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of others in two different and discrete ways rather than in one uni¬ed way™.
 Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©© , p. ±±·.
· Hazlitt, ˜Madame de Sta¨ l™s Account of German Philosophy and Literature,™
e
The Morning Chronicle,  March ±±, Works, vol. , p. .
 See, for example, Hazlitt™s preface to the Abridgement of the Light of Nature
Pursued. Works, vol. ©, p. ±°: Tucker, Hazlitt claims, ˜believed with professor
Kant in the unity of consciousness, or ˜that the mind alone is formative™
[ . . . ].™ A. F. M. Willich™s Elements of the Critical Philosophy was published in
London in ±·.
 In ˜The Literature of Power™, for example, Jonathan Bate distinguishes De
Quincey™s Wordsworthian, affective notion of power from Hazlitt™s more
˜sinister™ and ˜political™ sense, adding that ˜[t]he fact that for one hundred
and ¬fty years it was De Quincey™s, not Hazlitt™s, sense of “power” which
held sway in literary criticism goes a long way to explain the ardour of recent
attacks on criticism™s claims to be above ideology™ (p. ±).
±° Uttara Natarajan, Hazlitt and the Reach of Sense: Criticism, Morals and the
Metaphysics of Power (Oxford University Press, ±), pp. , ·.
±± Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©© , p. ±°.
± Tom Paulin, in The Day-Star of Liberty, notes that ˜[t]he word “dry” [ . . . ] is
a signi¬cant critical term in Hazlitt™s writing [ . . . ]™ (p. ±), expressing at
times ˜his detestation of all that is ¬xed [ . . . ] concrete, or literal™ (p. ±µ±) and
yet at others ˜an af¬rmation of physicality, a sort of worked thingness in prose
[ . . . ]™ (p. ±).
± Hazlitt, ˜Coriolanus™, Works, vol. , p. ·.
± Ibid., vol. ©, pp. “·.
±µ See Paulin, Day-Star of Liberty, p. ±.
± Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©© , pp. “·.
±· Ibid., vol. , p. ·±.
 Notes to pages ±±°“±±
± Locke, Essay, p. µ.
± George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. The
Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne, eds. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop
(London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, ±), vol. ©© , p. .
° Ibid., p. .
± Ibid., p. ·.
 Hume, Treatise, p. ±.
 Ibid., pp. ±µ“.
 Ibid., p. ±·.
µ Ibid., p. µ··.
 See Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©, p. ±: ˜Abstraction is a trick to supply the defect
of comprehension. The moulds of the understanding may be said not to be
large enough to contain the gross concrete objects of nature, but will still
admit of their names, and descriptions, and general forms, which lie ¬‚atter
and closer in the brain, and are more easily managed.™
· Hazlitt™s debt to Hume has been a hotly contested issue over the years.
Elizabeth Schneider™s contention that to Hume ˜he owed a good deal in
general outlook, though probably not in speci¬c points™ (Aesthetics of William
Hazlitt, p. °), is supported by David Bromwich™s claim that the critic ˜argues
as a thinking disciple of Hume™ (Mind of a Critic, p. ±). John Mahoney,
meanwhile, notes that Hazlitt was reading the Treatise while in the process
of composing the Essay (Logic of Passion, p. °), adding that Hazlitt™s basic
philosophical outlook ˜is on the one hand solidly grounded in [ . . . ] the
British empirical tradition, and yet on the other a sharp rejoinder to that
tradition™ (ibid., p. ). My own position is that what Hazlitt inherited from
Hume was a predicament or a dilemma rather than a creed.
 Hazlitt, ˜On Abstract Ideas™, Works, vol. ©© , p. ±±.
 Ibid., p. °.
° Ibid., p. ±.
± Ibid., vol. ©, p. ±·.
 See ibid., vol. ©©, p. °: ˜The knowledge upon which our ideas rest is general,
and the only difference between abstract and particular, is that of being more
or less general.™
 Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (±µ) (Harvard University
Press, ±·), p. ·.
 Sellars, Empiricism, p. ±.
µ See John Horne Tooke, The Diversions of Purley, ed. Richard Taylor, rev. edn,
 vols. (London, ±), vol. ©, p. : ˜The business of the mind [ . . . ] extends
no farther than to receive impressions, that is, to have Sensations or Feelings.
What are called its operations, are merely the operations of Language.
A consideration of Ideas [ . . . ] will lead us no farther than to Nouns: i.e.
the signs of these impressions, or names of ideas.™
 Natarajan, Reach of Sense, p. ±.
· Ibid., pp. , °.
 Davidson, ˜On the Very Idea™, p. ±µ.
Notes to pages ±±“± ·
 Sellars, Empiricism, p. .
° Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©© , p. .
± Paulin, Day-Star of Liberty, p. µ.
 Hazlitt, Works, vol. © , p. .
 A. C. Grayling, The Quarrel of the Age: The Life and Times of William Hazlitt
(Weidenfeld and Nicolson, °°°), pp. “.
 Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©, p. .
µ Ibid., p. µ.
 Ibid., pp. ·±“.
· Ibid., p. ±.
 Roy Park argues that Hazlitt™s theory of abstraction breaks new ground by
denying, pace Locke and Hume, that all abstraction is a result of generalization
(Spirit of the Age, p. ). Instead, Park claims, Hazlitt adopts a particularist
view which, like that of Blake, stemmed from his concrete experience as a
painter: ˜In Hazlitt™s view, as indeed in the view of most painters, no two
leaves, no two grains of sand are alike. Each is composed of an in¬nity of
parts™ (ibid., p. ±°°). Yet Hazlitt™s epistemology depends upon the premise
that, as he puts it, the ˜knowledge upon which our ideas rest is general, and
the only difference between abstract and particular, is that of being more or
less general™ (˜On Abstract Ideas™, Works, vol. © © , p. °). While it is certainly
true that Hazlitt retained a corpuscularian view about reality, it is the very
gap between this atomistic, indeterminate ˜external™ world, and the uni¬ed
world of consciousness ˜within™ which his theory of abstraction is designed
to bridge; that is, how the ˜manifold™ forms of things in nature ˜become
one by being united in the same common principle of thought™ (ibid., vol. ©,
p. ·±).
 Ibid., vol. , p. .
µ° Ibid., p. .
µ± Ibid., p. µ.
µ Ibid., vol. © , pp. ±“.
µ Ibid., vol. © ©, p. ±±·.
µ Hazlitt, ˜On Locke™s “Essay on the Human Understanding” ™, Works, vol. © © ,
p. ±µ±.
µµ A. F. M. Willich, Elements of the Critical Philosophy (London, ±·).
µ See Preface to an Abridgement of the Light of Nature Pusued: Tucker, according
to Hazlitt, ˜believed with professor Kant in the unity of consciousness, or
“that the mind alone is formative” ™ (Works, vol. ©, p. ±°). See also his review
of Madame de Sta¨ l for The Morning Chronicle: the necessity of the ˜super-
e
intending faculty™ (ibid., vol. , p. µ) of understanding for the unity of
experience demonstrates that ˜[t]he mind alone is formative, to use the expres-
sion of Kant™ (ibid., p. ). However, Hazlitt™s belief in ±°· that Tucker™s
notion of the coalesence of association might be suf¬cient for the unity of
mental representations was not a secure one.
µ· Ibid., vol. © ©, p. ±.
µ Ibid., p. ±±·.
 Notes to pages ±“±°
µ Ibid., vol. , p. .
° Ibid., vol. © , p. ±·.
± Park argues that Hazlitt™s work differs radically from that of Coleridge inso-
far as it forgoes the attempt to distinguish poetry from (empirical) science;
removing it instead from all forms of knowledge, and marking it as
non-af¬rmative: poetry has no truth-value, because it does not make state-
ments. Instead, it offers the reader or listener a ˜middle way™ (Spirit of the Age,
p. µ), and gives one a feeling for the ineffable aspects of existence; or, as Park
puts it, the ˜experiential™ (ibid., p. ·).
 Hazlitt, ˜Prejudice™, Works, vol. , p. ±.
 Ibid., vol.  ©©, p. .
 Ibid., vol. ©©©, p. .
µ Ibid., vol. ©, pp. ±“.
 Reid, Inquiry, p. .
· Ibid., p. .
 Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©, pp. ±“µ.
 See Jacobi, supplement, David Hume on Faith (±··), Main Philosophical Writings,
p. ±: Jacobi complains, with regard to Kant™s postulation of noumena, that
˜I must admit that I was held up not a little by this dif¬culty [ . . . ] viz. that
without that presupposition I could not enter into the system, but with it
I could not stay within it.™
·° Hazlitt, ˜Common Sense™, Works, vol. , pp. “°.
·± Ibid., vol. ©© ©, pp. µ“.
· Ibid., vol. ©© , p. ±±·.
· Hume, Treatise, pp. ±°“±±.
· Hartley, Observations, vol. ©, pp. µ“.
·µ Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©, p. µ.
· Ibid., pp. µ±“.
·· Ibid., p. ±·.
· Ibid., p. . He adds, in a typically candid moment, that ˜[i]f I am asked if
I conceive clearly how this is possible, I answer no: “ perhaps no one ever
will, or can. But I do understand clearly, that the other supposition [i.e.,
associationism] is an absurdity™ (ibid., p. ·°).
· Ibid., p. °.
° Ibid., p. µ.
± Tucker, Light of Nature, vol. © , p. .
 Ibid., pp. ±“±µ.
 Ibid., p. µ±.
 Hartley, Observations, vol. ©, pp. ±“.
µ Tucker, Light of Nature, vol. ©, p. .
 Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©© , p. µ±.
· Ibid., p. .
 Tucker, Light of Nature, vol. © , p. ±.
 Hazlitt, Works, vol. ©© , p. µ°.
° Ibid., vol. , p. °±.
Notes to pages ±± “± 
± Ibid., vol. © ©, pp. ±±“±·.
 See ibid., vol. © , p. .
 Ibid., vol. ©© , p. ±·.
 Ibid., p. ±.
µ Ibid., pp. ±µ“.
 Ibid., p. ±±.
· Prior to Natarajan, John Kinnaird had claimed in William Hazlitt: Critic of
Power that Hazlitt™s notion of power ˜is the informing vision of all his criticism™
(p. viii).
 Hazlitt, Works, vol. © , p. ±.
 Ibid., p. ±°.
±°° Ibid., vol. , pp. ±“±.
±°± [Hazlitt?], ˜Coleridge™s Literary Life™, Works, vol. © , p. ±. In an editorial
note, P. P. Howe (ibid., p. µ) points out that Jeffrey claimed the authorship
of all of ˜Coleridge™s Literary Life™, even though parts of it were republished
by Hazlitt elsewhere, and argues that ˜[f]ew, if any, articles in the present
volume are entirely free from Jeffrey™s editorial touches™ (ibid., p. °).
±° Ibid., vol. , p. ± (emphasis added).
±° Hazlitt™s misunderstanding of the signi¬cance of ˜Kant™s notions a priori™ has
been discussed before, most notably by Ren´ Wellek in Immanuel Kant in
e
England ±·“± (Princeton University Press, ±±), pp. ±“·.
±° This does not remove Hazlitt™s epistemic ambivalence, merely inverts it. As
W. P. Albrecht notes, ˜[w]hereas the Essay and Hazlitt™s political writings
stress the moral, sympathizing quality of the imagination, his critical essays
emphasize its creative, truth-¬nding power™ (Creative Imagination, p. ·). Yet at
the same time, in his writing on aesthetics and art Hazlitt is less concerned
to curb the notion of power as such.
±°µ Park, Spirit of the Age, p. ±.
±° Natarajan, Reach of Sense, p. . In ˜Power and Capability: Hazlitt, Keats
and the Discrimination of Poetic Self ™, Romanticism .± (±), Natarajan
notes the ˜bigotry™ which Hazlitt attributes to genius; an innate bias or
predisposition to view the world in a given way which is singular and
exclusive, guaranteeing in itself no access to knowledge (pp. µ·“). Instead, it
is a form of power which represents ˜a kind of tyranny: the colonisation and
subjection of lesser understandings by the powerful assertion of an individual
ego™ (ibid., p. µ).
±°· Hazlitt, Works, vol.  ©©© , p. .
±° Ibid., vol. , p. °.
±° Ibid., vol. ©©©, p. .
±±° Ibid., p. ±.
±±± Ibid., p. .
±± Ibid., vol. , p. ·.
±± Ibid., p. .
±± Ibid., vol.  , pp. ±“µ.
±±µ Ibid., p. .
° Notes to pages ±·“±·
±± Ibid., vol. , p. .
±±· Ibid., vol.  , p. .
±± Ibid., p. ° (emphasis added).
±± Ibid., p. ±.
±° Ibid., pp. ·“.
±± Ibid., vol. , pp. “°.
± Ibid., vol.  , p. .
± Ibid., vol. © ©©, p. ·.
± Ibid., pp. “.
±µ See Harold Bloom, Agon: Towards a Theory of Revisionism (Oxford University
Press, ±), p. ±·: ˜I have come to a conviction that the love of poetry is
another variant of the love of power, a conviction in which I am happy to
note I have been preceded by Hazlitt.™
± Hazlitt, Works : ±.
±· Ibid., p. µ.
± Ibid., p. ·.
± See ibid., vol.  ©© , p. °: ˜Burke was so far right in saying that it is no
objection to an institution, that it is founded in prejudice, but the contrary, if
that prejudice is natural and right; that is, if it arises from those circumstances
which are properly subjects of feeling and association, not from any defect
or perversion of the understanding in those things which fall strictly under
its jurisdiction.™
±° Hazlitt, Works, vol. © , p. ±.
±± Ibid., vol. ©© , pp. ±±“±.
± Ibid., vol. ©©©, p. .
± Ibid., vol. © , p. µ.

  ¬© ¤§  ® ¤   ®· ¦µ ®¤ ©®¬© 
± Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. ©, pp. “·.
 Bowie, Romanticism, p. ±.
 See Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism, p. : Abrams represents Wordsworth™s
˜high argument™ as a way of communicating the power of mind ˜to create
out of the world of all of us, in a quotidian and recurrent miracle, a new
world which is the equivalent of paradise™.
 Coleridge, ˜To Thomas Poole™, ± March ±°±, letter · of Letters, vol. © © ,
pp. ·°“·.
µ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. ±.
 Coleridge, Logic, ed. J. R. de J. Jackson (Princeton University Press, ±±),
p. ±.
· In particular, G. N. G. Orsini, Coleridge and German Idealism (Carbondale and
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, ±).
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © ©, p. .
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lectures ±±“±±: On the History of Philosophy, ed.
J. R. de J. Jackson (Princeton University Press, °°°), vol. © © , p. µ.
Notes to pages ±“±µ ±
±° I say ˜ungenial™ to distinguish this view from Seamus Perry™s ˜third course™
for Coleridge scholarship, presented in Coleridge and the Uses of Division
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, ±), which despite ˜accepting his failure as
just that™ (p. ) sees Coleridgean ambiguity and indecision as ˜an example of
muddle in its nobler aspect, a whole-hearted dealing with intractables™ (p. ).
±± Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. ±.
± Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson (Basil Blackwell, ±), p. ·°.
± Coleridge, Logic, p. ±.
± Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. ±±.
±µ Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, trans. and ed. Gary
Hat¬eld (Cambridge University Press, ±·), p. ±·.
± Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin, nd edn
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, ±µ), p. vi.
±· Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. ±.
± Ibid., p. ±µ.
± Kant, Prolegomena, p. ·.
° Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. ±µµ.
± Coleridge, Lectures ±°“±± On Literature, ed. R. A. Foakes,  vols. (Princeton
University Press, ±·), vol. © , p. ±.
 Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic, p. .
 A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, nd edn, ± (Penguin Books, ±°),
p. .
 Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, nd edn (University of Chicago Press,
±µ), p. .
µ Quine, Word and Object, p. .
 W. V. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, nd edn (Harvard University Press,
±°), p. ·.
· See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, nd edn, trans. G. E.
M. Anscombe (Basil Blackwell, ±µ), p. µ±; par. ±, ˜There is not a phil-
osophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different
therapies.™
 Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts (Blackwell, ±±), pp. xiv“xv.
 Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Harvard University
Press, ±µ), p. ±µ.
° Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism (The MIT Press, ±), p. ±±.
± Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische Schriften und Fragmente ±“ (Paderborn: Ferdinand
Sch¨ ningh, ±), vol. ©© , p. ±µ. Quoted in Bowie, Romanticism, p. µ.
o
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. ©, p. °.
 Coleridge, The Friend, vol. © , pp. ±“.
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. ©©, p. .
µ Ibid., vol. © , p. °. As the editors note here, by this Coleridge probably had
in mind the work he was to take up later in the ˜Logic™ and ˜Opus Maximum™
manuscripts.
 Ibid., p. .
 Notes to pages ±µ“±µ
· See Thomas McFarland, Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, ±), p. ±: ˜Coleridge™s connexion with Kant only becomes
meaningful in terms of the counter-pull of Spinoza [ . . . ].™
 Orsini, Coleridge, p. °µ.
 For a reading of Biographia Literaria as re¬‚exively and ironically enacting
its own imaginative metaphysics, and thereby executing ˜a transcendental
deduction of mind in aesthetic terms™, see Kathleen Wheeler, Sources, Pro-
cesses and Methods in Coleridge™s Biographia Literaria (Cambridge, ±°), p. ±µ·.
Paul Hamilton has claimed in Coleridge™s Poetics (Oxford, ±), however, that
Coleridge™s ˜ideas on desynonymy, repressed in Biographia, are the clue to
his missing theory [ . . . ]™ (p. ±). More recently Tim Fulford has argued
in Coleridge™s Figurative Language (London, ±±) that Coleridge saw ¬gura-
tive language as an embodiment of intellectual intuition. Additionally, for
a thorough defence of the logos as forming the apex of Coleridge™s phil-
osophy after ±°µ, see Mary Anne Perkins, Coleridge™s Philosophy. The Logos
as Unifying Principle (Oxford, ±). Perkins™s view that ˜Coleridge™s thought
is, taken as a whole, integrated and coherent™ (p. ±°) is similar to Nicholas
Reid™s contention in ˜Coleridge and Schelling: The Missing Transcendental
Deduction™, Studies in Romanticism,  (±), that ˜a stable, coherent and sys-
tematic philosophy is evident in his writings from September ±± onwards™
(µ), in that both continue the attempt made over the past quarter of a
century to repair the damage in¬‚icted upon Coleridge™s philosophical rep-
utation by Kantian-orientated critics such as Ren´ Wellek in Immanuel Kant
e
in England ±·“± (Princeton, N.J., ±±), and (more damagingly still)
by accusations of plagiarism; for which, see Norman Fruman, The Damaged
Archangel (New York, ±·±).
° Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. µ.
± Ibid., vol. ©© , p. ±µ.
 Ibid., pp. “.
 Ibid., p. .
 Thomas Pfau, ˜Excursus: Schelling in the Work of S.T. Coleridge™, Idealism
and the Endgame of Theory, by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, trans.
and ed. Thomas Pfau (State University of New York Press, ±), p. ·µ.
µ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism
(±°°), trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia,
±·), p. °.
 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, On the History of Modern Philos-
ophy, trans. and ed. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge University Press, ±),
pp. ±µ“.
· Schelling (History, p. ±µ) maintains that the ˜¬rst declaration in philosophy
(which even precedes philosophy) can in fact only be the expression of a
wanting™.
 Schelling, History, p. µ.
 Elridge, Human Life, p. µ.
µ° McFarland, Coleridge, p. ±·.
Notes to pages ±µ“± 
µ± See, for example, John A. Hodgson, Coleridge, Shelley, and Transcendental Inquiry
(University of Nebraska Press, ±). Hodgson applies the term ˜transcen-
dental™ indifferently to Freud, Coleridge and Shelley, and ˜to arguments and
tropes of mind no less than of God, to querying of inner no less than of outer
noumena™, as a ˜practice [ . . . ] genuinely and broadly Romantic [ . . . ]™
(p. xv).
µ Transcendental argument returned to prominence during the ±°s and
™·°s, largely due to its anti-sceptical use in P. F. Strawson™s Individuals
(London: Methuen, ±µ). It has also been used by Wittgenstein, Austin and
Davidson.
µ Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , pp. “.
µ Ibid., p. ·.
µµ This is a far more telling difference between the positions of the two than
it might at ¬rst appear: Coleridge™s idea of what our ˜intellectual faculties™
are capable of outreaches Kant™s limitation of what can possibly constitute
experience.
µ Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. ©, p. .
µ· Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. ±.
µ Ibid., p. ±±.
µ Ibid., p. ±.
° Ibid., p. ±·.
± See ibid., p. ±: ˜The real problem of pure reason is now contained in the
question: How are synthetic judgements a priori possible?™
 Robert Paul Wolff, Kant™s Theory of Mental Activity (Harvard University Press,
±), p. µ°. Similar arguments have been made against Strawson. See, for
example: T. E. Wilkerson, ˜Transcendental Arguments™, Philosophical Quarterly
° (±·°), °°“±.
 Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge University Press,
±·), p. .
 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. , µ.
µ Guyer, Claims of Knowledge, p. µ.
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. µ±.
· Ibid., pp. ·°“.
 Ibid., p. ±.
 See Elinor S. Shaffer, ˜The “Postulates in Philosophy” in the Biographia Lit-
eraria™, Comparative Literature Studies · (±·°), ·“±. Shaffer argues that
the issue of philosophical postulates in Biographia marks the point at which
Coleridge shares more ground with Kant™s critical epistemology than the
˜aesthetic usurpation™ of Schelling (°).
·° Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. ±. Cf. The Friend, vol. © , p. ±·: ˜the
eye must exist previous to any particular act of seeing, though by sight only
can we know that we have eyes™.
·± Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , pp. ±±“.
· Coleridge, Logic, p. ±·.
· Ibid., p. °µ.
 Notes to pages ±“±
· Ibid., p. °. For J. H. Muirhead™s view of this issue, see Coleridge as Philosopher
(London: George Allen and Unwin, ±°), p. .
·µ Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. .
· Cf. Kant™s footnote in the preface to the second edition of the ¬rst Critique,
in which he likens his method to that of Copernicus, beginning with a
˜hypothesis [ . . . ] in a manner contradictory to the senses™ which will later
˜be proved not hypothetically but rather apodictically from the constitution
of our representations of space and time and from the elementary concepts
of understanding™ (Critique of Pure Reason, p. ±±).

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