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that we experience their objective simultaneity.

this process finds its initial impulse in the mere consciousness of the
simultaneous existence of things in space, because such consciousness
itself already depends on a synthesis of sensible manifolds guided by our
capacity to judge, namely, a synthesis oriented toward reflection accord-
ing to the form of hypothetical judgments.25
If this is correct, objects are thus individuated in space and time by
their reciprocal interaction, and concepts of objects thus individuated
are concepts of relational properties. But this means that the empirical-
cognitive use of the form of disjunctive judgment, by means of which
we think of objects in nature as falling under a unified scale of genera
and species, is mediated by that of the form of hypothetical judgment,
by means of which we individuate objects by determining their uni-
versal interaction in one space and one time. This is why I said earlier
that the category of community is the most complex of all. It cannot be
understood except under the presupposition of the other relational
categories, and thus under the presupposition of the empirical use of
the logical forms they depend upon. I submit that this is why the third
category of relation has two names: Wechselwirkung (reciprocal action,
where the emphasis is on the relation of causal interaction) and
Gemeinschaft (community, where the emphasis is on objects™ belonging

Note that Kant™s reasoning here, just like his argument in the Second Analogy, displays
a complex web of interdependence between subjective and objective temporality. On the
one hand, awareness of the irreversibility or reversibility (order-determinateness or order-
indifference) of the subjective succession of representations is all that perceiving (experien-
cing) the objective temporal order of appearances amounts to. So, the perception of
objective temporal order depends on a specific feature of the subjective succession of
representations. But on the other hand, what generates our consciousness of such
a feature of the subjective succession just is our act of relating our representations to an
intentional object (an object they are the representation of). This is because relating our
representations to objects is attempting to reflect objects under concepts according to the
logical forms of categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgment, and this in turn is what
generates “ depending on what is given to our senses “ our awareness of the irreversibility of
the subjective succession in case the pattern that emerges is that of a permanent object whose
states change, or the reversibility of the subjective succession in case the pattern that emerges
is that of several coexisting permanent objects whose states are interrelated. So, striving to
relate representations to objects is what generates the awareness of the reversibility or
irreversibility of the subjective succession, and this in turn just is what our awareness of
the objective temporal order (succession or simultaneity of states of things) amounts to. Thus
Kant™s Analogies of Experience should be understood as being essentially an explanation of
how we relate representations to objects in general: an explanation of intentionality (the
directedness of representations, their property of being representations of something), and
as a result, a theory of what makes it possible to apply concepts such as those of causal
connection and causal interaction to the objects of an empirical science of nature.

to one space, thus to one world-whole, and under one logical space
of concepts).26

Concluding remarks
Kant™s logic typically comes under heavy attack, on two main grounds.
First, it is suspiciously psychologistic. Second, it is caught within the
narrow bounds of an Aristotelian model of predication and syllogistic
inference, a model relegated to irrelevance by Fregean/Russellian exten-
sional logic. However, in the light of the use Kant makes of his ˜˜logical
functions of judgment™™ for solving the problems he addresses in the
critical system, I would like to suggest that the charges of psychologism
and archaism perhaps cancel each other. Because what Kant calls ˜˜pure
general™™ or ˜˜formal™™ logic is exclusively concerned with the ˜˜universal
rules of the understanding,™™ and understanding is the faculty of concepts
(defined as ˜˜universal and reflected representations™™), Kant™s logical
forms of judgment are nothing but forms of concept subordination, and
the forms of inference he is concerned with are merely the various ways
in which concept subordination (inclusion or exclusion of the extensions
of concepts, under an internal or external condition) allows for truth-
preserving inference. And because his ˜˜pure general logic™™ is so narrowly
defined, it can make a claim to being a description of the forms according
to which minds such as ours are capable of universalization of their
representations “ capable of combining their representations in such a
way that they are susceptible to being reflected under concepts and thus
related to objects, defined both logically as instances of concepts, and
intentionally as what our representations are representations of (the
intentional correlate of our representations). None of this makes Kant™s
˜˜general pure logic™™ a part of psychology, for logic, as Kant puts it, is
concerned not with the way we think, but with the way we should think:
the normative rules of concept combination according to which our
judgments are testable as to their truth and falsity (cf. A54/B78).27

It is striking that in the appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, when Kant talks of
the demand of reason to unify all concepts of natural science under one highest genus,
the genus he cites is that of the concept of force (A649/B677), namely precisely that concept
he takes to justify, in the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection, the anti-Leibnizian
point that (empirical) substances are individuated only by their relational properties (see
Cf. also Jasche Logic, Einl. i , AAix , p. 14. And in this volume, ch. 4, pp. 89“91.

I pointed out earlier that in his explanation of logical forms of judg-
ment “ especially the form of disjunctive judgment “ Kant gives pride
of place to an extensional consideration of concepts and concept
subordinations, that is, to the consideration of the classes or multiplicities
(Mengen) of objects thought under concepts. This is because his main
concern is to elucidate the ways in which forms of concept subordination
are also forms according to which individual objects are subsumed
under concepts, and thus extensions of concepts are constituted in the
first place. And this in turn is related to the role Kant assigns to forms of
intuition (space and time) as the forms according to which objects are
individuated, distinguished from one another and brought together,
˜˜synthesized™™ so that they become susceptible to being reflected under
concepts. Examining and evaluating Kant™s notion of a form of intuition
is beyond the limits of this chapter, as is examining Kant™s account of the
synthetic a priori character of mathematics and its role in empirical
science. Nevertheless, in light of my examination of Kant™s logical form
of disjunctive judgment and its relation to the category of community,
I suggest that we should be attentive to the ways in which the notion of an
a priori form of intuition is meant to account for an original capacity to
represent (anticipate, generate) homogeneous multiplicities (multipli-
cities of objects thought under the same concept) just as Kant™s table of
logical functions is meant to account for an original capacity to form
universal concepts. Kant did not anticipate logical or scientific revolu-
tions to come, and certainly we have reason to wish he had been more
circumspect in his remarks on Aristotelian logic, Euclidean geometry, or
Newtonian science. But what he did provide was a striking model of how
elementary functions of minds such as ours “ functions of concept
formation and functions of object-individuation “ might account for
the unity of our unsophisticated, everyday perceptual world, and our
sophisticated, scientific worldview.
He argued, moreover, that these same elementary functions, when
related not to sensations, but to impulses and desires, are capacities to
develop a moral standpoint (Critique of Practical Reason); and that both
moral and theoretical standpoint are ultimately rooted in the peculiar
nature of the living, pleasure-seeking, purposeful beings we are (Critique
of Judgment).28 All three Critiques thus give us a view of human beings as
having a peculiar capacity to develop what we might call a standpoint on

See chs. 9 and 10 in this volume.

the whole: a standpoint whose elementary discursive form is the form of
disjunctive judgment and the grounding concept, that of community.
Just a few more words, before I close, about this concept of ˜˜community™™
and its further destiny in the critical system. In the first version of the Third
Analogy, after developing his argument to the effect that substances are
perceived as simultaneously existing only if they are in relations of universal
interaction, Kant notes that our own body is the mediator for our percep-
tion of the simultaneous existence of other bodies, or physical substances:
From our experience it is easy to notice that only continuous influence in
all places in space can lead our sense from one object to another, that the
light that plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies effects a
mediate community between us and the latter and thereby proves the
simultaneity of the latter, and that we cannot empirically alter any place
(perceive this alteration) without matter everywhere making the percep-
tion of our position possible; and only by means of its reciprocal influ-
ence can it establish their simultaneity and thereby the coexistence
of even the most distant objects (though only mediately). (A213/B260)29

Because of this mediating role of our sensing body in our perception of the
community of material substances, the community of material substances is
also a community of our respective standpoints (the respective standpoints
of empirically given human beings located in space) on material substances,
and on the world as a whole. Now, in the third Critique “ the Critique of the
Power of Judgment “ Kant makes it one of the grounding maxims of
Enlightenment, that we should strive to think ˜˜from the standpoint of
everybody else.™™ And he grounds our capacity so to think in what he calls
a gemeinschaftlicher Sinn, a common sense or sense of community, namely
the capacity to develop a common standpoint on the whole (whether a
common epistemic standpoint on the whole of objectively existing things,
or a common normative/moral standpoint on the whole of interacting
human beings). This gemeinschaftlicher Sinn, or common sense, consists in
our capacity to use imagination and understanding in such a way that each
enhances the other in striving for a universal standpoint, albeit one pre-
mised on each of the particular standpoints we initially hold.30

On Kant™s view of the relation between self-consciousness, our consciousness of our own
body and our consciousness of a world of material objects in general, see my ˜˜Self-
consciousness and consciousness of one™s own body: variations on a Kantian theme.™™
Forthcoming in Philosophical Topics.
See Critique of the Power of Judgment, AAv, p. 293. Guyer and Mathews translate gemeinschaf-
tlicher Sinn as ˜˜communal sense.™™

We are more used to reading the critical system under the dominance
of the concept of cause: from Kant™s response to Hume™s skeptical doubt
in the first Critique, to his elaboration of the concept of free agency in the
second Critique. And certainly, there is a lot to say for this line of reading.
But I would like to suggest that from the community of substances in the
first Critique, to the community of standpoints on substances, also in the
first Critique, to the community of rational agents in the second Critique,
to the gemeinschaftlicher Sinn of the third Critique, there is another line
of reading, one that does not contradict the previous one but integrates
it into a more complete view of Kant™s philosophical project: relating, as
he says, all cognition to ˜˜the essential purposes of human reason™™
Finally, I submit that it is also from the standpoint of this concept and
its development throughout the critical system that we can best evaluate
Kant™s relation to his German Idealist successors. It is quite striking, for
instance, that in Hegel™s Phenomenology of Spirit the progress from
˜˜Sense-Certainty™™ to ˜˜Perception,™™ to ˜˜Force and Understanding™™ (the
first three chapters of the Phenomenology) is one where we gradually
become aware that only under a representation of universal interaction
is the identification of any individual object of sense-perception possible
for a consciousness such as ours. Hegel thus appears to espouse just the
kind of reasoning I have argued is Kant™s own in the Third Analogy. And
like Kant, he goes on to examine what relation between the conscious
subjects themselves is involved in the cognitive process just described
(fourth chapter of the Phenomenology, ˜˜Self-Consciousness,™™ and the
dialectic of desire and recognition). This being said, there are of course
major differences between the ways each of them proceeds from there
(not to mention the differences in the ways they arrive there). Where
Kant thinks that the same discursive (intellectual) functions by means of
which we represent the community of spatiotemporal substances can
also serve to think a purely noumenal (a-temporal and non-spatial)
region of being to which we belong as moral agents, Hegel, reasonably
enough, denounces the hypostatization of an ˜˜inverted world™™ (end of
the chapter on ˜˜Force and Understanding™™).31 On the other hand,
where Kant insists that our epistemic standpoint on the whole is irre-
trievably limited by the given spatiotemporal conditions of our human

Hegel™s Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977),
pp. 79“105; G. W. F. Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, ed. Wolfgang Bonsiepen und
Reinhard Heede, in Gesammelte Werke, vol. ix (1980), pp. 82“102.

sensory knowledge, Hegel, unreasonably enough, strives to achieve a
standpoint that would amount to ˜˜the presentation of God, as he is in his
eternal essence before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit.™™32 It is
perhaps possible to interpret Hegel™s grandiose statement as gesturing
toward nothing more than some universal underlying logic of all concept
formation and correction.33 Just as it is perhaps possible to interpret
Kant™s talk of a ˜˜noumenal realm™™ as gesturing toward nothing more
than our moral use of reason in achieving a fully autonomous determin-
ation of action. Perhaps we can come to this kind of reasonable recon-
struction in both cases. Even so, I would suggest that the resistance
Hegel opposes to Kant™s ˜˜noumenal realm,™™ on the one hand, and the
resistance Kant opposes, preemptively as it were, to any ambition remotely
resembling Hegel™s logic of ˜˜absolute knowledge,™™ are, from each of
them respectively, a lasting legacy.34

Hegel™s Science of Logic, trans A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1976), p. 50;
G. W. F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik. vol. i: Die objective Logik, ed. Friedrich Hogemann
and Walter Jaeschke, in Gesammelte Werke, xi (1978), p. 21.
This kind of reading is defended by Robert B. Brandom, ˜˜Some pragmatic themes in
Hegel™s idealism,™™ European Journal of Philosophy (1999), pp. 164“89; repr. as ch. 7 in Tales
of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2002).
On this point, see my ˜˜Point of view of man or knowledge of God: Kant and Hegel on
concept, judgment and reason.™™



Kant starts the exposition of the Transcendental Ideal, in the Critique of
Pure Reason, by stating what he calls the ˜˜principle of complete determin-
ation™™ in the following terms: ˜˜Every thing . . . as to its possibility . . . stands
under the principle of complete determination [durchgangigen ¨
Bestimmung], according to which, among all possible predicates of things,
insofar as they are compared with their opposites, one must apply to it™™
(A572/B600). This principle is susceptible to different interpretations.
I suggest it has, according to Kant, a legitimate, critical interpretation,
which emerges from the Transcendental Analytic as a whole.1 I shall
consider that interpretation in a moment. But it also has an interpret-
ation in the context of rational metaphysics, from which Kant inherits
the principle in the first place.2 In this context, ˜˜complete determination™™
means complete determination by the intellect alone. As it gradually

Thus at the end of section two of the Transcendental Ideal, to the question: ˜˜How does
reason come to regard all the possibility of things as derived from a single possibility,
namely that of the highest reality, and even to presuppose these possibilities as contained
in a particular original being? ™™ Kant answers by sending us back to ˜˜the discussions of the
Transcendental Analytic themselves™™ (A581/B609). In what follows I shall attempt to out-
line what I take to be the most important features of those discussions for understanding
what the critical version of the ˜˜principle of complete determination™™ might be.
See Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Metaphysica (Halle, 1739, repr. in Kant, AAXvii),
x148; Christian Wolff, Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia (Frankfurt-am-Main and Leipzig,
1736); repr. in Christian Wolff, Gesammelte Werke, ii-3, pp. 187“9.


appears while we progress through section two of the Transcendental
Ideal, this interpretation is one to which reason, according to Kant, is
inevitably drawn, and which leads to the dialectical reasoning that Kant
calls the ˜˜Transcendental Ideal,™™3 in accordance with the illusory principle
stated at the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic: ˜˜If the condi-
tioned is given, then the totality of its conditions is also given.™™ In this case:
if limited realities are given, then the absolutely unlimited totum realitatis is
also given. This totum realitatis is then posited as a distinct being, the
ground of all finite reality: the ens realissimum of rational theology.4
The Transcendental Ideal is not the first instance in the Critique of Pure
Reason where Kant criticizes the rationalist notion of a totum realitatis, an
unlimited whole of reality. One memorable previous occasion for such
criticism was the appendix to the Transcendental Analytic, On the
Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection, and more specifically, the analysis
of the concepts of reflection: ˜˜matter, form.™™ The rationalist concept of a
whole of reality, or unbounded reality, was then cited as a typical
instance of the error of intellectualist philosophers, according to which
the matter of thought (positive determinations or realities, thought by
concepts) is prior to its form (relations of these determinations according
to the principle of contradiction). ˜˜In respect to things in general,
unbounded reality was viewed as the matter of all possibility, but its
limitation (negation) as that form through which one thing is distin-
guished from another in accordance with transcendental concepts™™

Kant sometimes calls ˜˜Transcendental Ideal™™ the reasoning that leads to the representation
and hypostatization (positing as an existing object) of an ens realissimum (see A340/B398).
But he more often calls that representation itself, as an archetype and source of all reality,
˜˜the Ideal of pure reason™™: see A568/B596, A569/B597, A574/B602. Here I am referring to
the Transcendental Ideal in the first sense. Later in this chapter the expression
˜˜Transcendental Ideal™™ will mostly be used in the second sense.
On the steps of the illusion, cf. A582“3/B610“11. On the characterization of the dialectical
reasoning called ˜˜Ideal of pure reason,™™ cf. A340/B398. For a careful analysis of the steps of
Kant™s argument in section two of the Transcendental Ideal, see Michelle Grier, Kant™s
Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001),
pp. 230“51. In the course of her analysis, Michelle Grier subjects to acute scrutiny what I
call, in the paper that was the original version of this chapter, the ˜˜critical version™™ of the
principle of complete determination and the ˜˜critical reduction™™ of the rationalist notion of
an ens realissimum (see Beatrice Longuenesse, ˜˜The Transcendental Ideal, and the unity of
the critical system,™™ Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, Milwaukee 1995
[Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995], i , pp. 521“37. And Grier, Transcendental
Illusion, pp. 237“48). I think her criticisms are often well taken, and I have tried accordingly
to clarify my view in revising the paper for this chapter, which on several points extensively
revises the earlier paper. See also my review of her book in Mind, vol. 112, no. 448 (2003),
pp. 718“24, esp. p. 723.

(A267/B323, translation modified).5 To this conception, Kant then opposed
his own conception of the primacy of form over matter: the forms of
sensibility being a priori and making possible the consciousness of sensa-
tions, and therefore the matter of appearances as that which corresponds to
sensation (cf. A20/B34); the forms of thought being a priori and making
possible concepts and objects recognized or thought under these concepts.6
Now, relating Kant™s criticism of the Transcendental Ideal in the
Transcendental Dialectic to his criticism of the concept of the unbounded
whole of reality in the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection is interesting
for at least two reasons. First, it gives us a route to the critical reduction of
the rationalist notion of a whole of reality, by sending us back to
the exposition of the forms of sensibility and understanding and their
respective relation to their matter, according to the Transcendental
Analytic. But second, and less generally acknowledged, it also sends us
forward, to the analysis of matter and form of thought in the First
Introduction to the third Critique.7 Indeed, I want to suggest that
the critical version of the concepts of reflection ˜˜matter, form™™ expounded
in the Amphiboly chapter of the first Critique finds its ultimate develop-
ment in the concepts of matter and form (matter as ˜˜logical genus™™ and
its complete specification in the form of a system) which guide reflective
judgment according to the First Introduction to the third Critique.
My goal in this chapter is therefore threefold.
First, I propose to sort out the legitimate (critical) and illegitimate
(intellectualist) uses of the ˜˜principle of complete determination™™ in
section two of the Transcendental Ideal. In doing so, I shall be primarily

Guyer and Wood translate: ˜˜In respect to things in general, unbounded reality is regarded
as the matter of all possibility . . . ™™ Kant uses the past tense: ˜˜Auch wurde in Ansehung der
Dinge ¨ berhaupt . . . ™™ It is important to translate this past tense to make it clear that Kant is
describing a view made irrelevant by the critical standpoint he advocates. I should add that
in the original version of this paper, I said that in the Amphiboly chapter, Kant denounces
the illusion of rationalist metaphysicians (or what he calls ˜˜the intellectualist philosopher™™ “
see A367/B323). As Michelle Grier has pointed out to me, the doctrine of illusion belongs in
the Transcendental Dialectic, not the Transcendental Analytic. Here we can talk only of an
error. It will turn out, from the argument of the Transcendental Dialectic, that this error is
itself kept alive by an unavoidable illusion of reason. On this point, see below, esp.
pp. 233“4.
In the Amphiboly, Kant mentions only the primacy of form over matter in the sensible
given: the primacy of forms of intuition over sensations and thus appearances (cf. A267“8/
B323“4). But I think the point can be extended to the relation between matter and form of
thought: when thought is sensibly conditioned, its form is prior to its matter. I shall argue
for this in the second part of this chapter. See also KCJ, pp. 147“63.
Cf. Critique of the Power of Judgment, First Introduction, AAxx, pp. 211“17. And see below in
this chapter, pp. 230“2.

concerned, not so much with Kant™s account of the illusion of reason
which he calls the ˜˜transcendental ideal,™™ as with what I have called its
˜˜critical reduction™™: what the principle of complete determination and

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