the Refutation (p. ±·). Although it may be unclear whether Pritchard
argues from the privacy of all appearances to the need for external things
that are things in themselves, the argument is explicit in Broad (Kant: An
Introduction, pp. ±“±).
 There is a tendency in the literature to gloss transcendental realism as
synonymous with any awareness of things in themselves. ˜˜But Kant does
not accept realism, understood ˜transcendentally.™ For him it is not true
˜transcendentally™ that we are aware of things that are independent of us.
The correct ˜transcendental™ position is idealism: what we perceive and
know are all ˜appearances,™ things that are dependent on us,™™ Barry Stroud,
˜˜Kant and Skepticism,™™ in M. Burnyeat (ed.), The Skeptical Tradition (Ber-
keley: University of California Press, ±), p. ±. Stroud™s discussion of the
role of transcendental idealism in Kant™s argument against skepticism is
quite helpful. But some direct awareness of things as they exist in themselves
is necessary if Kant™s inference from the existence of appearances to the
 Notes to pages ±±“
existence of things as they exist in themselves is to be valid. This is consistent
with the restriction of all descriptive knowledge to appearances.
 According to J. Findlay, there is the same demand for something outside of
the subject to act on the subject in the case of transcendental self-conscious-
ness, as in the case of empirical self-consciousness. Kant studiously used the
terms ˜˜outside™™ and ˜˜external™™ in an ambiguous manner so as to cover both
the phenomenal outsidedness of bodies in space and the meta-empirical,
transcendental outsidedness of things-in-themselves to that thing-in-itself
which is our own transcendental self: John N. Findlay, Kant and the Transcen-
dental Object (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ±±), pp. ±“±µ.
° Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. .
± I have criticized this view in my discussion of the synthesis of apprehension
in chapter three. It is also rejected by Anthony Bruckner in his critical
discussion of Guyer™s reconstruction of the Refutation in ˜˜The Anti-Skepti-
cal Epistemology of the Refutation of Idealism,™™ Philosophical Topics ±
(±±), “µ.

± ±   °©  ©  ¬   ¬ ©  ® ¤    ®  ® ¤  ®   ¬ © ¤  ¬ ©  
± A parallel claim is made for time ( µ“/ µ).
 Against such interpreters as Allison and Strawson, Guyer maintains that the
non-spatiality of things in themselves is the premise from which Kant
argues here for the subjectivity of space, rather than a conclusion drawn
from the premise that space is inherently subjective ˜˜the passage concisely
displays the order of Kant™s inference from the nonspatiality of things in
themselves to the merely subjective nature of space, as well as the claim
about knowledge of necessity on which the premise of this inference itself is
based,™™ Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. µµ. However, the phrase ˜˜that is™™
in the second sentence does not seem to introduce an inference from the
claim made in the ¬rst sentence, but rather a mere explication of the
meaning of that ¬rst sentence. The a priori, and hence necessary, character
of intuition seems to be the claim about knowledge of necessity to which
Guyer also refers as the basis of Kant™s argument. However, it should be
noted that Kant appeals to a distinctive intuitive necessity rather than some
general notion of necessity as the basis for his argument. Since intuition is a
form of representation, some notion of the subjectivity of space is involved
in the initial premise of the argument.
 Kant addresses the problematic character of a priori intuition in the
Prolegomena (section “±°, Ak. ©, pp. ±“). He notes that, since intuition
depends for its existence on the immediate presence of its object, this seems
to rule out the very existence of a priori intuition. For a priori intuition
cannot depend on the previous or present object that intuition requires.
Intuition would have to depend on the presence of givenness of the object, if
the object were a thing in itself. Thus, any intuition of things in themselves
would have to be empirical. A priori intuition is possible as an intuition of
the form according to which objects immediately present to the mind must
Notes to pages “ 
be ordered. It is possible to intuit the form according to which a thing in
itself is immediately present to the mind. But what one is intuiting according
to that form is not the thing as it exists in itself. It is only the thing as it
appears to us a priori. This is the thing as that thing must appear to us in
absolutely all situations.
 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, pp. ¬.
µ Allison, Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, p. ±±°.
 Ibid., p. ±°.
· Morris Lipson attempts to articulate a variant of Allison™s mode of presenta-
tion account of transcendental idealism that does not fall victim to the
problem in question. He argues that space is ˜˜a mode of presentation of
ontological independence.™™ Morris Lipson, ˜˜On Kant on Space,™™ Paci¬c
Philosophical Quarterly · (±), ·. Kant does think of space as a mode in
which objects are presented or given to us ( /µ, µ/µ). Lipson
maintains that it makes no sense to argue that a thing in itself is in space, if
one understands space to be a mode of presentation. For, once we see that
space is the way in which ontological independence is presented to us, ˜˜we
¬nd that we have no basis for suspecting that space is anything else than
this,™™ ·. Even if we have no basis for suspecting space is anything but the
form according to which ontological independence is presented to us, space
might well also itself be genuinely independent of us. Our very ability
successfully to structure the objects of our experience spatio-temporally
suggests that there is some independent basis for the existence of space and
time.
 Allison, ˜˜Transcendental Idealism: A Retrospective,™™ Idealism and Freedom,
p. ±°.
 Allison, ˜˜Incongruence and Ideality,™™ Topoi  (±), ±“±·µ; cf. also J.
Buroker, ibid., ±··“±°.
±° Lorne Falkenstein, ˜˜Kant™s Argument for the Non-Spatiotemporality of
Things in Themselves,™™ Kant-Studien ° (±), µ“.
±± A helpful discussion of this evidence may be found in J. Buroker, Space and
Incongruence: The Origins of Kant™s Idealism (Dordrecht: Reidel, ±±).
± Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. .
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