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cessively. Now we must consider whether a skeptic like Hume could
object to this premise. Allison maintains that Hume cannot reject this
premise since “event awareness is presupposed by his own well-known
account of how we come to form the belief that future sequences of
events will resemble past sequences.”13 Moreover, Hume™s theory that
impressions precede their corresponding ideas evidently requires him
to distinguish between objective and subjective successions.
3. Perceiving an objective succession of states requires the imagination
to connect and order perceptions in global time. Recognizing an event
requires one to perceive (judge) the component states as having a
determinate order in global time. Now commentators disagree over
what Kant is claiming about this temporal ordering. Allison believes
Kant is arguing only that we must be able to determine the relative
order of states in time.14 By contrast, Melnick takes Kant to argue
that it must be possible to locate an event in relation to all other
events in global time. In support, he cites passages such as A177/B219,
where Kant describes the principles as rules “in accordance with which
the existence of each [appearance] can be determined with regard to
the unity of all time.”15 Melnick™s reading offers a more coherent
interpretation of Kant, one reinforced by the Postulates of Empirical
Thought, as well as the First Analogy.
4. The “backdrop thesis:” the objective position of states in global
time cannot be determined by mere perception. In discussing the First
Analogy we accepted this view, that neither the data of intuition nor
the mere order of apprehension can determine the objective times

13 14 See Allison, Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, 229.
Kant™s Transcendental Idealism, 228.
15 Melnick, Kant™s Analogies of Experience, 85“8.
Analytic of Principles II 177
of the intuited states. Lovejoy objects, however, that it is possible to
perceive the succession of states constituting an event. Citing Kant™s
example of the ship ¬‚oating downstream, Lovejoy says, “I can, in the
language of common sense, see the ship move.” From this he concludes
that the principle of causality (he says suf¬cient reason) is not required
to distinguish between objective successions and coexisting states.16
Lovejoy is right, of course, that one can perceive successive states of
an object (this is consistent with premise 2). But it does not follow
from mere perception that these are states of the same substance, or
that we can locate the states in global time. Consider the ship case:
what guarantees that the substance of the ship upstream is the same
substance as the ship downstream? It will turn out that one function
of causal laws is precisely to justify assumptions about the identity of
the objects whose states are being perceived. The discussion of time
determination above also shows that mere perception is not suf¬cient
to locate successive states in global time. Thus Lovejoy™s example does
not refute Kant™s argument.
5. Therefore, the only alternative is to think the succession of states as
necessarily determined or irreversible. This is the famous “irreversibil-
ity thesis,” about which there is much confusion. What Kant actually
says is that in order to determine the objective relation of the appear-
ances, “the relation between the two states must be thought in such
a way that it is thereby necessarily determined which of them must
be placed before and which after rather than vice versa” (A188/B234,
my italics). And at A192“3/B237“8 he distinguishes event perception
from the successive perception of coexisting states: “if in the case of
an appearance that contains a happening I call the preceding state
of perception A and the following one B, then B can only follow A
in apprehension, but the perception A cannot follow but only pre-
cede B” (my italics). By contrast, in the successive apprehension of
coexisting states, the order of perceptions has no necessity: “In the
previous example of a house . . . there was therefore no determi-
nate order that made it necessary when I had to begin in the appre-
hension in order to combine the manifold empirically” (A193/B238).
Thus what characterizes event perception is the irreversibility of the
perceptions; as Strawson puts it, perceptions of coexisting states have

16 See Lovejoy, “On Kant™s Reply to Hume,” 297“8.
Analytic of Principles II
178
“order-indifference.”17 The question arises whether Kant is attribut-
ing irreversibility to the states perceived or to our apprehensions of
them, since the term “perception” is ambiguous. As I emphasized
above, however, irreversibility must be attributed originally to the
appearances. In consequence (I list this as a corollary in step 8), we
must think the order of apprehension as “bound to” the order of the
states perceived. Here, then, Kant identi¬es the feature characterizing
event perception as the thought that the sequence S1 “S2 constitut-
ing the event is irreversible. As both Melnick and Allison emphasize,
Kant is not arguing that irreversibility in apprehension is a datum
from which we infer the irreversibility of states of appearances.18
A second issue concerns whether Kant™s claim that one must think
the succession as necessary is analytic. Several commentators argue
that given that one perceives an event E constituted by S1 “S2 , it is
logically necessary that the states occur in the order S1 “S2 . If they
occurred in the order S2 “S1 , by de¬nition one would perceive a dif-
ferent event.19 But as James Van Cleve has shown, this objection
commits two fallacies.20 First is a scope error: Kant is arguing that the
necessity attaches unconditionally to the existence of the event rather
than to the consequent of a conditional. That is, event perception
is characterized by the thought “Necessarily S1 is followed by S2 ,”
rather than “If I perceive E, necessarily S1 is followed by S2 ,” which
is analytic. A related error is construing the necessity here as logical
rather than real. Clearly the sequence S1 “S2 has a real necessity, which
Kant attributes to the necessity of causal laws. Kant is offering a tran-
scendental deduction to show that the real necessity of metaphysical
principles is grounded in their “epistemic” status.
6. The concept required to think the irreversibility of states is cause“
effect, that is, the concept of a condition upon which something else follows
necessarily according to a rule. Finally, Kant connects the idea of irre-
versibility to causal laws. As we saw earlier, the event being perceived
is the effect, and the cause is some condition that initiates the change

17 See Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, 133.
18 See Melnick, Kant™s Analogies of Experience, 82“3, and Allison, Kant™s Transcendental Idealism,
225.
19 Among those raising this objection are Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, 137, Wolff, Kant™s
Theory of Mental Activity, 268, and Bennett, Kant™s Analytic, 221.
20 See Van Cleve, “Four Recent Interpretations of Kant™s Second Analogy,” 82“3.
Analytic of Principles II 179
from S1 to S2 . It is essential to causality that the relation between cause
and effect be rule-governed: “This connection must therefore consist
in the order of the manifold of appearance in accordance with which
the apprehension of one thing (that which happens) follows that of
the other (which precedes) in accordance with a rule” (A193/B238).21
As Melnick explains, Kant sees causal laws as rules for ordering
states, based on features of appearances.22 Since the sequence is irre-
versible, the law must be asymmetrical: Kant says that being rule-
governed entails “that I cannot reverse the series and place that which
happens prior to that which it follows” (A198/B243). But causal laws
are complex, and it is an oversimpli¬cation to represent them in the
form, “Whenever C occurs, E occurs.” For in addition to describing
the cause and the effect, they must take into account other relevant
factors called boundary conditions. For example, it is not the case
that water invariably freezes at a temperature of 32—¦ Fahrenheit; other
factors come into play, including the volume and shape of the liquid
mass and the pressure acting on it. Thus the rules relating cause to
effect must always refer to the circumstances in which the event takes
place. To cite Melnick™s more elaborate example, an automobile can
be rust-free (P1 ) at t, and corroded (P2 ) at t . How we order these states
depends on the circumstances. The event could be the change P1 “P2
if oxidation occurs; or it could consist of P2 “P1 if the automobile is
repainted. Causal laws, then, take the form, “Given circumstances B,
whenever event C occurs, S1 will be followed by S2 .”
Whether step 6 is acceptable, then, depends on whether order-
ing successive states requires us to think them as governed by causal
laws. Given the backdrop thesis, the conclusion that this objective
ordering depends on features of appearances appears undeniable. But
as Melnick points out, nothing about appearances determines their
order “except in terms of some rule that orders the appearances on
the basis of these features.”23 As we saw above, ordering the states as
non-coexistent means that the rule must be asymmetrical: given the
circumstances, S1 is followed by S2 and not vice versa. Thus Kant
can reasonably conclude that perceiving states as necessarily succes-
sive requires thinking them as subject to causal laws. Causal laws

21 Additional passages occur at A193/B238“9, A195/B240, and A201/B247.
22 23 Kant™s Analogies of Experience, 89.
Kant™s Analogies of Experience, 89“90.
Analytic of Principles II
180
function as rules for ordering states as successive based on features of
the states.24
7. Therefore, the perception of events in time presupposes that all events
are caused. Kant™s conclusion is the general principle that all events are
caused. This follows from steps 5 and 6, for if it is true that we must
think of the states making up an event as necessarily successive, and
if causal laws are required to order states in this way, then all events
must be subject to causal laws.
As I mentioned, commentators question whether Kant also intends
to prove the existence of particular empirical laws. On the above
interpretation, the causal principle must be true because we must
think of events as governed by empirical laws. Friedman defends
this reading in discussing Kant™s view of empirical laws.25 Friedman
argues that for Kant, causality is a rule-governed relation between two
events, such that given the cause, the succession of states constituting
the effect follows necessarily. Moreover, the universality of a rule
entails that it applies to types of events (e.g., lowering temperature
with the freezing of water).26 Thus he agrees with Melnick that Kant
justi¬es the causal principle by showing that all events are governed
by empirical laws; in other words, “the universal causal principle
must assert the existence of particular causal laws.”27 Now as Melnick
explains, this does not guarantee that we can discover these causal
laws. The Second Analogy argues only that there must be causal
laws governing changes of state, not that we must know them. For
one thing, we may need the repetition of types of events to discover
causal laws, but the Second Analogy does not imply anything about
the frequency of types of events.28
Friedman also argues that Kant does not construe particular causal
laws as inductive generalizations. Of course empirical laws are more
speci¬c than the causal principle because they employ empirical con-
cepts (e.g., matter as the movable in space). Although “empirical laws
can only obtain and be found by means of experience” (A216/B263),
it does not follow that they are a posteriori. Throughout the Analytic,

24 See Melnick, Kant™s Analogies of Experience, 89“90.
25 See “Causal Laws,” especially 165“75.
26 See “Causal Laws,” 192n4 and 193n6. Obviously the general causal principle does not specify
the kind of rule Kant is arguing for.
27 28 See Melnick, Kant™s Analogies of Experience, 91“3.
“Causal Laws,” 171.
Analytic of Principles II 181
Kant emphasizes the necessity of causal connections. At A91/B124 he
says the concept of causality requires that the effect follow from the
cause
necessarily and in accordance with an absolutely universal rule . . . thus
to the synthesis of cause and effect there attaches a dignity that can never
be expressed empirically, namely that the effect does not merely come along
with the cause, but is posited through it and follows from it.
And at A159/B198 he says laws of nature “carry with them an expres-
sion of necessity, thus at least the presumption of determination by
grounds that are a priori and valid prior to all experience.” For Kant,
empirical laws have a mixed necessity, which Friedman describes as
“a priori in a derivative sense.”29 Although empirical laws are not
deducible from the principle of causality, that principle makes possi-
ble particular causal laws.30 Friedman describes the three-stage pro-
cedure for deriving the law of gravitation from Kepler™s laws, which
subsumes both the latter and the theory of gravitation under the
necessary transcendental principles. Melnick™s and Friedman™s analy-
ses should put to rest doubts that Kant intends to demonstrate the
existence of particular causal laws.
8. Corollary: the subjective order of apprehension is “bound to” or
derived from the objective order of the states. Finally we come to Kant™s
claim concerning the order of apprehension in event perception. As
I see it, this is not a premise, but an implication of the conclusion.
One could interpret it to mean that to represent states as necessarily
successive, our apprehensions of those states must also be necessarily
successive. But a careful reading shows that Kant never says this: he
claims only that the subjective order is “bound to” or “derived from”
the objective order. A better construal is based on a causal theory of
perception, according to which our apprehensions are mental events
themselves subject to the principle of causality. Thus the order of our
apprehensions a“b of an event A“B is determined by the location
of the event A“B in time. Whether the subjective order reproduces
the objective order depends on the circumstances. Under ordinary
circumstances, such that the way a depends on A does not differ from

29 “Causal Laws,” 174.
30 Friedman sketches how the law of universal gravitation is “grounded” in the MFNS in section
IV of “Causal Laws,” 175“80, and Kant and the Exact Sciences, 165“210.
Analytic of Principles II
182
the way b depends on B, the order of apprehension would repro-
duce the order of the states.31 Moreover, since this is only a corollary
of the causal principle, there is no circularity in basing this claim on a
causal theory of perception. Demonstrating the truth of the principle
of causality a fortiori justi¬es a causal theory of perception and this
corollary claim.
Throughout the Second Analogy, Kant claims that only transcen-
dental idealism, and not transcendental realism, can account for
the distinction between objective and subjective temporal orders.
Although this does not play a role in the proof, it does bolster the
case for transcendental idealism. Kant explains the inadequacy of
transcendental realism thus:
If appearances were things in themselves, then no human being would be
able to assess from the succession of representations how the manifold is
combined in the object. For we have to do only with our representations;
how things in themselves may be . . . is entirely beyond our cognitive
sphere. (A190/B235)
For the transcendental realist, all representations are empirical and
provide no basis for distinguishing the subjective order of apprehen-
sion from the objective order of events. Only by taking appearances to
be constituted by the act of judging, can we recognize features essen-
tial to experience of objects: “If we investigate what new characteristic
is given to our representations by the relation to an object, and what
is the dignity that they thereby receive, we ¬nd that it does nothing
beyond making the combination of representations necessary in a
certain way, and subjecting them to a rule” (A197/B242“3).32
One last question concerns the simultaneity of cause and effect.
At A202“3/B247“9 Kant denies that the cause necessarily precedes
the effect, or that the necessary succession obtains between cause and
effect. Kant™s examples of the stove heating a room and the lead ball
creating a depression in the pillow illustrate that “The majority of
ef¬cient causes in nature are simultaneous with their effects, and the
temporal sequence of the latter is occasioned only by the fact that the

31 Van Cleve calls this condition “perceptual isomorphism” in “Four Recent Interpretations of
Kant™s Second Analogy,” 81“2.
32 See also A191/B236, A196“7/B241“2, and A199“200/B244“5.
Analytic of Principles II 183
cause cannot achieve its entire effect in one instant” (A203/B248). As
we have seen, causal laws imply not that causes must precede their
effects, but that given the cause, the succession of states constituting
the effect is necessary. Now one relation that must obtain between
cause and effect is that the effect could not precede its cause: “For if I
lay the ball on the pillow the dent follows its previously smooth shape;
but if (for whatever reason) the pillow has a dent, a leaden ball does
not follow it” (A203/B248“9). In Kant™s view, the actual temporal
relations between cause and effect will depend on the nature of the
interaction.

4. the third a nalog y: th e prin ci pl e
of c au sa l in te racti on
In the Third Analogy, Kant argues that our ability to determine
that states of distinct substances coexist presupposes laws of causal
interaction. This completes his analysis of the necessary conditions
for determining objective time relations of appearances. As Melnick
points out, however, the Second and Third Analogies are actually
two sides of the same coin. This is not surprising since, according
to Newton™s third law of motion, every causal action also involves
an interaction. Melnick argues that Kant™s distinction between the
schemata of causality (succession) and that of mutual interaction
(coexistence) is mistaken. By generalizing the notion of causal law
to include dynamical interactions, Kant can combine the two argu-
ments. Thus the weakness is in the detail rather than the substance
of the arguments.33
As usual, Kant presents two versions of the Third Analogy prin-
ciple, which the B edition labels the “Principle of simultaneity,
according to the law of interaction, or community.” The A edition
version states, “All substances, insofar as they are simultaneous, stand
in thoroughgoing community (i.e., interaction with one another)”
(A211). The B edition reads: “All substances, insofar as they can be
perceived in space as simultaneous, are in thoroughgoing interaction”
(B256). Since substances are absolutely permanent, simultaneity must

33 Here I follow Melnick in Kant™s Analogies of Experience, 94“7 and 102“10.
Analytic of Principles II
184
be a feature of their states. The point, then, is to show that judging
states of (distinct) substances to be simultaneous requires that they
fall under laws of dynamical interaction.
The of¬cial argument is given at B257“8, and closely parallels the
argument of the Second Analogy. The main steps are these:
1. Things (states) are simultaneous when their perceptions are recip-
rocal or reversible. For example, perceptions of coexisting states of
the moon and the earth can occur in any order.
2. Simultaneity is the existence of the manifold at the same time.
3. The backdrop thesis: objective simultaneity is not given in intu-
ition.
4. Therefore, the understanding must think the perceived states as
simultaneous and thereby as reversible in perception.
5. The concept required to do this is mutual dynamical interaction.
6. Therefore, the perception of simultaneous states presupposes laws
of dynamical interaction.
The problem is how to distinguish causal actions determining
objective successions from the dynamical interactions correlated with
objective simultaneity. Melnick thinks this is not serious, since it is
possible to unify the arguments of the Second and Third Analo-
gies. The Second Analogy principle applies to successive states of
one substance, the Third Analogy to simultaneous states of distinct
substances. Melnick shows that determining a succession of states of
distinct substances requires both causal action and mutual interac-
tion. Had Kant generalized his approach, the two arguments could
be combined as follows:34
1. We can determine the objective times of events or states of affairs
only relative to other events or states of affairs, and presupposing
that the position of an event can be determined relatively to all
other events.
2. Objective time-determinations are not given in perception.
3. Therefore temporal determinability must be based on features of
appearances.
4. Features of appearances can be used to locate events and states of
affairs only by presupposing rules licensing such inferences.
34 I paraphrase Melnick at Kant™s Analogies of Experience, 95“7.
Analytic of Principles II 185
5. Rules licensing inferences from features of appearances to their
temporal locations are laws describing real connections, both asym-
metrical and mutual, among substances.
6. Therefore, the objective determination of states as successive
or simultaneous requires the application of causal laws or rules
describing necessary connections among states of affairs.
Melnick defends his view by analyzing the impact motion of billiard
balls described by laws of collision. Consider an impact law L that
describes the motions of bodies following a collision as a function of
the magnitude and direction of force, their elasticity, the coef¬cient
of friction, and so on. Melnick argues that such a law can be used
to determine both successive and simultaneous states of the balls.35
Suppose a billiard ball a simultaneously strikes two billiard balls at
rest, b and c. If we are interested only in the positions of b and
c relative to each other, but not with respect to a, we can use L to
determine the simultaneous positions of b and c after the collision. By
the same token, we can use L to determine that b is at p before c is at p
following the collision. In neither case are the positions of the two balls
a function of each other, nor does any mutual interaction between
them play a role. Thus where there is a causal interaction involving
a change of state(s) brought about by an initiating condition, the
same law can be used to determine both the objective succession and
coexistence of states, in the same and distinct substances.
Melnick concludes that although Kant wrongly correlates causal-
ity with succession and interaction with simultaneity, he is right that
objective time-determination requires us to apply causal laws of action
and interaction to the things whose states they are.36 In the absence of
dynamical interactions among substances, we could not make objec-
tive temporal claims about their states, since we could not determine
whether the two states are objectively successive or simultaneous. In
concluding, Kant claims that “There are therefore certain laws, and
indeed a priori, which ¬rst make a nature possible” (A216/B263). By
“nature” he means the necessary unity of all appearances in one space-
time. “Thus together [the Analogies] say: All appearances lie in one
nature, and must lie therein, since without this a priori unity no unity
35 See Melnick, Kant™s Analogies of Experience, 102“10 for the full discussion.
36 Melnick, Kant™s Analogies of Experience, 109.
Analytic of Principles II
186
of experience, thus also no determination of the objects in it, would
be possible” (A216/B263).

5 . t he post ul ates of e mpi ri ca l thou g h t
Up to this point the Principles describe conditions that constrain
the content of our experience of objects. By contrast, the Postulates
govern the mode in which the subject holds objective judgments, as
to their real possibility, actuality, or necessity. At A219/B266 Kant says
the modal categories are peculiar insofar as “they do not augment the
concept to which they are ascribed in the least, but rather express only
the relation to the faculty of cognition.” Rather than contributing
to the concept of an object, the modal categories relate objects “to
the understanding and its empirical use, to the empirical power of
judgment, and to reason.” In other words, the modal categories are
required to create a coherent system of knowledge.
The categories of modality are schematized versions of the logical
concepts of modality discussed in the Metaphysical Deduction. In
chapter 4 we saw that the latter concern the illocutionary or assertive
force of judgments: logical possibility expresses the mode in which
the subject merely considers a proposition; logical actuality expresses
assertion; and logical necessity expresses the assertion of a proposition
as following from other propositions. In the Postulates, Kant claims
our ability to judge states of affairs as really possible or impossible,
actual or non-actual, and necessary or contingent, requires us to think
appearances under these modal concepts.
Kant™s discussion does not so much justify as explain the application

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