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± See Plato, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, eds. Edith Hamilton and
Huntington Cairns (Princeton University Press, ±), p. ±±: According
to Plato™s Timaeus, the divine creator came to a universe already existent,
but in chaos. Thus, ˜¬nding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving
in an irregular and disorderly fashion, out of disorder he brought order,
considering that this was in every way better than the other™.
 Alexander Gerard, An Essay on Genius, ed. Bernard Fabian (Munich, ±),
p. ·.
 Cooper, Characteristics, vol. ©, pp. ±“·.
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. °.
µ William Hazlitt, The Complete Works of William Hazlitt, ed. P. P. Howe, ± vols.
(London: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd, ±°“), vol. © , p. .
 Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. © , p. .
± Notes to pages “±
· Geoffrey H. Hartman, Saving the Text (The Johns Hopkins University Press,
±±), p. .
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. ©© , p. ±.
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Aids to Re¬‚ection, ed. John Beer (Princeton Univer-
sity Press, ±µ), pp. µ“°.
° M. H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic
Literature (Oxford University Press, ±·±), p. ±.
± Mark Kipperman, Beyond Enchantment (University of Pennsylvania Press,
±), p. ±. For a thorough examination of Romantic myths of creation,
see Warren Stevenson™s Divine Analogy (Universit¨ t Salzburg, ±·).
a
 William James, Pragmatism (Longmans, Green and Co., Inc., ±°·),
pp. µ“·.
 Ibid., pp. µ“µ.
 See John Dewey, Experience and Nature ±µ (La falle: Open Court, ±µ),
p. µ±.
µ Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©, p. ±±.
 See Jonathan Bate, ˜The Literature of Power: Coleridge and De Quincey™,
Coleridge™s Visionary Languages: Essays in Honour of J. B. Beer, eds. Tim Fulford
and Morton D. Paley (D. S. Brewer, ±), p. ±.
· Thomas De Quincey, The Collected Writings of Thomas De Quincey, ed. David
Masson (Edinburgh, ±“°), vol.  , p. .
 Ibid., vol.  ©, p. .
 Percy Bysshe Shelley, Shelley™s Poetry and Prose, eds. Donald H. Reiman and
Sharon B. Powers (Norton, ±··), p. .
µ° Tilottama Rajan, The Supplement of Reading: Figures of Understanding in Romantic
Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, ±°), p. ±.
µ± Shelley, Poetry and Prose, p. .
µ Stanley Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism
(University of Chicago Press, ±), pp. , .
µ Friedrich Schlegel, ˜Athen¨ um Fragments™, The Origins of Modern Critical
a
Thought: German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism from Lessing to Hegel, ed. David
Simpson (Cambridge University Press, ±), p. ±µ; par. .
µ Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©, p. ±µ.
µµ Ibid., p. ±°.
µ Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©© , p. ±°.
µ· Tom Paulin, The Day-Star of Liberty: William Hazlitt™s Radical Style (Faber and
Faber, ±), p. .
µ I coin the term ˜will to value™, albeit with a slightly different emphasis for
the present purpose, from Laurence Lockridge. See The Ethics of Romanticism
(Cambridge University Press, ±), p. : ˜What I call a “will to value” is
the dominant ethical tendency in Romantic writers; it is their response to
a moment in history when concepts of value are seen to be reduced or
denuded.™
µ Richard Elridge, Leading a Human Life: Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanti-
cism (University of Chicago Press, ±·), p. ·.
Notes to pages ±“± ±
° Wheeler, Romanticism, Pragmatism and Deconstruction, p. µ.
± Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. .
 Ibid., p. °.
 Ibid., p. ±.
 Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy of German
Literary Theory (Routledge, ±·), p. ·±.
µ Ibid., p. .
 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute ±·,
trans. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester (Albany: SUNY, ±), p. ±·.
· Rorty, Mirror, pp. °“±.
 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Beacon Press, ±), p. .
 Stanley Cavell, foreword, Must We Mean What We Say? pp. xxiii, xxvi.
·° Ibid., pp. , µ.
·± Jacobi, Main Philosophical Writings, p. µµ.
· George di Giovanni, introduction, Main Philosophical Writings, by Friedrich
Jacobi, p. ±µ±.
· Marjorie Levinson, introduction, Rethinking Historicism, by Marjorie
Levinson, Jerome McGann, Paul Hamilton and Marilyn Butler (Basil
Blackwell, ±), pp. , ±.
· Alan Lui, ˜Local Transcendence: Cultural Criticism, Postmodernism, and
the Romanticism of Detail™, Representations  (±°), ±.
·µ See Jean-Fran¸ ois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, ±·, trans. Geoff
c
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester University Press, ±),
pp. °“±. Lyotard claims that ˜the little narrative [petit r´cit] remains the
e
quintessential form of imaginative invention™, and that ˜it is now dissention
that must be emphasized. Consensus is a horizon that is never reached.™ In
her afterword to The Supplement of Reading, Rajan concludes that ˜demysti¬-
cation is not the ultimate horizon of our reading but must itself be inscribed
in the intertextual processes generated by the poem [ . . . ]™ (p. µ±). For a
critique of Jerome McGann and Paul de Man as trading, respectively, on an
explicit and a covert notion of the ˜empirical sublime™, see Frances Ferguson,
Solitude and the Sublime (Routledge, ±), ch. ·.
· Rorty, Contingency, p. µ·.
·· David Simpson, Romanticism, Nationalism, and the Revolt Against Theory (Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, ±), p. .
· Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? p. ·.
· Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe,
eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
±), p. ±µ; par. ·.
° Ibid., p. ; par. µ.
± Coleridge, Aids to Re¬‚ection, p. °.
 John Keats, The Letters of John Keats ±±“±± , ed. Hyder Edward Rollins, 
vols. (Cambridge University Press, ±µ), vol. ©, p. ·.
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. ±.
 Ibid., p. 
° Notes to pages ± “
µ Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Friend, ed. Barbara E. Rooke,  vols. (Princeton
University Press, ±), vol. ©, p. µ±.
 David Vallins discusses the same passage in Coleridge and the Psychology of
Romanticism (Macmillan, °°°), p. . He notes how it ˜involves the paradox
that while thought is progressing it is also limited “ that it is in a continuous
tension with the ¬xed forms of knowledge™.
· Coleridge, The Friend, vol. ©, p. µ±.
 Rorty, Contingency, pp. , µ, ±.
 Wheeler, Romanticism, Pragmatism and Deconstruction, p. .
° Michael Fischer, ˜Accepting the Romantics as Philosophers™, Philosophy and
Literature ± (±), ±.
± W. V. Quine, ˜Epistemology Naturalized™, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
(Columbia University Press, ±), p. ·.
 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. ; par. ·±.
 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: Capricorn Books, ±°),
pp. “.
 Rorty, Contingency, pp. °“±.


± ¦   ©  ©  °©   ©    © ®:
  ©§  ®    ® µ 
± David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the
Principles of Morals, ±···, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rd edn, rev. P. H. Nidditch
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, ±·µ), p. ±µ.
 See esp. James Engell, The Creative Imagination, Enlightenment to Romanticism
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, ±±).
 Wordsworth, Prose Works, vol. ©© , p. µ·.
 Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©©, p. ±±·.
µ Jeremy Bentham, ˜A Table of the Springs of Action™, Deontology, together with
A Table of the Springs of Action and Article on Utilitarianism, ed. Amnon Goldworth,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, ±), p. µ±; par. µ.
 Thomas Love Peacock, ˜The Four Ages of Poetry™, The Works of Thomas
Love Peacock, eds. H. F. B. Brett-Smith and C. E. Jones (London, ±“),
vol. ©© ©, p. ±±.
· [George Puttenham], The Arte of English Poesie (London, ±µ), p. .
 Ibid., p. ± (insertions added).
 Puttenham™s radical conclusion is that ˜[i]t is therefore of Poets thus to be
conceiued, that if they be able to deuise and make all these things of them
selues, without any subiect of veritie, that they be (by maner of speech) as
creating gods™ (ibid., p. ).
±° Philip Sidney, An Apologie for Poetrie (London, ±µµ), p. .
±± Ibid., p. .
± Ibid., p.  .
± Ibid., p. ¤.
Notes to pages “± ±
± Sidney acknowledges this in a mock-apology towards the end of the Apologie:
˜But what? me thinks I deserue to be pounded, for straying from Poetry
to Oratorie: but both haue such an af¬nity in this wordish consideration™
(ibid., p. ¬).
±µ Ibid., p.  .
± Ibid., p. © . Sidney™s replacement of this classical notion of inspiration with
something far more worldly looks towards its uneasy position in literary
theory over the following two centuries, with its connotations of enthusi-
asm and irrationalism. Davenant was later to complain to Hobbes about
the notion of ˜inspiration, a dangerous word which many have of late suc-
cessfully us™d™ (preface, Gondibert. Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century, ed.
J. E. Spingarn (Oxford University Press, ±µ·), vol. © © , p. µ). Hobbes agreed,
comparing the inspired poet to a ˜bagpipe™ (˜The Answer of Mr Hobbes to Sr
Will. D™Avenant™s Preface Before Gondibert™, Critical Essays, vol. © © , p. µ). By
the end of the seventeenth century, Dennis is arguing ˜that this extraordinary
thing in Poetry which has been hitherto taken for something Supernatural
and Divine, is nothing but a very common Passion, or a complication of
common Passions™ (preface, Remarks on a Book Entituled, Prince Arthur. The
Critical Works of John Dennis, ed. Edward Niles Hooker (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, ±“), vol. ©, p. ). In the eighteenth century,
even an enthusiast like Young holds back from the claim that creative genius
has access to divine truth (Conjectures on Original Composition (London, ±·µ),
p. ), while Gerard endeavours to explain the fact that genius acts ˜as if it
were supernaturally inspired™ in terms of the effects of enthusiasm, by which
genius ˜gives vigour and activity to its associating power™ (Essay on Genius,
pp. “).
±· It should be noted here that Sidney™s sense of ˜genius™ approximates
to the older, pre-Romantic sense of a characteristic disposition or qual-
ity of character, though that itself suggested further an innate ability or
capacity.
± Sidney, Apologie for Poetrie, p. ± (insertion added).
± Francis Bacon, The Two Bookes of Francis Bacon of the Pro¬cience and Advancement
of Learning Divine and Humane. The Works of Francis Bacon, eds. James Spedding,
Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath (London, ±µ·“), vol. © © ©,
p. .
° Ibid., p. .
± Ibid., p. .
 As Bacon puts it, ˜knowledges are as pyramides, whereof history is the basis
[ . . . ]™ (ibid., p. µ).
 Ibid., pp. “.
 Ibid., pp. “. For further discussion of this question, see, for example:
Murray Bundy, ˜Bacon™s True Opinion of Poetry™, Studies in Philology · (±°),
and John Harrison, ˜Bacon™s View of Rhetoric, Poetry, and the Imagination™,
The Huntington Library Quarterly ° (±µ·).
 Notes to pages ± “µ
µ See Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Soliloquy: or Advice to
an Author, Characteristics, vol. ©, p. °: ˜[t]he most ingenious way of becoming
foolish, is by a System™.
 In The Moralists, Philocles rhapsodizes to Palemon: ˜And of this Mind ™tis
enough to say, “That it is something which acts upon a Body, and has
something passive under it [ . . . ]” ™ (ibid., vol. ©© , pp. µ“µ). Later, Theocles
remarks that ˜™Tis Mind alone which forms™ (ibid., p. °µ).
· Ibid., pp. µ“.
 To Theocles in The Moralists, Beauty was ˜never in the Matter, but in the Art
and Design; never in Body it-self, but in the Form or Forming Power™ (ibid., p. °µ) “
a power which man retains in his nature as one of ˜the Forms which form™,
intermediate between the ˜dead Forms™ of matter and the ˜Order of Supreme
and Sovereign Beauty™ (ibid., p. °).
 Ibid., vol. ©©©, pp. ±“.
° Ibid., p. ±µ. He also goes as far as to claim that ˜E ® Conscience, I fear, such
as is owing to religious Discipline, will make but a slight Figure, where this
T  is set amiss™ (ibid., p. ±··).
± Ibid., vol. © , p. ±. The concept of ˜poetic truth™, indeed, becomes something
of a tautology in Shaftesbury.
 Ibid., p. °·.
 Ibid., pp. ±“µ.
 Ibid., vol. ©©©, p. .
µ Ibid., p. ·.
 Dennis, Critical Works, vol. ©, p. ±·.
· Ibid., p. .
 Compare Addison™s account of genius™s ability to ˜raise a pleasing kind of
Horrour in the Mind of the Reader, and amuse his Imagination with the
Strangeness and Novelty of the Persons who are represented in them™ (The
Spectator, ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, ±µ), vol. © © © ,
pp. µ·°“±).
 Dennis, Critical Works, vol. © , pp. µ“.
° Edward Niles Hooker, introduction, Critical Works by John Dennis, vol. © ,
p. cxxiii.
± [Edmund Burke], A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime
and Beautiful, nd edn (Scolar Press, Ltd, ±·°), pp. ±µ“±.
 As Burke phrases it, ˜[w]hen we go but one step beyond the immediately
sensible qualities of things, we go out of our depth™ (ibid., p. ). However,
even Burke™s empirical method, as Walter Hipple Jr notes (The Beautiful,
The Sublime, and The Picturesque in Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetic Theory
(Carbondale: The Southern Illinois University Press, ±µ·), p. µ), is not
straightforward enumerative induction, but what John Stuart Mill labelled
the inverse deductive method, whereby empirical generalization is veri-
¬ed against provisional a priori principles (which are themselves subject to
revision).
 Burke, Philosophical Enquiry, pp. µ“°.
Notes to pages µ“ 
 See ibid., p. ·: ˜sublime objects are vast in their dimensions, beautiful ones
comparatively small [ . . . ]™.
µ Ibid., p. ±.
 Ibid., p. °.
· Ibid., p. .
 Ibid., p. .
 Ferguson, Solitude and the Sublime, p. ±°.
µ° On the vexed question as to what Locke intended by ˜idea™, I see no rea-
son to disagree with Michael Ayers™s view as expressed in Locke: Epistemology
and Ontology (Routledge, ±) that ˜[d]espite the relative unpopularity of an
af¬rmative answer, the grounds for holding him [Locke] an imagist are con-
clusive™ (vol. ©, p. ). See, for example, Locke™s allusion to ˜[t]he Pictures drawn
in our Minds ( . . . ) laid in fading Colours™ (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford University Press, ±·µ), p. ±µ).
µ± Ibid., p. ±±.
µ Ibid., p. ±°µ.
µ Ibid., p. ±±.
µ Ibid., p. ±µ°. The rest of this passage has drawn much attention. However,
Locke™s claim that in the recollection of ideas, ˜the Mind is oftentimes more than
barely passive™, and that it is in this activity which ˜consists that which we call
Invention, Fancy, and quickness of Parts™, does not amount to a real defence of
creativity. The important point here is that even recollected ideas are ˜none
of them new ones™; nor do they constitute a discrete form of truth (ibid.,
pp. ±µ“).
µµ Ibid., pp. ±µ“·.
µ Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Hackett, ±), p. .
µ· See ibid., pp. “: ˜  ® , in this sense, is nothing but reckoning (that is,
adding and subtracting) of the consequences of general names agreed upon
for the marking and signifying of our thoughts [ . . . ].™
µ Ibid., p. ±.
µ Ibid., p. .
° Ibid., p. ·.
± Locke, Essay, p. µ.
 Ibid., pp. µ“.
 See Locke, Essay, p. µ: ˜since consciousness always accompanies thinking,
and ™tis that, that makes every one to be, what he calls self ; and thereby
distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists
personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational Being [ . . . ]™.
 Examples of this legacy are Bolingbroke™s attack upon ˜imaginative™ philoso-
phers like Plato in his ¬rst essay to Pope: ˜all they have done has been to
vend us poetry for philosophy, and to multiply systems of imagination™ (Henry
St. John, The Works of Lord Bolingbroke (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, ±±),
vol. ©© ©, p. ·±) “ and his denigration of genius, ˜a blazing meteor, irregular
in his course, and dangerous in his approach; of no use to any system, and
able to destroy any™ (ibid., vol. ©©, p. ±·).
 Notes to pages “
µ Hume, Treatise, p. .
 Ibid., p. ±. However, Georges Dicker notes in Hume™s Epistemology and Meta-
physics (Routledge, ±) that Hume has ˜two different and incompatible
criteria for distinguishing between impressions of sensation and ideas: his
of¬cial criterion of “force and vivacity”, and the implicit and unacknowl-
edged criterion of objectivity™ (p. ).
· Hume, Treatise, p. .
 Ibid., pp. ±°“±±.
 Ibid., pp. ±°,  (emphasis added).
·° Ibid., p. µ.
·± Hume, Enquiries, p. µ.
· Hume, Treatise, p. .
· Ibid., pp. “.
· See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Monadology (±·±), Philosophical Writings, ed.
G. H. R. Parkinson (London: Dent, ±°), p. ±: ˜the principle of suf¬cient
reason, [is that] by virtue of which we consider that no fact can be real or
existing and no proposition can be true unless there is a suf¬cient reason,
why it should be thus and not otherwise [ . . . ].™
·µ Hume, Treatise, p. ·.
· Ibid., p. ±µ. See Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume
(Macmillan, ±±).
·· Robert J. Fogelin, Hume™s Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature (Routledge
and Kegan Paul, ±µ), p. ±µ°.
· H. O. Mounce, Hume™s Naturalism (Routledge, ±), pp. ±±, .
· Hume, Treatise, p. .
° Donald Davidson, ˜On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme™, Post-Analytic
Philosophy, p. ±.
± Rorty, Mirror, p. ±.
 Roderick M. Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press,±), p. ±.
 Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge University Press, ±±),
p. ±±°.
 See de Man, Blindness and Insight, p. ±: ˜what they call anthropology, linguis-
tics, psychoanalysis is nothing but literature reappearing, like the Hydra™s
head, in the very spot where it had supposedly been suppressed™.
µ Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue;
In Two Treatises, th edn (London, ±·), p. xii (emphasis added).
 Ibid., pp. xiii, xvi.
· Ibid., pp. ±“±µ.
 Ibid., p. °.
 In the Preface to the Inquiry, Hutcheson identi¬es, as well as the internal sense
of beauty, ˜another superior Sense, natural also to Men, determining them to be
pleas™d with Actions, Characters, Affections. This is the Moral Sense™ (ibid., p. xvi).
° Ibid., p. ±°.
± Ibid., p. .
Notes to pages “µ± µ
 More conservative or Neoclassical theorists saw in inner sense a possible
block to the sceptical effects of association. Kames, for instance, ranks
the senses according to a ˜principle of order™ (Henry Home, Elements
of Criticism, th edn (Routledge/Thoemmes Press, ±), vol. © , p. )
in perception based on re¬nement (p. ). Gerard, (An Essay on Taste, rd
edn (Gainsville: Scholars™ Facsimiles and Reprints, ±)) while occasion-
ally adopting the language of the ˜internal or re¬‚ex senses™ (p. ±), eventually
¬nds ˜that the internal senses are not ultimate principles, because all their
ph¦nomena can be accounted for, by simpler qualities of the mind [i.e.
external senses]™ (p. ±·). Later, Francis Jeffrey was to reject outright the
notion that the sense of beauty might be a single sensation, or a kind
of ˜sixth sense™ (Contributions to the Edinburgh Review (London, ±), vol. ©,
pp. “µ), arguing that it depends entirely upon ˜the accidental relations™ of
association (p. ±±).
 Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense,
th edn (Bristol: Thoemmes, ±°), pp. iv“v.
 Shaftesbury, Characteristics, vol. ©, p. ±. To Shaftesbury, sensus communis is
a moral intuition linked to ˜the Love of Mankind™ (ibid., p. ±). Despite the
manifold differences between this position and that of Reid, Shaftesbury™s
wariness of the direction of Lockean empiricism, and its implications for
moral philosophy, is similar to that of the Scottish philosopher.
µ Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (Edinburgh, ±·µ),
p. µ.
 Reid, Common Sense, p. vii. See also Intellectual Powers: ˜I believe ideas, take in
this sense, to be a mere ¬ction of Philosophers™ (p. ·).
· Ibid., p. µ.
 Reid, Common Sense, p. .
 Ibid., p. ·µ.
±°° Ibid., p. ·.
±°± Reid, Intellectual Powers, pp.  (emphasis added), ±.
±° Ibid., pp. µ°“±.
±° Reid, Common Sense, pp. ±±“±.
±° For example, Coleridge™s articulation of the concept of inner sense in
Biographia Literaria needs to be read in the context of his debt to the
German philosophy of freedom. Philosophy, he argues, ˜is employed on
objects of the ©® ® ® , and cannot, like geometry, appropriate to ev-
ery construction a correspondent outward intuition™ (Biographia Literaria, vol. © ,
pp. µ°“±). Without this schema, inner sense is determined only by ˜an act
of freedom™ in the mind.
±°µ Elridge, Human Life, p. µ.
±° Martin Kallich, The Association of Ideas and Critical Theory in Eighteenth-Century
England: A History of a Psychological Method in English Criticism (The Hague:
Mouton, ±·°), p. .
±°· In Leviathan, Hobbes had identi¬ed the ˜Consequence, or T© ® of thoughts™
which constitutes ˜mental discourse™, appearing as either a ˜wild ranging of
 Notes to pages µ± “µ
the mind™ (p. ±) or as ˜regulated by some desire, and design™ (p. ±). Locke,
however, condemned association in the Essay as ˜a Weakness to which all men
are so liable™ (p. µ). As Kallich observes (Association, p. ), it is something
of a paradox that while Hobbes™s is the more tolerant view, it was Locke™s
analysis of the processes of association that was to in¬‚uence later positivists
like Hartley.
±° Hume, Treatise, p. ±°.
±° This is the distinction deployed by Coleridge in his attack on Hartley in
chapter  of Biographia Literaria. By making the contemporaneity of ideas a
constitutive condition of knowledge, Hartley turns reason and will into the
mere ˜creatures™ of association (Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. ±±°).
±±° Theodore Huguelet, introduction, Observations on Man, His Frame, His
Duty, and His Expectations, by David Hartley (Gainesville, Florida: Scholars™
Facsimiles and Reprints, ±), vol. © , p. viii.
±±± The eighth ˜proposition™ of Observations is that ˜Sensations, by being often
repeated, leave certain Vestiges, Types, or Images, of themselves, which may
be called, Simple Ideas of Sensation™ (p. µ).
±± Ibid., p. µ.
±± See ibid., p. : ˜It may be proper to remark here, that I do not, by thus as-
cribing the Performance of Sensation to Vibrations excited in the medullary
Substance, in the least presume to assert, or intimate, that Matter can be
indued with the Power of Sensation.™
±± Ibid., p. .
±±µ See the tenth proposition of Observations: ˜Any Sensations A, B, C, &c. by
being associated with one another a suf¬cient Number of Times, get such a
Power over the corresponding Ideas a, b, c, &c. that any one of the Sensations

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