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·· Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ˜On Poesy or Art™, Biographia Literaria, ed.
J. Shawcross (Oxford University Press, ±°·), vol. © ©, pp. µ“µ.
· Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lectures ±°“±± on Literature, vol. ©© , p. ±.
· Coleridge, ˜On Poesy™, Shawcross, vol. ©© , p. µ·.
° Ibid., p. µ.
± Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © © , pp. ±µ“±.
 Pfau, Idealism, p. ·µ.
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. ©©, pp. “µ.
 Coleridge, ˜Essays on the Principles of Genial Criticism™, Shorter Works,
vol. © , p. µ.
µ Ibid., pp. ··“°.
 See Hume, ˜On the Standard of Taste™, Essays Moral, Political, and Literary
±·±“··, ed Eugene F. Miller, rev. edn (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, ±µ),
p. °: ˜It is evident that none of the rules of composition are ¬xed by
reasonings a priori [ . . . ].™
· Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, p. ±.
 See ibid., pp. ±“·: Kant maintains that ˜genius (±) is a talent for producing
that for which no determinate rule can be given [. . . and] consequently
that originality must be its primary characteristic. () That since there can
also be original nonsense, its products must at the same time be models,
i.e., exemplary, hence, while not themselves the result of imitation, they must
serve others that way, i.e., as a standard or rule for judging. () That it cannot
itself describe or indicate scienti¬cally how it brings its product into being,
but rather that it gives the rule as nature [ . . . ].™
 Ibid., p. .
° Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , pp. ±“µ.
± See Kant™s ˜Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgement™, Critique of the
Power of Judgement, p. : ˜But that things of nature serve one another as
means to ends [ . . . ] for that we have no basis at all in the general idea of
nature as the sum of the objects of the senses.™
 See Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
p. ±: To Bentham, the principle of utility ˜approves or disapproves of every
action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to
augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question
[ . . . ]™.
 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, p. .
Notes to pages ±“±· µ
 As Kant puts it, ˜beautiful art cannot itself think up the rule in accordance
with which it is to bring its product into being™: ˜[g]enius is the inborn
predisposition of the mind (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to
art™ (ibid., p. ±).
µ Guyer sees this as a virtue rather than a problem in Kant and the Claims of Taste
(Harvard University Press, ±·), p. ±°: ˜the analysis of aesthetic judgement
without the explanatory theory of the harmony of the faculties would be
empty, though the explanation without the analysis would surely be blind™.
 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, p. .
· Ibid., p. °.
 J. G. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John
Lachs (Cambridge University Press, ±), pp. ±±±“±.
 These have been discussed extensively in McFarland, Coleridge, esp. ch. .
±°° Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, trans.
Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford University Press,
±·), p. µ.
±°± Friedrich Schlegel, ˜From “Critical Fragments” ™, Origins of Modern Critical
Thought, p. ±°.
±° Bowie, Romanticism, p. ±µ.
±° See Coleridge, The Friend, vol. ©, p. µµ: Coleridge maintains that all sound
method supposes ˜a staple, or starting-post, in the narrator himself; [ . . . ]
the leading Thought, which, borrowing a phrase from the nomenclature of
legislation, we may not inaptly call the © ®© ©  ©™.
±° See ibid., p. µ·: ˜The term, Method, cannot [ . . . ] otherwise than by abuse,
be applied to a mere dead arrangement, containing in itself no principle of
progression.™
±°µ See ibid., pp. µ“°: ˜we contemplate it [i.e., law] as exclusively an attribute
of the Supreme Being, inseparable from the idea of God: adding, however,
that from the contemplation of law in this, its only perfect form, must be
derived all true insight into all other grounds and principles necessary to
Method, as the science common to all sciences [ . . . ]. Alienated from this
(intuition shall we call it? or stedfast [sic] faith?) ingenious men may pro-
duce schemes, conducive to the peculiar purposes of particular sciences,
but no scienti¬c system.™ Reconciling the claims of science/knowledge
and religion/faith was to become the chief project of Coleridge™s later
career.
±° See ibid., p. : Coleridge is relatively brief on Theory, ˜in which the
existing forms and qualities of objects, discovered by observation or exper-
iment, suggest a given arrangement of many under one point of view [ . . . ]
for the purposes of understanding, and in most instances of controlling,
them. In other words, all    supposes the general idea of cause and
effect.™
±°· Ibid., p. .
±° Ibid., p. µ.
±° Ibid., pp. ·“··.
 Notes to pages ±·“±·
±±° See ibid., p. : ˜Hence too, it will not surprise us, that Plato so often
calls ideas ¬© ©®§ ¬· , in which the mind has its whole true being and
permanence [ . . . ].™
±±± See ibid., pp. µ±µ“±. Namely, that unity which ˜is absolutely one, and that
it © ,and af¬rms itself  , is its only predicate. And yet this power,
nevertheless, is! In eminence of Being it IS! [ . . . ].™ The manifestation of
this is ˜¬ ©®™: ˜[a]nd the manifesting power, the source and the
correlative of the idea thus manifested “ is it not GOD?™
±± See ibid., pp. µ±“°: ˜But here it behoves us to bear in mind, that all true
reality has both its ground and its evidence in the will, without which as its
complement science itself is but an elaborate game of shadows, begins in
abstractions and ends in perplexity.™
±± Ibid., p. µ·.
±± See Schelling, History, p. ±: Hegel identi¬es knowing with what is within
the concept, Schelling claims, but ˜cognition is the Positive and only has
being (das Seyende), reality (das Wirkliche), as its object, whereas thinking just
has the possible [ . . . ]™. For Schopenhauer, however, knowledge must be
forsaken, not reconstructed: ˜For in everything in nature there is something
to which no ground can ever be assigned, for which no explanation is
possible [ . . . ]™ (The World as Will and Representation, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New
York: Dover, ±), vol. ©, p. ±).

µ   ® ¤  ¦ « ® ·¬¤§ : ¬ © ¤§  ® ¤  ° 
± Coleridge, ˜To John Kenyon™,  Nov. ±±, letter µ of Letters, vol. © © ©,
p. µ.
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Table Talk, ed. Carl Woodring (Princeton
University Press, ±°), vol. ©, p. .
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed.
Kathleen Coburn,  vols. to date (Routledge and Kegan Paul, ±µ·“ ),
vol. © , note µ°.
 It was such a doctrine as this that Coleridge repeatedly forecast in Biographia,
as when he claims that ˜[i]n the third treatise of my Logosophia [ . . . ] I shall
give (deo volente) the demonstrations and constructions of the Dynamic
Philosophy scienti¬cally arranged™ (Biographia Literaria, vol. ©, p. ).
µ Coleridge, Lectures on Philosophy, vol. © , p. ·.
 Ibid., pp. µ“°.
· In a letter to Hugh Rose, for instance, Coleridge outlines his plans ˜from
Philosophy to derive a Scientia Scientiarum, and by application of its
Principles and Laws a reversed arrangement of the Sciences: namely by
Descent instead of the hitherto plan by Ascent. ±. Theology. . Ethics. .
Metaphysics or Constructive Logic [ . . . ]™ (˜To Hugh J. Rose™,  May ±±,
letter ±± of Letters, vol. © , p. ).
 Perry, Uses of Division, p. .
 Coleridge, Table Talk, vol. © , p. ±.
Notes to pages ±·“±± ·
±° See Nigel Leask, The Politics of Imagination in Coleridge™s Political Thought
(Macmillan, ±), p. ±, for how this idea coincided with Coleridge™s
increasing interest in mystery cults.
±± Muirhead, Coleridge as Philosopher, p. ±±°. See also James D. Boulger, Coleridge as
a Religious Thinker (Yale University Press, ±±) for a description of Coleridge
as an Anglican ˜voluntarist traditionalist™ (p. ), and Raimonda Modiano,
Coleridge and the Concept of Nature (Macmillan, ±µ) for a discussion of
˜Coleridge™s voluntaristic philosophy™ (p. ±µ). Mary Anne Perkins observes
that ˜[h]is philosophy, despite its emphasis on Reason, cannot, owing to the
primacy which he attributes to the Will, be adequately categorized as idealist
or rationalist™ (p. ±±). However, Jerome Christensen notes in Coleridge™s Blessed
Machine of Language (Cornell University Press, ±±) that because of this ˜the
will never settles anything for Coleridge “ least of all its own recklessness™
(p. µ).
± S.V. Pradhan, ˜The Historiographer of Reason: Coleridge™s Philosophy of
History™, Studies in Romanticism µ.±: (±), p. µ.
± Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Shorter Works, vol. ©© , p. ±µ. In this passage, written
for Joseph Henry Green, Coleridge also claims that ˜The Ground of Man™s
nature is the Will in a form of Reason™ (vol. ©© , p. ±).
± See Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor, (Cambridge
University Press, ±): ˜the concept of a being that has free will is the con-
cept of a causa noumenon [ . . . ]™. ˜But because no intuition, which can only
be sensible, can be put under this application, causa noumenon with respect to
the theoretical use of reason is, though a possible, thinkable concept, nev-
ertheless an empty one™ (p. ±). Kant argues that concepts which cannot
be schematized in intuition, such as objective freedom “ which is simply
˜unconditioned causality™, ˜which for theoretical purposes would be transcen-
dent (extravagant)™ (p. ) “ can only be realized through the moral law, and
thus practically.
±µ See Kathleen Wheeler, ˜Coleridge™s Theory of Imagination: a Hegelian
Solution to Kant?™ The Interpretation of Belief: Coleridge, Schleiermacher and
Romanticism, ed. David Jasper (London, ±).
± Anthony J. Harding™s Coleridge and the Idea of Love (Cambridge University Press,
±·), p. ±, Stephen Prickett™s Coleridge and Wordsworth: The Poetry of Growth
(Cambridge University Press, ±·°), p. ±, and Modiano, Concept of Nature,
p. °, have each argued that combining the Christian idea of love to his
metaphysics of polarity provided Coleridge with a more sophisticated, value-
based model for solving such problems as the nature of personal identity and
divine activity. In Coleridge™s Philosophy, Perkins maintains that the same idea
takes Coleridge™s thought beyond both Kantian and Hegelian philosophy
(p. °).
±· Schelling, History, p. ±.
± Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. ©© , p. .
± Coleridge, ˜To Thomas Poole™, ± Oct. [±·]·, letter ±° of Letters, vol. © ,
p. µ.
 Notes to pages ±“±
° Coleridge, ˜To Robert Southey™, ° Sept. [±·], letter  of Letters, vol. ©,
p. µ.
± Coleridge, Notebooks, vol. © , note µµ.
 Ibid., vol. © ©© , note ·µ.
 Biographia frames Spinoza and Jacob Boehme as united in opposition to
the mechanistic philosophy of ˜¤  ™, and denies that Spinoza™s Ethics
is ˜in itself and essentially [ . . . ] incompatible with religion, natural or
revealed™ (Biographia Literaria, vol. ©, p. ±µ). However, by ±± Schelling and
Spinoza have jointly been implicated in the error of considering ˜Ens and
Non-Ens as having no possible intermediates or degrees™ (Notebooks, vol. © © © ,
note µ).
 Coleridge, Notebooks, vol. © , note ··.
µ Schelling, History, pp. ±“°.
 Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics. The Collected Works of Spinoza, trans and ed. Edwin
Curley (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, ±µ), vol. © , p. .
· Ibid., p. ·.
 Ibid., p. .
 Coleridge, Notebooks, vol. © , note .
° See Spinoza, Collected Works, vol. ©, p. µ: ˜the human Mind is part of the
in¬nite intellect of God™.
± To a coherentist like Quine, indeed, ˜[w]hat the empirical under-
determination of global science shows is that there are various defensible
ways of conceiving the world™ (Pursuit of Truth, ±°).
 Spinoza, Collected Works, vol. ©, pp. ·“.
 See ibid., pp. ··“: knowledge derived from ˜opinion or imagination™ is ˜the
only cause of falsity [ . . . ]™. The highest form of knowledge, meanwhile, is a
kind of intuitive reason, which ˜proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal
essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence
of things™. For further discussion of Spinoza™s theory of knowledge, see
G. H. R. Parkinson, Spinoza™s Theory of Knowledge (Oxford University Press,
±µ), pp. ±·“°, and E. M. Curley, ˜Experience in Spinoza™s Theory of
Knowledge™, Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Marjorie Grene
(University of Notre Dame Press, ±·), pp. µ“µ.
 See Coleridge, The Friend, vol. ©, p. ±. Coleridge here de¬nes genius ˜as
the faculty which adds to the existing stock of power, and knowledge by new
views, new combinations, &c.™
µ Ibid., p. ·.
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lay Sermons, ed. R. J. White (Princeton University
Press, ±·), p. .
· Coleridge, Table Talk, vol. © , p. .
 Coleridge, Lectures on Philosophy, vol. ©, p. ·.
 Ibid., vol. ©©, p. µ±.
° Coleridge, Notebooks, vol. ©© , editorial note ±.
± Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. ±µµ.
 Coleridge, Shorter Works, vol. ©©, p. ±°.
Notes to pages ±“±± 
 Coleridge, ˜To Mr. Pryce™, April ±±, letter ±± of Letters, vol. © , p. µ±.
 This has already been noted by at least one commentator. See D. M.
MacKinnon, ˜Coleridge and Kant™, Coleridge™s Variety: Bicentenary Studies, ed.
John Beer (Macmillan, ±·). MacKinnon observes that Coleridge ˜was
very wrong to regard the Dissertation as a summary of the ¬rst Kritik™ (ibid.,
p. ±), but ¬nds the misinterpretation understandable in view of the ˜extent
to which he found in the Dissertation an attempt to formulate the kind of
pure unfettered intellectual ascent to the ultimate which he desired™ (ibid.,
p. ±·).
µ Immanuel Kant, On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible
World [˜Inaugural Dissertation™], Theoretical Philosophy, ±·µµ“±··°, trans. and
ed. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge University Press, ±),
p. .
 Kant, Theoretical Philosophy, p. ·.
· Ibid., pp. °·“.
 See Biographia Literaria, vol. ©, pp. “.
 Coleridge, ˜To Thomas Poole™, ± March ±°±, letter · of Letters, vol. © © ,
p. ·°.
µ° Coleridge, ˜To Hugh J. Rose™,  May ±±, letter ±± of Letters, vol. © ,
p. .
µ± Coleridge, Aids to Re¬‚ection, p. °°.
µ Coleridge, Lectures on Philosophy, p. ·.
µ Coleridge, Logic, pp. ±µ“°.
µ Leibniz, ˜Metaphysical Consequences of the Principle of Reason™, Philosophi-
cal Writings, p. ±·.
µµ Leibniz, ˜Of Universal Synthesis and Analysis™, Philosophical Writings, p. ±°.
µ Coleridge, Lectures on Philosophy, vol. © ©, p. µµ.
µ· Coleridge, ˜To Mr. Pryce™, April ±±, letter ±± of Letters, vol. © , p. µ.
µ Descartes, Principles of Philosophy. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans.
and ed. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch and Anthony
Kenny (Cambridge University Press, ±“±), vol. ©, p. °.
µ Coleridge, Aids to Re¬‚ection, p. ±·µ.
° John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, ±°, rev. edn (Boston, Mass.: Beacon
Press, ±), p. ±±.
± William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (N.Y.:
Longmans Green and Co., ±°), p. .
 Coleridge, The Friend, vol. © , p. °.
 Ibid., p. .
 See Coleridge, Lay Sermons, p. : Religion considers the particular and uni-
versal as one, ˜[ h]ence in all the ages and countries of civilization Religion has
been the parent and fosterer of the Fine Arts, as of Poetry, Music, Painting,
and c. the common essence of which consists in a similar union of the
Universal and the Individual™.
µ Coleridge, Table Talk, vol. ©, p. ±·.
 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. ©© , p. .
µ° Notes to pages ±“±
· See Kant, Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals. Practical Philosophy, p. .
 Coleridge, Notebooks, vol. ©, note ±·±·.
 Ibid., vol. ©©©, note µ. See also Thesis  of ch. ±: Biographia Literaria,
vol. © , pp. ·“.
·° Ibid., p. ±± (emphasis added).
·± Ibid., p. °.
· Schelling, System, p. .
· Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and Other
Writings, ±··“±°°, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale (Indianapolis/
Cambridge: Hackett, ±), p. .
· See Fichte, Science of Knowledge, p. ±µ. To Fichte, the problem of knowledge
will be solved when the division between the self and its converse, the not-
self, can be seen to be resolved in the principle that ˜[t]he not-self is itself a
product of the self-determining self, and nothing at all absolute, or posited
outside the self ™, and that the realisation of this principle (which would mean
an intellectual intuition) can only be achieved practically.
·µ See Schelling, System, p. ±.
· Ibid., pp. µ“.
·· Ibid., pp. °“±.
· Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature as
Introduction to the Study of This Science, nd edn, trans. Errol E. Harris and Peter
Heath (Cambridge University Press, ±), p. . Thus, eternal knowing
produces three unities, or the ˜three potencies of Nature-philosophy [ . . . ]
the universal structure of the world [ . . . ] universal mechanism [. . . and] organism
[ . . . ]™ (p. µ±).
· Schelling, System, p. ·.
° Ibid., p. .
± Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. .
 Coleridge, Notebooks, vol. © , note µ.
 Coleridge, Aids to Re¬‚ection, p. .
 See Schelling, System, p. ·: ˜absolute freedom is identical with absolute
necessity™.
µ Coleridge, Aids to Re¬‚ection, p. .
 Ibid., p. .
· Coleridge, The Friend, vol. ©, p. ±.
 Coleridge, Lay Sermons, p. ±.
 Coleridge, The Friend, vol. © , p. ·.
° Ibid., p. 
± Coleridge, [˜On First Postulates in Philosophy™], Shorter Works, vol. ©,
p. ··µ.
 Coleridge, [˜On the Will™], Shorter Works, vol. © , pp. ···“°.
 Reid (˜Coleridge and Schelling™) claims that Coleridge moves away from a
correspondence theory of truth after Biographia (and thus from the purely
˜binary™ dialectic of subject and object in Schelling) and towards a
Trinitarian-based polarity in which the human will exists ¬nitely, and a
Notes to pages ±“° µ±
prothetic ˜Will is the ground of the Trinity, but [ . . . ] has no existence other
than in its existence as the Trinity [ . . . ]™ (p. ·). It remains to be explained,
however, how Coleridge can be said to have embraced a holistic or relational
view of truth while he maintains that there is such a ground of reality.
 Coleridge, The Friend, vol. © , pp. ±µµ“.
µ Coleridge, Aids to Re¬‚ection, p. ±·.
 Coleridge, The Friend, vol. © , p. ±µ·.
· Schopenhauer, World as Will, vol. ©© , p. µ·.
 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. .
 Coleridge, Lectures on Philosophy, p. .
±°° Ibid., p. °.
±°± Coleridge, Notebooks, vol. © , note µ.
±° Schopenhauer, World as Will, vol. © , p. .
±° Muirhead, Coleridge as Philosopher, pp. “.
±° See Gerald McNiece, The Knowledge that Endures: Coleridge, German Philosophy
and the Logic of Romantic Thought (Macmillan, ±), p. µ. Coleridge™s pro-
gression as a thinker, McNiece argues, follows that of post-Kantian ideal-
ism, culminating in Hegelianism, but ˜all the time professing an abiding alle-
giance to Kant™. Perkins claims that Coleridge™s ˜dialectical thinking™ means
that ˜his thought has more in common with Hegel™ (ibid., p. ·). Charles
De Paolo™s Coleridge: Historian of Ideas (University of Victoria, ±) and
James McKusick™s Coleridge™s Philosophy of Language (Yale University Press,
±) have traced dialectical method through Coleridge™s theories of history
(p. ±) and language (p. ) respectively. For a general appraisal of the func-
tion of dialecticism in Romanticism, see Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism,
pp. ±·“.
±°µ See Wheeler, ˜Coleridge™s Theory of Imagination™.
±° Ren´ Wellek, Immanuel Kant in England, p. °.
e
±°· Ibid., p. .
±° Arthur O. Lovejoy, ˜Coleridge and Kant™s Two Worlds™, Essays in the History
of Ideas (New York: George Braziller, ±µµ), p. ·.
±° Most notably, Thomas McFarland, whose main purpose in Coleridge
and the Pantheist Tradition was to defend the ˜organic unity™ of the
Coleridgean corpus (p. xxxvii). More recently, Perkins has identi¬ed the
˜Logos™ as ˜the unifying factor of Coleridge™s “system” ™ (Coleridge™s Philosophy,
p. ).
±±° For a discussion of ˜the Romantic, as opposed to the Idealist, view of the
post-Kantian situation™, see Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from
Kant to Nietzsche (Manchester University Press, ±°), ch. .
±±± Coleridge™s translation.
±± Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Marginalia, eds. George Whalley and H. J.
Jackson.,  vols. to date (Princeton University Press, ±°“ ), vol. © © ©,
pp. ·“.
±± Coleridge, Logic, p. ±.
±± Fichte, Science of Knowledge, pp. ±±±“±.
µ Notes to pages °“±±
±±µ See, for example, Coleridge, Lectures on Philosophy, vol. © © , pp. µµ“:
Coleridge describes desynonymy of language as ˜an organ and vehicle of
thought™, in which the duty of the philosopher is ˜to aid and complete
this process as his subject demands [ . . . ]™. For an exploration of desyn-
onymy and its relation to Coleridge™s aesthetic and political theory, see Paul
Hamilton, Coleridge™s Poetics.
±± See Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, ed. and
trans. Douglas W. Stott (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, ±),
p. ±·: Schelling notes the idealist™s perennial problem of particularity: how
can ˜a principle that is in and for itself absolutely one and simple [ . . . ] pass
over into multiplicity and differentiation™? His conclusion is based on the
view that ˜the universe is structured in two directions corresponding to the
two unities within the absolute™, which are together ˜essentially one™ (ibid.,
p. °±).
±±· Coleridge, The Friend, vol. ©, p. ·.
±± Coleridge, Notebooks, vol. © , note µ.
±± Coleridge, Marginalia, vol. ©©© , p. .
±° Coleridge, Aids to Re¬‚ection, p. ±·µ.
±± Ibid., p. ±°.
± Ibid., pp. ±°“±.
± Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. .
± Ibid., pp. ±“.
±µ Ibid., p. .
± Coleridge, Aids to Re¬‚ection, p. ±°.
±· Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. ±±. See also: George Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel, Hegel™s Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, ±µ), p. : ˜The method whereby, in philosophic science, the con-
cept develops out of itself [ . . . ] is a purely immanent progress, the engen-
dering of its determinations. Its advance is not effected by the assertion
that various things exist and then by the application of the universal to
extraneous material of that sort culled from elsewhere.™
± Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. © , p. .
± Dewey, Quest for Certainty, pp. ±°-±.

 ®¬µ ©® : ¬©¦ · ©  µ  «®· ¬¤§
± Hume, ˜The Sceptic™, Essays, p. ±°.
 Hume, Enquiries, p. ±µ.
 Charles and Mary Lamb, Letters, vol. © , p. ±.
 Jacobi, Main Philosophical Writings, p. µµ.
µ Schelling, History, p. ±µ.
 Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian
McLeod (University of Chicago Press, ±·), p. .
· Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, vol. ©© , p. ±.
 Coleridge, Aids to Re¬‚ection, pp. µ·, µ.
Notes to pages ±“±µ µ
 See James A. Notopolous, The Platonism of Shelley: A Study of Platonism and
the Poetic Mind (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, ±),
pp. ±“ and H. B. de Groot, ˜The Ouroboros and the Romantic
Poets: A Renaissance Emblem in Blake, Coleridge, and Shelley™, English
Studies µ° (±), µµ“. Abrams (Natural Supernaturalism, pp. ±“) dis-
cusses the symbol™s meaning to the Romantics in light of its origins in Plato,

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