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at the beginning of this introduction (see above, p. 1): ˜˜Point of view of man or knowledge of
God: Kant and Hegel on concept, judgment and reason,™™ in Sally Sedgwick (ed.), Kant and
German Idealism: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
The title of this paper inspired the title of the present volume, and the paper was to be its
concluding chapter. For reasons of length, I agreed to transfer that paper to a different
volume devoted to Hegel™s Science of Logic. The title still seemed apt for the present book.

Two objections are worthy of special notice. The first, raised by Henry
Allison (discussed in ch. 1), is that by insisting as I do on their origin in
logical functions of judgment, I end up depriving Kant™s categories of
any role of their own, and instead substitute for them the corresponding
logical forms of judgment. The second, raised by Michael Friedman
(discussed in ch. 2), is that by giving as much importance as I do to
Kant™s logical forms of judgment, which are based on the traditional,
Aristotelian subject“predicate form, I end up downplaying what is most
novel about Kant™s transcendental logic “ its relation to the Newtonian
model of mathematical principles of natural science “ and instead tend to
attribute to Kant an ontology of nature that is fundamentally Aristotelian
in inspiration. Although the two objections were raised independently of
one another, I am struck by their convergence. Both concern the
respective weights of Aristotelianism and of the new, mathematical
science of nature in Kant™s epistemology and in his ontology (albeit an
ontology of appearances, things as they appear to us). Now in my
opinion what is most striking about Kant™s view is that he indeed
makes use of an Aristotelian subject“predicate logic, but in such a way
as to ground an ontology of appearances that is decidedly non-
Aristotelian. This is of course made possible by the appeal to the forms
of intuition as being what alone makes possible the representation of
individual objects, identified and re-identified only by way of their rela-
tions in space and time and the universal correlation between their
respective states and changes of states. Only insofar as they determine
what Kant calls the ˜˜unity of synthesis™™ according to forms of intuition do
logical functions of judgments become categories, concepts guiding the
combination of what is given to sensible intuition so that it can eventually
be thought under (empirical and mathematical) concepts, combined
according to the logical forms of judgments whose table Kant sets up
in the Transcendental Analytic of the first Critique. Both Allison™s and
Friedman™s challenges have helped me to make clearer (at least for
myself, and I hope for others as well) my interpretation of Kant™s view,
as have Sally Sedgwick™s questions concerning the ways in which one
should understand the a priori character of the categories.
Allison™s and Sedgwick™s comments also converge in an interesting
way with the questions raised by Michel Fichant, which I address in
ch. 3. In 1997 Michel Fichant published in the French journal Philosophie
the first translation into French of a text which, to my knowledge, is to this
day not translated into English: Kant™s essay, unpublished in his lifetime,
˜˜Uber Kastner™s Abhandlungen,™™ ˜˜On Kastner™s articles.™™ Fichant also
¨ ¨

offered an extensive commentary of Kant™s essay on Kastner in the
course of which he took me to task for maintaining that according to
Kant, space and time as forms of sensibility, namely as forms in which
what is given to our senses is ordered and related, depend on spontaneity,
or more precisely on what Kant called the ˜˜affection of sensibility by the
understanding.™™ In emphasizing this point, Fichant warned, I seem to
bring Kant perilously close to his German Idealist successors, who denied
any validity to the Kantian dualism of receptivity and spontaneity, of
passivity and activity, in our representational capacities. But I do not
think I in fact cross that line, although I do argue that space and time
are each represented as one only if they are brought under what Kant
calls the ˜˜unity of apperception,™™ and thus the understanding. In ch. 3,
I revisit this point and explain why it is decisive to Kant™s argument in the
Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.
The stage is thus set for part ii of the book. Here one of my goals is to
correct what I think may have been a one-sided understanding of the
view I defended in KCJ. Even the most careful readers of that book have
tended to focus their comments on what I say of the logical forms of
judgment and their role in analysis (or the process of comparison,
reflection, and abstraction by which, according to Kant, we form any
kinds of concepts) and have devoted comparatively less attention to my
interpretation of Kant™s notion of synthesis and its role in constituting
what I just described as the ˜˜human standpoint,™™ according to the
Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason. This imbalance
may have been due partly to the structure of KCJ: the logical forms of
judgment, and their role in analysis or reflection on the sensible given,
are expounded in great detail in part ii of the book, synthesis according
to the categories is explained only in part iii. In the present book, in
each of the four chapters of part ii, I jointly present, in connection
with a particular point of Kant™s argument in the Transcendental
Analytic, Kant™s view of general logic and the role of logical forms of
judgment, and Kant™s view of transcendental logic and the way those
logical forms, related to forms of sensibility, account for the role of a
priori concepts of the understanding in guiding the syntheses that make
possible any representation of objects.
Chapter 4 was originally written for the new edition of the Cambridge
Companion to Kant, edited by Paul Guyer. In this chapter I sketch out a
history of Kant™s question, ˜˜How do concepts that have their origin in the
workings of our minds apply to objects that are given?™™ and I explain
how Kant came to think he could find the solution to that problem in

investigating the ways in which our discursive capacity (our capacity to
form concepts, which depends on spontaneity) and our intuitive capacity
(our capacity to form singular representations immediately related to
objects, which depends on sensibility or receptivity) work together.
I then closely follow the structure of Kant™s argument in ch. 1 of the
Transcendental Analytic, ˜˜the Leading Thread for the Discovery of all
Pure Concepts of the Understanding,™™ in which Kant justifies his claim
that pure concepts of the understanding have their origin in what he
calls ˜˜logical functions of judgment,™™ and prepares the ground for the
central argument of the first Critique, the Transcendental Deduction of
the Categories.
Kant™s argument in the Leading Thread depends on the relation he
lays out between analysis and synthesis: analysis of sensible, individual
representations into concepts, and of less general (˜˜lower™™) concepts into
more general (˜˜higher™™) concepts; and synthesis of individual elements
(entities or parts of entities) into wholes (what Kant calls ˜˜unified mani-
folds™™). The latter notion has been the object of much suspicion in the past
forty years, especially under the influence of Strawson™s claim that it
belongs to the ˜˜imaginary subject of transcendental psychology.™™4 For
Strawson, taking seriously the role assigned to synthesis in Kant™s
argument is endorsing the worst kind of armchair psychology and losing
track of what is truly groundbreaking in Kant™s Critique of Pure Reason: the
invention of a new kind of philosophical argument, which Strawson calls
transcendental argument, in which some general features of objects (and
thus some general concepts, or categories, under which they are thought
or known) are proved to be necessary conditions for the possibility of
ascribing one™s representations to oneself, and thus for any experience at
all. Transcendental arguments are thus a special kind of anti-skeptical
argument, in which no appeal at all needs to be made to dubious
psychological notions such as Kant™s notion of a transcendental synthesis
of imagination, supposed to condition any representation of object.
Interestingly, it is not just Kant™s notion of synthesis that Strawson
rejects. It is also Kant™s table of logical functions of judgment, which
Strawson evaluates in the light of contemporary truth-functional logic.
This being so, Strawson™s charge against Kant is really not just one of
˜˜armchair psychology.™™ For Strawson, the kind of logical argument Kant
makes in support of his doctrine of the categories (their nature, and the

P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: an Essay on Kant™s Critique of Pure Reason (London:
Methuen, 1966), p. 32.

grounds we have for asserting their relation to objects existing indepen-
dently of our minds) is also irrelevant. Indeed its results are ˜˜so meager
as to render almost pointless any critical consideration of the detail of
Kant™s derivation of the categories from the Table of Judgments.™™5
Now my own claim is that indeed Kant™s table of logical forms has
no justification at all if we read it in the light of contemporary truth-
functional logic and first-order predicate logic. Nor does the relation
Kant goes on to draw between forms of judgment as forms of analysis,
and what he calls ˜˜schemata™™ of the categories as forms of the unity of
synthesis. To understand this relation, one needs to consider the early
modern version of logic Kant is working with, and the notion of judg-
ment he has himself defined. I defended these points in KCJ. What I did
not do is provide a step-by-step analysis of the chapter in which Kant
expounds and defends the central thesis of his metaphysical deduction
of the categories: the view that logical forms of judgment provide a
˜˜leading thread™™ for the establishment of a table of categories. Such an
analysis is what I now offer in ch. 4. At the end of the chapter I also offer
some suggestions about how we might think of the relation between
Kant™s logic, and the role Kant assigns to it in his transcendental project,
and later developments in logic and natural philosophy. The same issue
is taken up again later in the book, e.g. at the end of ch. 7, where I
suggest again that Kant™s limited notion of logic (a science of the rules of
concept subordination, in which objects and their relations have no
place) is to be kept in mind if one is to understand its role in Kant™s
system and its relation to post-Fregean logic and ontology.
In ch. 5, I consider an issue that played a decisive role in the develop-
ment of Kant™s transcendental philosophy: Kant™s criticism of his ration-
alist predecessors™ ˜˜proof™™ of the ˜˜principle of sufficient reason,™™ and his
argument for his own proof of the same principle. I follow the develop-
ment of Kant™s view from the pre-critical New Elucidation of the Principles
of Metaphysical Cognition (1755) to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). What
initially intrigued me was Kant™s statement that his argument for the
universal validity of the causal principle in the Second Analogy of
Experience provided precisely the proof of the principle of sufficient
reason that his predecessors had been unable to provide. In investigat-
ing Kant™s relation to his rationalist predecessors from the pre-critical
writings to the Critique of Pure Reason, I discovered that even in his

Ibid., p. 82.

earliest texts what was original about Kant™s approach was his defining
the notion of reason or ground (ratio, Grund) in relation to propositions.
Whereas for his rationalist predecessors the notion of reason was pri-
marily a metaphysical one (and the principle of sufficient reason stated
that nothing is, or comes to be, or exists, without a reason or ground for
its being, or coming to be, or existing), for Kant the notion of reason or
ground is primarily a logical one. In his formulation, the principle of
sufficient reason states that no proposition is true without there being a
reason or ground for its truth.
What is characteristic of Kant™s pre-critical period is that he thinks that
this principle of sufficient reason of propositions directly maps the way
things are: just as a proposition is true only if there is a reason for its
being true (a principle for which Kant thinks he has a proof), a state of
affairs obtains, or comes to be, or a thing comes into existence, only if
there is a reason or ground for the state of affairs™ obtaining, or coming
to be, or a thing™s coming to exist. But in the critical period, what Kant
argues is that our capacity to order states of affairs and individual entities
in time depends on our capacity to relate the truth of propositions to the
reasons or grounds for their being true. So now it is not simply assumed
that logical relations (relations between propositions) perfectly map real
relations (relations between states of affairs). Rather, our discursive
ability to think logical relations, once related to the forms of our intuition
(and here, more specifically, to the form of time), allows us to introduce
into what is given according to these forms the kinds of ordering that will
allow us to recognize things, their states, and their changes of states or
alterations: to order them in time.
Chapter 6 is directly connected to the argument of ch. 5. Here I
analyze Kant™s argument in the Second Analogy of Experience. Since I
have already devoted a long chapter in KCJ to all three Analogies, one
might wonder what remains for me to say on the issue. First, I relate my
understanding of Kant™s argument to recent prominent interpretations
of the Second Analogy. Second, I refine my analysis of the relation
between Kant™s logical argument and his account of time determination.
Finally, I now offer what I believe to be a more complete account of the
ways in which Kant calls upon the unity and continuity (denseness, in
contemporary vocabulary) of time and space, as objects of our a priori
intuition, to complete his argument in the Second Analogy. If I am right
in thinking that these features of space and time play a decisive role in
completing the argument, it should come as no surprise if challenges
against Kant™s view of space and time as a priori forms of appearances

are generally paired with challenges against the strong version of the
causal principle I take Kant to be defending in the Second Analogy of
Experience (all events in nature are subject to strictly necessary causal
laws). This is a point that would certainly merit further investigation.
Just as in ch. 6 I revisit my account of the Second Analogy, in ch. 7
I revisit and expand my account of the Third Analogy of Experience and
of Kant™s many-faceted category of community. I argue that the category
of community, rather than that of causality, should be seen as the central
category for the whole critical system, from the Third Analogy of
Experience in the first Critique to the community of rational agents in
the second Critique and Metaphysics of Morals, to the sensus communis that
grounds aesthetic judgment in the third Critique.
This provides the transition to part iii of the book, where I consider
Kant™s view of the human standpoint in the critical system as a whole.
In ch. 8, I analyze the ˜˜principle of complete determination™™ that Kant
introduces at the beginning of the chapter on the Transcendental Ideal,
in the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason. My initial
motivation in undertaking this analysis was my surprise at the way Kant
introduces this principle. According to Kant, this principle is at work in
generating the rationalist idea of an ens realissimum (most real being)
represented as the source of all reality in finite things. One might think
that the illusion Kant denounces in the idea he also denounces in the
principle on which the idea depends. But at the beginning of the chapter
on the Transcendental Ideal, the principle is presented without any kind of
disclaimer on Kant™s part. My initial question was: is there a critical, legi-
timate version of the principle, to which Kant claims one can retreat once its
illusory, illegitimate interpretation is properly undermined on the basis of
the critical standpoint established in the Transcendental Analytic? I argue
that indeed there is. Moreover, laying out the critical version of the prin-
ciple brings to light an interesting connection between notions of systema-
ticity at work in the Transcendental Analytic, in the Transcendental
Dialectic, and in the First Introduction to the third Critique.
I argue that Kant™s claims concerning the unavoidable and epistemic-
ally indispensable character of what he calls the illusions of reason,
especially the illusion carried by the Transcendental Ideal, are not well
supported. I claim that the appendix to the Transcendental Analytic
(On the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection), together with the account
of systematicity in the First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment,
provide enough tools to dispel the purported inevitability of the
theological illusion expounded in the Transcendental Ideal. One way

of characterizing my work in this chapter is thus to say that I defend
Kant™s ˜˜human standpoint™™ as laid out in the Transcendental Analytic of
the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment against what I take
to be the unnecessary concessions (however cautious and limited these
are) that Kant makes, in the Transcendental Dialectic, to a view where
the human standpoint is defined in necessary relation to (albeit also in
contrast with) divine understanding and agency.
Chapters 9 and 10 are devoted respectively to Kant™s views of moral
judgment and aesthetic judgment. For each of these chapters, my initial
question was whether the logical forms of judgment laid out in the first
Critique have any relevance at all for Kant™s investigations in the other
two Critiques. I argue that they do, and that examining how and why this
is the case yields illuminating results concerning Kant™s substantive views
of morality and aesthetic experience.
In ch. 9, I consider moral judgments. It might seem that the issue of
judgment and its forms is not especially central to Kant™s view of mor-
ality, since after all, Kant™s most insistent claim is that moral decision and
moral evaluation are a matter of the determination of the will by reason
(Vernunft). It thus seems that Kant™s view of reason is what needs to be
investigated if one™s concern is to investigate the role of human beings™
spontaneity in the moral determination of the will. However, the striking
fact is that Kant does make use of the logical forms of relation and
modality defined in his table of judgments, in characterizing the differ-
ent kinds of imperatives reason sets to itself in determining the will. It is
therefore worth asking what role these forms play in reason™s moral
determination of the will. It turns out that investigating the nature of
practical reason in this way helps us better understand how the role of
the unconditioned, categorical imperative, is to sift through the rules
depending on conditioned, hypothetical imperatives, so as to determine
which of these rules still stand (are permissible), and which of them
collapse, in the light of the unconditioned demand of the categorical
imperative. It thus appears that even in moral determination, spon-
taneity and sensibility are inseparably intertwined. That our notions of
the morally good are rationally determined means that all sensible
motivations are ordered under an original principle that is independent
of them: the unconditioned command of the categorical imperative.
There are still important differences, of course, between the theoretical
and the practical use of reason. In its theoretical use, reason depends on
sensibility and understanding for the presentation of the objects of
cognition. In its practical use, reason defines its own object: the good,

by its conformity to the categorical imperative. Nevertheless, this very
general characterization of the good finds itself instantiated, indeed real-
ized by us, only in relation to emotions and desires that are characteristic
of human beings as pathologically affected. My claim is thus that the very
same duality that characterizes the human standpoint in cognition also
characterizes it in moral determination. Indeed this duality is the source
of the well-known difficulties Kant encounters when it comes to answering
questions about what morality, as he defines it, commands us to do.
I examine a few of these difficulties at the end of ch. 9.
Finally, in ch. 10 I consider Kant™s view of aesthetic judgment. In
analyzing the features of our judgments of the beautiful, Kant makes
systematic use of the forms he has laid out in the first Critique. My claim
here is that the use he makes of these forms is quite unusual, in at least
two ways. First, although Kant™s initial investigation concerns a
judgment about an object (˜˜this X is beautiful™™), it turns out that the
characterization Kant gives of the logical form of that judgment seems to
address primarily not a descriptive judgment about the object, but a
prescriptive, normative judgment about the judging subjects (˜˜all
judging subjects ought to judge the object to be beautiful™™). Second,
the aesthetic judgment, with the peculiar feature I just described, is
grounded on an immediately experienced feeling, not (like theoretical
judgment) on the recognition of a synthesized intuition as falling under a
concept or (like moral judgment) on the determination of the will by an a
priori law of reason, the categorical imperative. Investigating these two
peculiar features of aesthetic judgment reveals in human beings a
sensitivity to their community as human beings, which has the same a
priori grounds as their capacity to develop an objective view of the
world, and their capacity to develop moral motivation. But what distin-
guishes aesthetic judgment from theoretical and moral judgment is its
responsiveness to feeling rather than to synthesis of sensible intuition
according to a rule, or determination of the faculty of desire according to
the categorical imperative of reason.
There is a missing link in the account I offer here of Kant™s conception of
the ˜˜human standpoint.™™ I say little about ˜˜I™™ in ˜˜I think™™ or about Kant™s
distinction between empirical and transcendental self-consciousness,
in the first Critique. Nor do I offer any comment on the distinction
between ˜˜I™™ as the subject of the categorical imperative (˜˜I ought never
to act except in such a way that I could also will the maxim of my action to
be a universal law™™) and what Kant calls, in Groundwork of the Metaphysics
of Morals and elsewhere, the ˜˜dear self.™™ I do offer some comment on the

combination, in Kant™s account of aesthetic judgment, of what is most
individual (feeling) and what is universally shared, or apt to be shared:
what Kant calls sensus communis, or sense of the universal community of
human beings. But Kant™s view of ˜˜I™™ in all three areas of investigation, in
particular his account of persons in the first and second Critiques, and
what this account has to offer in light of contemporary investigations of
self-reference and personal identity, will have to be the object of another



Both Sally Sedgwick and Henry Allison focus their comments1 on the
central thesis of my book (KCJ): we should take more seriously than has
generally been done Kant™s claim that a ˜˜leading thread™™ can be found
from some elementary logical forms of judgment to a system of categories,
or ˜˜pure concepts of the understanding.™™ Both of them, however, express
the worry that in stressing the role of the logical forms of judgment in
Kant™s argument not only in the Metaphysical Deduction of the
Categories (Kant™s argument for the derivation of the categories from
logical forms of judgment) but also in the Transcendental Deduction
(Kant™s proof of the objective validity of the categories, or their a priori
applicability to all objects of experience), I end up losing track of the
categories themselves. ˜˜Where have all the categories gone?™™™ asks
Allison. And Sally Sedgwick: how is the idea that categories are ˜˜gener-
ated™™ compatible with Kant™s insistence on their apriority? Given the close
connection between their discussions, I shall not attempt to answer each of
them separately. Rather, I shall weave my way from one to the other and
back again, in considering two main issues: How should we understand

Henry Allison, ˜˜Where have all the categories gone? Reflections on Longuenesse™s reading
of Kant™s Transcendental Deduction,™™ Inquiry, vol. 43, no. 1 (2000), pp. 67“80. Sally
Sedgwick, ˜˜Longuenesse on Kant and the priority of the capacity to judge,™™ Inquiry, vol. 43,
no. 1 (2000), pp. 81“90.


the relationship between categories and logical forms of judgment? Do
the categories end up playing no role at all in my account of the two main
steps of the B Transcendental Deduction of the Categories?

Categories and logical forms of judgment

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