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principle of the necessary unity of apperception is identical and hence an
analytic proposition, but explains a synthesis of the manifold that is given in one
intuition as necessary without which that pervasive identity of self-conscious-
ness could not be thought. (section ±,  ±µ)

It is analytic of a representation being my representation that it is one
that I can ascribe to the identity of my self-consciousness. But I can think
of di¬erent representations as belonging to my self-consciousness only
insofar as I can think of them as ones that are linked together by my
consciousness of self. This might suggest that these representations must
therefore have a content that is purely subjective. But Kant rightly
resists this conclusion. To think of representations as my representations
is to think of them as representations that belong together in a certain
distinctive unity of consciousness, that is, in a certain history. But they
can only belong to a certain distinctive unity of consciousness, in a
certain history, to the extent that they could be connected together with
the representations belonging to other distinctive unities of conscious-
ness, that is, to other distinctive histories, histories that are yours, his,
hers, and its. Moreover, representations can only be regarded as belong-
ing to these distinctive unities of consciousness, or points of view, insofar
as they can be taken to have cognitive signi¬cance for me and my
thought. It is my capacity for such I thoughts that allows me to represent
things from di¬erent possible points of view. I can do this precisely
because I thoughts have a conceptual content that is independent of any
particular point of view.
() The synthetic unity of consciousness is therefore an objective condition of all
cognition, not which I merely require in order to know an object, but under
which any intuition must stand in order for it to become an object for me, because in
any other way and without this synthesis this manifold would not become
uni¬ed in consciousness.The last proposition is, as was said, itself analytic,
although it makes synthetic unity the condition of all thought; for it says nothing
more than that all my representations in any given intuition must stand under
the condition that I can alone ascribe them as my representations to an identical
self, and therefore can grasp them together synthetically connected in one
apperception by means of the universal expression I think. (section ±·,  ±)
· Kant and the demands of self-consciousness

 ° °    ° ©  ®  ® ¤  ®   °    ¦      
After arguing that self-consciousness places impersonal constraints on
all my representations, Kant moves to the claim that these impersonal
constraints are the basis for concepts of objects. These concepts of
objects are then interpreted as ones that we use to form judgments and
to articulate cognition or knowledge in judgments. Initially, we expect to
see Kant derive the conditions for concept use, judgment, and knowl-
edge from the conditions governing self-consciousness; he seems instead
merely to shift from talking about conditions on self-consciousness to
talk of conditions on conceptual cognition and judgment without
clarifying how concepts or judgment depend on self-consciousness. It
seems as if, instead of arguing from the a priori enabling conditions for
the unity of self-consciousness to the a priori enabling conditions for
concepts and for knowledge of objects, he argues from the a priori
conditions governing concepts and knowledge of objects to the a priori
enabling conditions for the unity of self-consciousness.
An argument to a priori enabling conditions for self-consciousness
based on the existence of knowledge will only be convincing to the
reader who is already prepared to accept the existence of knowledge as a
given. Initial appearances to the contrary, Kant really wants to argue
that enabling conditions for the unity of self-consciousness are enabling
conditions for judgment and knowledge. His line of thought in arguing
for the idea that the uni¬ability of representations in self-consciousness
is a necessary condition for cognition may be reconstructed as follows:
knowledge involves judgment. Judgment involves the possibility of
agreement or disagreement between di¬erent persons about some pur-
ported state of a¬airs. As such, judgment involves an implicit commit-
ment to the idea that there is some normative ground that allows one to
determine whether the judgment is right or wrong, whether it is true or
false. But such a normative basis for agreement or disagreement is only
present where there is at least the possibility of a standpoint that is
outside of the standpoints of those who articulate judgments that either
agree or disagree. It is this standpoint that is implicitly presupposed
when we interpret a certain object in terms of certain concepts. Such a
standpoint is precisely that provided by Kant™s idea that di¬erent
representations must be uni¬able in a possible self-consciousness that is
able to abstract from any particular point of view within experience.
Without self-consciousness, I do not have a consciousness of myself as
one person among others. I am thus unable to represent my point of
·
The demands of judgment in the B-Deduction
view as one which is either distinguishable or indistinguishable with
respect to some subject-matter from that available to some other being.
But if I have self-consciousness, then I also have the capacity to repre-
sent myself in a way that is indistinguishable from the way any other
self-conscious being represents itself or the world. I exercise this capacity
when I represent myself in abstraction from what distinguishes my point
of view from other points of view and when I represent things in a
manner that is, in principle, available to anyone. Concepts represent
contents in terms of representations that can be had in altogether
di¬erent circumstances in experience.
Kant captures the implicit objective commitments of subjective ex-
perience, the implicit universal intelligibility of even subjective experi-
ence, by characterizing his notion of object in terms of representations
that are uni¬ed under concepts: ˜˜Object is that in the concept of which
a given manifold is uni¬ed™™ (section ±·,  ±·). Since concepts are
representations of items in a standpoint-independent or universal man-
ner, the concept of an object is something the content of which is
represented in a way that does not depend on a standpoint. If concepts
are to be applicable to experiences, and if those experiences are to
become an object for me, then those experiences must be uni¬able in
consciousness under concepts. But the consciousness in question must
have universal signi¬cance if we are to think of it as a consciousness that
could be right or wrong about what it is representing.
Failure to pay attention to Kant™s somewhat technical conception of a
concept can lead one to think that he simply shifts from a notion of
uni¬ability in consciousness that applies to anything that can be an
experience in any sense at all to a notion of uni¬ability that is restricted
to representations that have objective validity. For Kant moves directly
from his de¬nition of an object to the claim that representations uni¬ed
in that way in consciousness have objective validity and count as
cognition or knowledge (section ±·,  ±·).
As in the A-Deduction, Kant introduces the concept of an object in a
context in which he is also willing to talk of cognition (knowledge) of an
object that has objective validity. The idea seems to be that we only have
a bona ¬de concept of an object if we are able correctly to use the
concept in judgments that provide us with knowledge of an object.
Indeed, Kant is not satis¬ed with the assertion that cognition has unity
of consciousness as its necessary condition; he claims that unity of
consciousness is su¬cient for cognition.±° The important thing to note
here is that the unity of consciousness is su¬cient for cognition only
° Kant and the demands of self-consciousness
when it includes both empirical and a priori conditions for the unity of
self-consciousness. Kant does not suggest that the a priori conditions are
themselves independently su¬cient, nor does he suggest that empirical
conditions on the unity of consciousness would be su¬cient.
Allison tries to ¬ll the apparent gap in the argument generated by
Kant™s shift from treating the unity of consciousness as a necessary
condition for knowledge to treating it as a su¬cient condition for
knowledge by weakening the notion of object involved here to that of a
purely logical notion.±± This is tempting, but it will not work, since Kant
does not restrict cognition (Erkenntnis) to logical knowledge in the ¬rst part
of the B-Deduction as Allison maintains. Kant de¬nes knowledge as the
determination of representation in relation to an object (section ±·,  ±·).
In his summary of the argument in the ¬rst part of the Deduction, Kant
claims that unitary empirical intuition is determined with respect to the
forms of judgment (section °,  ±). He thus takes himself to be showing
in the ¬rst part of the B-Deduction that we have knowledge of objects
belonging to experience as well as purely formal objects.
Treatment of the unity of consciousness as su¬cient for cognition is
licensed by a further premise, that something is a cognition if and only if
it involves the uni¬cation of empirical representations under concepts.
Kant™s de¬nition of a cognition as the determinate relation of given
representations to an object supplies this missing premise. He does not
o¬cially introduce the notion of judgment until section ±, but he does
think of cognition as involving judgment. So the determinate relation in
question is a relation for judgment, since judgment is ˜˜the representa-
tion of the unity of consciousness of di¬erent representations or the
representation of their relationship insofar as they constitute a concept™™
(Logic, Ak. ©, section ±·, p. ±°±). Judgment represents items in a way that
commits one to those items being the same for everyone, that is to their
uni¬ability in an ˜˜I think p™™ that could be anyone™s. This capacity to
abstract from what is the case for me as a particular individual and to
take things as they would be represented by anyone else is what is
expressed by the ˜˜is™™ of assertion:
[A] judgment is nothing but the way given cognitions are brought to the
objective unity of apperception. That is the target of the little relational word
˜˜is™™ in them [judgments] to distinguish the objective unity of given representa-
tions from the subjective. (section ±,  ±±“±)

The universal commitments of judgment and claims to knowledge
expressed in judgment are already implicit in the concepts involved in
±
The demands of judgment in the B-Deduction
judgment. But in judgment concepts are related to each other in such a
way that a claim is made that can be either true or false. The unity of
consciousness in a judgment thus makes the relation of representations
to each other determinate in a way that makes agreement or disagree-
ment possible.
Kant ¬nally makes the distinction between the objective unity to be
found in shareable self-consciousness and the merely subjective unity of
consciousness we are accustomed to in our introspective self-conscious-
ness explicit in section ±. He identi¬es empirical apperception in
section ± ( ±°) with an associative connection between representa-
tions that is valid for me or for you, in contrast with an objective unity of
consciousness that is universally valid. In general, how I happen to
connect di¬erent words or other representations with objects in my
consciousness is a contingent matter that depends on the circumstances
under which I have come to connect those words with those objects.
Such accidental connection by association is not su¬cient for an objec-
tive unity of consciousness, that is, for a consciousness of what we
represent that can be the same for all of us. Kant identi¬es this objective
unity of consciousness with the transcendental unity of apperception
( ±).
Kant™s reference to transcendental apperception as having an objec-
tive unity to what it represents provides indirect support for the way I
have been reading his claim that representations must be able to belong
together in a self-consciousness. The universality of the unity of tran-
scendental self-consciousness that Kant invokes in the second para-
graph of section ± cannot be restricted to the representations in my
individual consciousness alone, for then it could not support the objec-
tive validity that he identi¬es with transcendental apperception in sec-
tion ±.
To be sure, the very introduction of a notion of ˜˜empirical appercep-
tion™™ ( ±°) in contrast to the transcendental unity of apperception
seems at ¬rst to wreak havoc with the argument. It is tempting to take
the view that consciousness of self-identity should then be possible
without the more ambitious conception of transcendental apperception.
Another response is to reject the notion that empirical apperception
really is a form of self-consciousness. On either of these interpretations,
the role of transcendental self-consciousness as enabling condition for
empirical self-consciousness drops out. Kant™s suggestion is crucial that
empirical apperception which is only subjectively valid is derived from
transcendental and objective apperception ˜˜under speci¬c conditions in
 Kant and the demands of self-consciousness
concreto™™ (section ±,  ±°). Empirical self-consciousness is character-
ized by a unity of the contents of consciousness that depends for its
character on the spatio-temporal context of a particular individual.
Such subjective unity of spatio-temporal experience is derived from an
objective unity based on facts about spatio-temporal objects that hold
for any arbitrary observer. Empirical apperception may be subject to
the unity required by transcendental self-consciousness without directly
displaying that unity.

 ¬ ¬©  ® ® ° °    °  ©  ®  ® ¤ µ     ©   µ ®©  
Henry Allison identi¬es apperception with the narrowly logical powers of
understanding and with the role of judgment in the making of objective
claims.± He worries that by assigning subjective validity to empirical
apperception Kant contradicts the principle that empirical consciousness
is subject to the transcendental conditions of unity. As a consequence of
Allison™s assimilation of self-consciousness to judgments with objective
import, self-consciousness threatens to drop out of subjective experience,
and subjective experience threatens to disappear altogether.
Allison insists that a subjective unity in consciousness is not something
through which even subjective states could be represented since it is not
something through which anything could be represented at all: ˜˜There
is in fact only one thing that could count as a subjective unity in the
Kantian sense: a unity or connection of representations through which
nothing is represented, not even our subjective states.™™± Since Allison
does not think that what Kant calls a subjective unity of consciousness
can be a bona ¬de unity of consciousness, he concludes that it cannot be
a fortiori a unity of self-consciousness either, although it can become the
topic of consciousness.± As objecti¬ed for self-conscious thought, the
subjective unity of my experience would be an object of judgment and
empirical knowledge. Thus on Allison™s interpretation all (empirical)
consciousness of oneself as a particular individual is knowledge of
oneself as an object. And this knowledge is knowledge by a non-empiri-
cal self. The implication is that all self-consciousness is knowledge of the
self through transcendental self-consciousness.
Although Allison initially maintains that Kant ˜˜refers to the subjec-
tive unity as a unity of consciousness and to the objective unity as a unity of
self-consciousness,™™ he soon is forced to concede that he also ¬nds Kant
˜˜treating the empirical unity of apperception as equivalent to the
subjective unity of consciousness. The problem is that Kant also seems

The demands of judgment in the B-Deduction
to regard empirical apperception as equivalent to empirical self-con-
sciousness, that is, as the mode of consciousness through which we
represent ourselves to ourselves as objects of inner sense.™™±µ As Allison
admits, the view that a subjective unity of consciousness is not a unity of
self-consciousness con¬‚icts with Kant™s reference to empirical appercep-
tion both as self-consciousness and as a subjective unity (B-Deduction:
section ±,  ±°). Allison concedes that, even though Kant notes that
the original unity of consciousness that is based on the relation of
intuition to one I think is ˜˜alone objectively valid,™™ Kant also insists that
˜˜the empirical unity of apperception which we are not considering here
and which is only derived from the former under given conditions in
concreto, has only subjective validity™™ ( ±°). Allison can ¬nd only
confusion in this remark of Kant™s because Allison™s interpretation of the
Kantian notion of apperception and self-consciousness only allows for a
self-consciousness of objective states of a¬airs.
Allison™s restriction of self-consciousness to objective states of a¬airs
forces not only him to ascribe confusion to Kant, it also has a more
devastating consequence. Our experience of ourselves as distinct indi-
viduals is based on what Kant calls inner sense. Allison argues plausibly
that ˜˜Kant™s theory of inner sense is best understood in terms of the
account of the subjective unity of consciousness which we have already
considered.™™± Because Allison™s reading of inner sense and the subjec-
tive unity of consciousness makes it independent of self-consciousness,
he argues that ˜˜Kant™s account of inner sense explains how the mind
can become aware of its own representations as ˜subjective objects,™ but
it does not explain how it can represent itself as an object.™™±· In contrast
to spatial objects, that is, the objects of outer sense, Allison thinks that
Kant is forced to adopt a ˜˜substratum™™ or ˜˜bare particular™™ theory of
predication when he deals with judgments about inner states.± One
might ask why the self cannot be experienced. Allison™s answer is: ˜˜the
important point is simply that, as non empirical, the I cannot know itself
through the (empirical predicates) representations which it refers to itself
in judgments in the same way in which it knows outer objects through
the predicates which it attributes to such objects in judgments of outer
experience.™™±
The self ceases to be something that we can experience at all in
Allison™s reconstruction of Kant™s account of experience. For according
to Allison the self can only be experienced as an object of judgment in
which its character as a point of view is no longer in play. But worse, the
self cannot even be experienced as an object of judgment, for then its
 Kant and the demands of self-consciousness
character as self would elude us. This consequence of Allison™s interpre-
tation seems quite unappealing. In general, his failure to do justice to the
Kantian account of empirical self-consciousness and to the fact that
having self-consciousness involves having a particular point of view
makes his account of transcendental self-consciousness irrelevant to the
phenomenon of self-consciousness as it is generally understood. For
most consciousness of self is not a consciousness of a proposition that has
a truth value. To the extent that the self is something of which we can be
conscious in being conscious of judgments that have objective validity,
an account must be o¬ered of how our own subjective take on things
could be involved in a consciousness of something that on Allison™s view
must have a truth value.° We need to be able to understand how
empirical self-consciousness could require transcendental self-con-
sciousness. Allison™s interpretation of transcendental self-consciousness
precludes him from o¬ering such an account.±
Now I wish to argue that, in the logical space of reasons opened up by
transcendental apperception, transitions from one representation to
another are governed not only by the kind of causal connections that
underwrite habits of association, but by normative principles of rational-
ity as well. Since the causal connections between representations in-
volved in the empirical psychologist™s description of the regularities in
our individual representations themselves depend on our ability to make
normative claims about what came before what and where and what
caused what, these empirical connections are not really free standing. As
the A-Deduction makes abundantly clear, our ability to make sense of
associative patterns itself depends on our ability to form the concept of
an object that is independent of the way it appears to us at any given
moment, and this requires the possibility of a point of view that is able to
abstract my own particular take on things.

     © ¬ ©¤© ¦ µ¤§ ®  ®¤   µ® © ¦
  ®   ©  µ  ®  
It is worthwhile to contrast the account of judgment in the B-Deduction
with that of the Prolegomena. In the Prolegomena, Kant distinguishes be-
tween subjective judgments of perception that do not require the appli-
cation of categories and necessarily intersubjective judgments of experi-
ence involving application of the categories. In the case of judgments of
perception, no issue of disagreement or agreement can arise, since they
merely express the subjective take that an individual has on his or her
µ
The demands of judgment in the B-Deduction
own experience, whereas in the case of judgments of experience agree-
ment or disagreement between persons is necessarily possible:
[J]udgments are either merely subjective when representations are referred to a
consciousness in one subject only, and are united in it, or they are objective
when they are united in consciousness in general, that is necessarily.
(Prolegomena, section , Ak. ©, pp. °“µ)

In a review of Ulrich™s Institutiones, Johann Schultz argued that the
theory of perceptual judgment in the Prolegomena was inconsistent with
the claim in the ¬rst edition of the Critique that all perception is subject to
the categories. Kant refers to the review in a famous footnote to the
Metaphysical Foundations (Ak ©, p. ·n) near the date of the second
edition of the Critique, so he clearly gave the problem some thought.
Perceptual judgments in the Prolegomena are independent of any applica-
tion of the categories. This is what distinguishes them from judgments of
experience. The independence of perception from the categories is not
something that Kant can advocate without giving up the universal scope
of categories with respect to our experience, and that would be to give
up the claim that the categories can make to being a priori enabling
conditions of experience.
In the B-Deduction, Kant responds to this objection by restricting
judgments to the objective states of a¬airs expressed by judgments of
experience in the Prolegomena. Such judgments involve the use of catego-
ries. For categories are the basic concepts that underwrite claims to
objectivity. In section ± of the B-Deduction, the distinction between
judgments of perception and of experience in the Prolegomena becomes a
distinction between judgments of experience and associative connec-
tions between perceptions. There are now statements that seem prima
facie to express judgments which turn out merely to express associ-
ations. Such statements are to be understood as a mere evocation of
inner states, comparable to cries of pain. In the cases of such subjective
statements, agreement or disagreement is inappropriate. It no more
makes sense for me to call into question the associations that you have
than it does for me to reject your pain. Judgments, by contrast, are now
taken by Kant to make claims that presuppose the possibility of agree-
ment or disagreement.
Judgments are based on what Kant calls the necessary unity of
self-consciousness, that is, the unity that representations must have if
they are to be able to belong together in any self-consciousness. By
contrast, associative connections of the kind established by largely
 Kant and the demands of self-consciousness
accidental causal circumstances are based on empirical self-conscious-
ness (section ±,  ±). The fact that judgment involves an implicit
commitment to the existence of necessary connections between what is
represented by the concepts that one uses in the judgment seems at ¬rst
to rule out any possibility of expressing a subjective standpoint. How-
ever, such a commitment is always taken on from a particular subjective
standpoint. Thus, judgment is compatible with the existence of di¬eren-
ces between persons in what they experience. The important part is how
what is experienced is interpreted. A judgment should express relations
between the objects and properties or relations attributed to those
objects that purport to be true for anyone in the circumstances stated by
the judgment.
The assimilation of objecthood to objectivity, and the idea that
judgment expresses objectivity lead to several problems. The ¬rst prob-
lem concerns the relation between judgment and knowledge. Kant
sometimes treats judgment as a relationship between concepts that is
objectively valid (section ±,  ±). Of course, not all judgments are
objectively valid even if they purport to be so. But, on the whole and in
the same context, he implicitly concedes that judgments have the kind of
objective unity that yields objective validity merely as their target. Not
every judgment is an instance of knowledge. Kant is interested in the
fact that a judgment is a claim to knowledge. As a judgment it must
purport to be true. He also treats all objects of experience as publicly
accessible because he wants to deny that there are any private objects
that are not available to us under some public description. Any object of
which I can be conscious ought to be an object of which someone else
could have indirect consciousness. Kant thus ¬nds himself compelled to
defend the view that all judgment purports to state objective facts.
Restricting judgment to objective facts seems to leave no room for
judgments concerning my inner states, at least insofar as these judg-
ments are about those inner states as I experience them. Since knowl-
edge or cognition requires judgment, the implication seems to be that
there is no self-knowledge.
Kant tries to ¬nd a way of accommodating self-knowledge in the
second step of the proof in the B-Deduction, which I will concern myself
with in the next chapter. I will show how the second step of Kant™s proof
resolves the di¬culties posed by his theory of objective judgment for his
account of inner experience. In the process, I will try to throw some light
on the manner in which subjective experience is dependent on objective
experience.
° µ

Self-consciousness and the unity of intuition:
completing the B-Deduction

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