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KANT ON THE HUMAN STANDPOINT

´
In this collection of essays Beatrice Longuenesse considers three main
aspects of Kant™s philosophy, his epistemology and metaphysics of nat-
ure, his moral philosophy, and his aesthetic theory, under one unifying
principle: Kant™s conception of our capacity to form judgments. She
argues that the elements which make up our cognitive access to the
world “ what Kant calls the ˜˜human standpoint™™ “ have an equally
important role to play in our moral evaluations and our aesthetic judg-
ments. Her discussion ranges over Kant™s account of our representations
of space and time, his conception of the logical forms of judgments,
sufficient reason, causality, community, God, freedom, morality, and
beauty in nature and art. Her book will appeal to all who are interested
in Kant and his thought.

´
Beatrice Longuenesse is Professor of Philosophy at New York
University. Her numerous publications include Kant and the Capacity to
Judge (1998).
MODERN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY
General Editor
R O B E R T B . P I P P I N , University of Chicago
Advisory Board
G A R Y G U T T I N G , University of Notre Dame
R O L F - P E T E R H O R S T M A N N , Humboldt University, Berlin
M A R K S A C K S , University of Essex


Some Recent Titles
Daniel W. Conway: Nietzsche™s Dangerous Game
John P. McCormick: Carl Schmitt™s Critique of Liberalism
Frederick A. Olafson: Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics
Gunter Zoller: Fichte™s Transcendental Philosophy
¨
¨
Warren Breckman: Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical
Social Theory
William Blattner: Heidegger™s Temporal Idealism
Charles Griswold: Adam Smith and the Virtues of the Enlightenment
Gary Gutting: Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity
Allen Wood: Kant™s Ethical Thought
Karl Ameriks: Kant and the Fate of Autonomy
Alfredo Ferrarin: Hegel and Aristotle
Cristina Lafont: Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure
Nicholas Wolsterstorff: Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology
Daniel Dahlstrom: Heidegger™s Concepts of Truth
Michelle Grier: Kant™s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion
Henry Allison: Kant™s Theory of Taste
Allen Speight: Hegel, Literature, and the Problem of Agency
J. M. Bernstein: Adorno
Will Dudley: Hegel, Nietzsche, and Philosophy
Taylor Carman: Heidegger™s Analytic
Douglas Moggach: The Philosophy and Politics of Bruno Bauer
Rudiger Bubner: The Innovations of Idealism
¨
Jon Stewart: Kierkegaard™s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered
Michael Quante: Hegel™s Concept of Action
Wolfgang Detel: Foucault and Classical Antiquity
Robert M. Wallace: Hegel™s Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God
Johanna Oksala: Foucault on Freedom
Wayne M. Martin: Theories of Judgment
KANT ON THE HUMAN
STANDPOINT


´
BEATRICE LONGUENESSE
New York University
cambridge university press
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 2ru, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521834780

© Beatrice Longuenesse 2005


This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of
relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place
without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published in print format 2005

isbn-13 978-0-511-13491-3 eBook (EBL)
isbn-10 0-511-13491-6 eBook (EBL)

isbn-13 978-0-521-83478-0 hardback
isbn-10 0-521-83478-3 hardback




Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls
for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not
guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
CONTENTS




Acknowledgments page ix

Introduction 1

PART I Revisiting the capacity to judge
Kant™s categories, and the capacity to judge
1 17
Synthesis, logical forms, and the objects of our ordinary
2
experience 39
Synthesis and givenness
3 64

PART II The human standpoint in the Transcendental
Analytic
Kant on a priori concepts: the metaphysical deduction
4
of the categories 81
Kant™s deconstruction of the principle of sufficient reason
5 117
Kant on causality: what was he trying to prove?
6 143
Kant™s standpoint on the whole: disjunctive judgment,
7
community, and the Third Analogy of Experience 184

PART III The human standpoint in the critical system
The transcendental ideal, and the unity of the critical system
8 211
vii
viii CONTENTS


Moral judgment as a judgment of reason
9 236
Kant™s leading thread in the Analytic of the Beautiful
10 265

Bibliography 291
Index of citations 297
Index of subjects 300
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS




Earlier versions of chapters of this book have appeared in the following
publications:
˜˜Kant™s categories, and the capacity to judge: responses to Henry
Allison and Sally Sedgwick,™™ Inquiry, vol. 43, no. 1 (2000), pp. 91“111.
˜˜Synthesis, logical forms, and the objects of our ordinary experience:
response to Michael Friedman,™™ Archiv fu Geschichte der Philosophie,
¨r
vol. 83 (2001), pp. 199“212.
˜˜Synthese et donation. Reponse ` Michel Fichant,™™ Philosophie, no. 60
` ´ a
(1998), pp. 79“91.
˜˜Kant™s deconstruction of the principle of sufficient reason,™™ The
Harvard Review of Philosophy, ix (2001), pp. 67“87. Also in German,
under the title ˜˜Kant uber den Satz vom Grund,™™ in Kant und die
¨
Berliner Aufkla ¨rung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, ed.
Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, and Ralph Schumacher
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001), i, pp. 66“86.
˜˜Kant™s standpoint on the whole: disjunctive judgment, community,
and the Third Analogy of Experience,™™ in Ralph Schumacher and Oliver
Scholz (eds.), Idealismus als Theorie der Repra¨sentation? (Paderborn: Mentis,
2001), pp. 287“313.
˜˜The transcendental ideal, and the unity of the critical system,™™ in Hoke
Robinson (ed.), Proceedings of the VIIIth International Kant Congress, Memphis
1995 (Memphis: Marquette University Press, 1995), i“2, pp. 521“39.
ix
x ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


`
˜˜Kant et le jugement moral,™™ in Michele Cohen-Halimi (ed.), Kant. La
´
rationalite pratique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2003),
pp. 15“55.
Three chapters are slightly revised versions of essays initially commis-
sioned for the following volumes:
˜˜Kant on a priori concepts: the metaphysical deduction of the cate-
gories,™™ in Paul Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern
Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). I am grateful
to Paul Guyer for giving me permission to include the essay in this volume.
˜˜Kant on causality: what was he trying to prove?™™ in Christia Mercer
and Eileen O™Neill (eds.), Modern Philosophy, Ideas and Mechanism (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2005). I am grateful to Christia Mercer
and Eileen O™Neill, and to Oxford University Press, for giving me
permission to include the essay in this volume.
˜˜Kant™s leading thread in the Analytic of the Beautiful,™™ in Rebecca
Kukla (ed.), Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant™s Critical Philosophy (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005). I am grateful to Rebecca Kukla for
giving me permission to include the essay in this volume.
My intellectual debts during the years in which I worked first on the
essays gathered in this volume, and then on the volume itself, are
countless. My gratitude goes first to my colleagues and students in the
philosophy department at Princeton. They provided an exciting, chal-
lenging, and supportive community. I have learnt from our collective
enterprise in more ways than I could ever have dreamt was possible.
I am also grateful to my colleagues and students in the philosophy
department at New York University for the wonderful welcome they
have given me since I arrived in the spring term of 2004, and for the
exciting work we are doing together.
It is impossible to name all the individuals from whose intellectual
companionship I have benefited. Among those who were directly
involved in helping me think about the issues discussed in this book,
I must at least mention Henry Allison, Richard Aquila, Jean-Marie
Beyssade, Michelle Beyssade, Quassim Cassam, Michelle Cohen-Halimi,
Steve Engstrom, Michel Fichant, Michael Friedman, Hannah Ginsborg,
¨
Michelle Grier, Paul Guyer, Rebecca Kukla, David Martin, Jean-Claude
´
Pariente, Martine Pecharman, Sally Sedgwick, Dan Warren, Wayne
Waxman, Michael Wolff, Allen Wood.
My thanks to Zahid Zalloua and to Nicole Zimek for the fine job they
did translating from the French, respectively, the essays that became
ch. 9 and ch. 3 in this volume.
xi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


Colin Marshall was my research assistant in the final phase of putting
together the book. He was unfailingly reliable and helpful in his editorial
suggestions as well as in putting together the bibliography and prepar-
ing the index. But he was also much more than that. He was an excep-
tionally sharp reader whose questions saved me more than once from
unclear or inconsistent formulations. The book is better for having
benefited from his assistance. Needless to say, its remaining imperfec-
tions are entirely my responsibility. This project would never have
seen the light without the persistence, kindness, and firm mentoring of
Hilary Gaskin of Cambridge University Press. My thanks also to Hilary
Scannell, who was a superb copy-editor.
I am grateful to the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of New York
University for its generosity in granting me a leave for the academic
year 2004“5, which allowed me to complete the project of this book.
I am grateful to the Humanities Council at Princeton for granting me
financial support to translate from the French two essays in this volume.
My deepest gratitude goes to Dale for his love and support, and for
making life and philosophy such endless sources of surprise and joy.
INTRODUCTION




This volume gathers some of the papers I wrote between 1995 and 2003,
namely in the years that followed the publication of my earlier Kant book,
first in French (Kant et le pouvoir de juger, Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1993, hereafter KPJ), then in its expanded English version (Kant
and the Capacity to Judge, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998,
hereafter KCJ). Among the essays written during that period that I did
not include in this volume are an essay on Kant and Hegel which belongs
in a separate volume devoted to my work on Hegel; essays on self-
consciousness and ˜˜I™™ which are part of a work in progress I hope to
develop further; and finally a few essays that in one way or another
overlap with those included here.
What unifies the essays selected for this volume is their relation to the
central theme of my earlier book on Kant: Kant™s conception of what he
calls our capacity to judge (Vermogen zu urteilen) and its role in our forming
¨
an objective view of the world. However, in addition to the role of our
capacity to judge in cognition, I now consider its role in moral deliberation
and in aesthetic evaluation. Some of the essays have been revised in light
of discussions I benefited from since they first appeared. Others, espe-
cially the more recent, remain mostly unchanged, except for editorial
adjustments necessary to unify references throughout the volume and
to tie the different topics together. Two of the essays are translated from
the French and appear in English for the first time in this volume.
1
KANT ON THE HUMAN STANDPOINT
2

Beyond their common theme, the essays fall into three main categories,
thus the three parts of the book. Part i (˜˜Revisiting the capacity to judge™™)
contains three essays that were written in response to comments on, and
criticisms of, KCJ. Part ii (˜˜The human standpoint in the Transcendental
Analytic™™) contains four essays that clarify some of the views I defended in
the earlier book, but also significantly expand the explanations I gave on
crucial points such as Kant™s argument in the Metaphysical Deduction
of the Categories (ch. 4), Kant™s relation to earlier German philosophy
(ch. 5), Kant™s defense of the causal principle in the Second Analogy of
Experience (ch. 6), or the argument and import of the Third Analogy
(ch. 7). Finally, part iii (˜˜The human standpoint in the critical system™™)
expands my discussion of Kant™s view of judgment beyond the
Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason. I analyze some
aspects of the relation between the Transcendental Analytic, the
Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, and the Critique
of Judgment (ch. 8); Kant™s view of moral judgment and its relation to the
conception of judgment expounded in the first Critique (ch. 9); and finally,
the use Kant makes of his analysis of logical forms of judgment in clari-
fying the nature of aesthetic judgments in the third Critique (ch. 10).
The chapters of this book, having initially been written as indepen-
dent essays, can be read separately and in any order that best suits the
reader™s own interests. Nevertheless, I think it may help to read them in
the order in which they are presented here “ the book does have its own
systematic unity. My hope is that it will provide an easier access to some
of the central theses of my earlier book, while also developing them in
new directions, progressively unfolding Kant™s view of what I call,
borrowing the expression from Kant himself, ˜˜the human standpoint™™
(cf. Critique of Pure Reason, A26/B42).1 Part i provides the general back-
ground against which the particular arguments of part ii can best be

1
In quoting the Critique of Pure Reason I use the standard references to A and B, meaning the
first edition (1781) and the second edition (1787). All other texts of Kant are referenced in
the Akademie Ausgabe (AA), with volume and page. Standard English translations are
indicated upon first occurrence in footnotes, and in the bibliography. References to the
German edition are in the margins of all recent English translations. References to A and B
will be given in the main text, all other references will be given in the footnotes. When
I refer to titles of chapters or sections in the Critique, I use capital letters (e.g. the
Transcendental Deduction); when I refer to arguments I do not capitalize (e.g. the trans-
cendental deduction).
I sometimes say ˜˜first Critique™™ to refer to the Critique of Pure Reason, ˜˜second Critique™™
to refer to the Critique of Practical Reason, and ˜˜third Critique™™ to refer to the Critique of the
Power of Judgment. All emphases in quotations are Kant™s unless it is otherwise indicated.
INTRODUCTION 3

understood. Part ii follows the systematic order of Kant™s argument in
the Transcendental Analytic (although of course it covers only some of
its central themes). Part iii builds on the lessons of the Transcendental
Analytic to illuminate the unity of the critical system and the
relation between the different uses of our capacity to judge: theoretical,
practical, aesthetic.
˜˜The human standpoint™™ expounded in the first Critique is that stand-
point on the world which, according to Kant, is proper to human beings
as opposed to non-rational animals, on the one hand, and to what a
divine understanding might be, on the other hand. As opposed to non-
rational animals, human beings are endowed with what Kant calls ˜˜spon-
taneity,™™ namely a rule-governed capacity to acquire representations
that are not merely caused by the impingements of the world, but
actively integrated into a unified network, where the ways in which the
mind combines representations make it possible to discern when they
ought to be endorsed (as veridical) or rejected (as non-veridical). The
rules according to which representations are thus integrated are rules
for forming judgments, which themselves determine rules of reasoning.
The capacity to form judgments according to those rules is thus, accord-
ing to Kant, what is characteristic of the human mind, as opposed to
non-human animal minds.2 However, as opposed to what a divine
understanding might be, human minds are, like all other animal
minds, also passively impinged upon by a reality that is independent
of them, which they have not created. Nevertheless, even under that
essentially passive, receptive aspect, the human mind, according to
Kant, has a peculiar capacity to order in one whole the objects of the
representations thus received, and thus to anticipate further represen-
tations and the unity in which their objects might stand with the objects
of present and past representations. This ordering and locating of
individual objects of representations in one whole is made possible by
the a priori forms of our receptive capacity: space and time. From the
fact that we have such a priori modes of ordering, forms of intuition as


2
On the contrast between the cognitive capacities of human beings and of animals, see Jasche
¨
Logic, in Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Logic, ed. and trans. J. Michael Young (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), AAix, 65. Also Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point
of View, trans. Mary Gregor (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974), AAviii, 154“5, 397, 411n; Critique
of Practical Reason, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997),
AAv, 12; First Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and
Eric Matthews, AAxx, 211. Many thanks to Wayne Waxman for having helped me with
these references.
KANT ON THE HUMAN STANDPOINT
4

well as forms of our capacity to judge (forms of judgments), Kant derives
a complex argument to the effect that we also have a priori concepts that
have their origin in the understanding alone and nevertheless are true
of all objects given to our senses: such concepts are what he calls,
borrowing the term from Aristotle, categories.3
In KCJ I argued, against standard interpretations, that in order to
understand Kant™s doctrine of the categories, and in order to under-
stand Kant™s argument to the effect that such concepts have applications
to objects of experience (i.e. that all objects of experience fall under the
categories), one needed to take seriously the origin Kant assigns to these
concepts in logical functions of judgment. In chs. 1 and 2 of the present
volume I address some of the objections that have been raised against
this claim. I have been fortunate in benefiting from the comments of
outstanding critics on the occasion of two ˜˜author meets critics™™ sessions
at meetings of the American Philosophical Association in the spring of
1999: one at the Pacific Division in Berkeley, the other at the Central
Division in New Orleans. Richard Aquila and Michael Friedman were
my critics on the first occasion, Henry Allison and Sally Sedgwick on the
second. Richard Aquila did not submit his comments for publication.
Michael Friedman published his comments in the form of an extensive
essay which appeared in Archiv fu Geschichte der Philosophie. The editors
¨r
of Archiv then offered to publish my response, which has now become
(with the addition of some developments I had to cut to respect length
limitations in Archiv) ch. 2 in this volume. Henry Allison™s and Sally
Sedgwick™s comments, as well as my response to them, were published
in one and the same issue of Inquiry, and my response has now become
ch. 1 in this volume. In both chapters I give extensive references to the
papers I respond to. But these chapters also provide an independent,
self-standing overview of what I take to be most original “ and thus also,
no doubt, most controversial “ about my interpretation of Kant™s views in
the first Critique.



3
I discuss in detail the contrast Kant draws between our own, discursive understanding and
what a divine, intuitive understanding might be in the paper on Kant and Hegel mentioned

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